burden to rebut presumption in Texas

2025See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97 .

2024See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97 .

2015Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2012Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2022Stults, 23 S.W.3d at 206 (citing Quinn, 958 S.W.2d at 401 ).

2019Stults, 23 S.W.3d at 206 ; see also Quinn, 958 S.W.2d at 401 .

2023“Content-based regulations (those laws that distinguish favored from disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed) are presumptively invalid, and the government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” Id.

2019In other words, “[c]ontent-based regulations . . . are presumptively invalid, and the government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” Id.

2024Plains Builders, Inc. v. Steel Source, Inc., 408 S.W.3d 596, 602-03 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.); Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); Tex. R.

2016Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2005, no pet.).

2021“If the presumption of harm arises, the State has the burden to rebut the presumption by showing no injury or prejudice to the accused.” Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 452 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d).

2021“However, the defendant has the initial burden to show that a conversation about the case on trial occurred between a juror and an unauthorized person,” and “[t]he defendant’s burden is not satisfied if there is no showing what a reported conversation was about.” Id. (emphasis added).

2019Turrubiartes v. Olvera, 539 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Lide, 116 S.W.3d at 152 .

2014The party seeking appointment as sole managing conservator has the burden to rebut the presumption, Lide v. Lide, 116 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).

2015Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim.

2015Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim.

2016Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 ; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 201 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref‟d) (op. on reh‟g).

2016Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 171 , 98 S.Ct. at 2676, 2684 ; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 201 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g).

2012Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim.

2012Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim.

2006It is possible for counsel to have legitimate reasons for his conduct.") (citations omitted); In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200, 205-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ("By not presenting the issue in a motion for new trial and developing a record of ineffective behavior, the proponent of the claim has a difficult burden to overcome because the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."); In re A.J.H., 2004 WL 414093 , at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 2, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) ("Appellant has the burden to rebut this presumption by presenting evidence illustrating why

2006It is possible for counsel to have legitimate reasons for his conduct.”) (citations omitted); In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200, 205-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ("By not presenting the issue in a motion for new trial and developing a record of ineffective behavior, the proponent of the claim has a difficult burden to overcome because the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."); In re A.J.H., 2004 WL 414093 , at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 2, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) (“Appellant has the burden to rebut this presumption by presenting evidence illustrating why

2024Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 .

2016Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 171 , 98 S.Ct. at 2676, 2684 ; Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 201 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g).

2020P. 76a(1).1 “The party moving for the sealing order then has the burden to rebut the presumption in order to seal the records.” Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).

2008Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex.App-Dallas 1995, no writ).

2011See Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 345 ; Gen.

2011See Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 345 ; Gen.

2003Carrera v. Yepez , 6 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Salas v. Carpenter , 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir.1992)).

2003Carrera v. Yepez, 6 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir.1992)).

2003Carrera v. Yepez , 6 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Salas v. Carpenter , 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir.1992)).

2003Carrera v. Yepez, 6 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir.1992)).

2025In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); In re I.I.T., 648 S.W.3d 467 , 476 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.).

2023In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); In re I.I.T., 648 S.W.3d 467 , 476 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.).

2024See id.

2023See Baylor Scott & White, 575 S.W.3d at 363 .

2023Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). “[I]nvoluntary execution and unconscionability (coupled with inadequate disclosure of marital property information) are the only two defenses to marital property agreements that are specified in the [Texas Family Code].” Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, 172 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Texas Family Code section 4.105 pertaining to partition or exchange agreements, which is otherwise identical to Texas Family Code section 4.006).

2020Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

2021In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

2019Id. § 153.131(b); In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

2014In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

2014In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

2020Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Am.

2013Lo Page 4 based on its content, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed.11 Content-based regulations (those laws that distinguish favored from disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed)12 are presumptively invalid, and the government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.13 The Supreme Court applies the “most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” 14 To satisfy strict scrutiny, a law that regulates speech must be (1) necessary to serve a (2) compelling state interest and (3) narr

2024Plains Builders, Inc. v. Steel Source, Inc., 408 S.W.3d 596, 602-03 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.); Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); Tex. R.

2014Plains Builders, Inc., 408 S.W.3d at 602 -03 (citing Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.)).

2023See Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim.

2021Colburn, 966 S.W.2d at 520 .

2022Blockbuster, Inc. v. C-Span Entm’t, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. dism’d by agr.).

2015Id.

2021The plaintiff bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by producing evidence that the defendant initiated a prosecution on the basis of information or motives that do not support a reasonable belief that the claimant was guilty of the charged crime.” Id.

2020The plaintiff bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by producing evidence that the defendant initiated a prosecution on the basis of information or motives that do not support a reasonable belief that the claimant was guilty of the charged crime.” Id.