Enmund culpability requirement in California

2026(Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 797 (Enmund) [wheelman who did not participate in killing during armed robbery could not receive the death penalty].) But as an exception, the Court held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 (Tison).) In Tison, the defendants broke two inmates out of prison, armed the escaped prisoners, captured and then held a family of passing motorists at gunpoint for a prolonged period of time while

2025(Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 797 .) However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 .) 6 Section 190.2, subdivision (d), generally provides that “every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated] felony . . .

2026(Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 797 (Enmund) [wheelman who did not participate in killing during armed robbery could not receive the death penalty].) But as an exception, the Court held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 (Tison).) In Tison, the defendants broke two inmates out of prison, armed the escaped prisoners, captured and then held a family of passing motorists at gunpoint for a prolonged period of time while

2025(Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 797 .) However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 .) 6 Section 190.2, subdivision (d), generally provides that “every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated] felony . . .

2022(Ibid.; accord, In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 ; People v. Allison, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 458; People v. Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 13, fn. 5, review granted.) Enmund prohibited felony-murder liability for a defendant who “did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder,” and explained that, to be liable for felony murder, the aider and abettor must himself “kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.” ( Enmund, supra, at pp. 795, 797

2022(Ibid.; accord, In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 ; People v. Allison, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 458; People v. Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 13, fn. 5, review granted.) Enmund prohibited felony-murder liability for a defendant who “did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder,” and explained that, to be liable for felony murder, the aider and abettor must himself “kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.” ( Enmund, supra, at pp. 795, 797

2025They are also raised for the first time in the reply brief and are similarly forfeited. 7 convicted murderers “then killed all four family members.” (Id. at p. 799.) Although the Tison brothers did not kill or intend to kill, their “ ‘major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, [was] sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 800.) Elaborating on reckless indifference in Banks, the California Supreme Court explained that an appellate court must “look to whether a defendant has ‘ “knowingly engag[ed] in

2025(Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 797 .) However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 .) 6 Section 190.2, subdivision (d), generally provides that “every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated] felony . . .

2016(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 704 , 106 S.Ct. 689 ] (Cabana), disapproved on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 503-504, fn. 7 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ].) The court reasoned: “[0]ur ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. . . .

2016(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 704 , 106 S.Ct. 689 ] (Cabana), disapproved on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 503-504, fn. 7 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ].) The court reasoned: “[0]ur ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. . . .

2022Accordingly, “the standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant [who was not the actual killer] liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under 12 section 190.2(d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.” (In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 561 .) Our high court has clarified that Enmund and Tison “establish that a defendant’s personal involvement [in the crimes] must be substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as Earl Enmund.” (B

2022Accordingly, “the standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant [who was not the actual killer] liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2(d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.” (In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 561 (Taylor).) Death penalty cases interpreting section 190.2, subdivision (d), including Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 , thus remain controlling here. 8 The California Supreme Court has clarified that Enmund and Tison “establis

2016But, as defendant acknowledges, in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 ] (Tison), the United States Supreme Court held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that, for the purposes of those special circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which include robbery and burglary, an aider and abettor must have been a “major participant” and have acted “wi

2016But, as defendant acknowledges, in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 ] (Tison), the United States Supreme Court held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that, for the purposes of those special circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which include robbery and burglary, an aider and abettor must have been a “major participant” and have acted “wi

2016(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 704 , 106 S.Ct. 689 ] (Cabana), disapproved on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 503-504, fn. 7 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ].) The court reasoned: “[0]ur ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. . . .

2016(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 704 , 106 S.Ct. 689 ] (Cabana), disapproved on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 503-504, fn. 7 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ].) The court reasoned: “[0]ur ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. . . .

2016But, as defendant acknowledges, in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 ] (Tison), the United States Supreme Court held that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that, for the purposes of those special circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which include robbery and burglary, an aider and abettor must have been a “major participant” and have acted “wi

2016(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 165 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 197-198 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) B.

2016(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 165 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 197-198 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) B.

2016(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 165 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 197-198 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) B.

2016(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 165 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 197-198 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ].) B.

2015(Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [defining what conduct would “satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement”]; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 825 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 ] [treating Tison and Enmund as of equal continuing vitality in marking the bounds of the 8th Amend.]; Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 421 [same]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 594 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ] [Tison represents a qualification of the rule in Enmund].) Under the spectrum of culpable felony-murderer behavior Tison constructs, Earl Enmund’s conduct marks o

2015(Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [defining what conduct would “satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement”]; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 825 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 ] [treating Tison and Enmund as of equal continuing vitality in marking the bounds of the 8th Amend.]; Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 421 [same]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 594 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ] [Tison represents a qualification of the rule in Enmund].) Under the spectrum of culpable felony-murderer behavior Tison constructs, Earl Enmund’s conduct marks o

2015(Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [defining what conduct would “satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement”]; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 825 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 ] [treating Tison and Enmund as of equal continuing vitality in marking the bounds of the 8th Amend.]; Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 421 [same]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 594 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ] [Tison represents a qualification of the rule in Enmund].) Under the spectrum of culpable felony-murderer behavior Tison constructs, Earl Enmund’s conduct marks o

2015(Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158 [defining what conduct would “satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement”]; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 825 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 ] [treating Tison and Enmund as of equal continuing vitality in marking the bounds of the 8th Amend.]; Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 421 [same]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 594 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ] [Tison represents a qualification of the rule in Enmund].) Under the spectrum of culpable felony-murderer behavior Tison constructs, Earl Enmund’s conduct marks o

1995“Murder committed by lying in wait has been ‘anciently regarded ... as a particularly heinous and repugnant crime.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ].) The moral culpability of the offender who murders by lying in wait justifies fixing the murder in the first degree.

1995“Murder committed by lying in wait has been ‘anciently regarded ... as a particularly heinous and repugnant crime.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ].) The moral culpability of the offender who murders by lying in wait justifies fixing the murder in the first degree.