non-exclusive list factors in Texas

2026In evaluating whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the well-known non-exclusive list of factors set forth in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462 , 6 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002)).

2026In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 4 “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ).

2015In Theus v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals set out a non-exclusive list of factors that courts should consider when determining whether the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect under Rule 609(a). 845 S.W.2d 874 , 880–81 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Them, the Court of Criminal Appeals set out a non-exclusive list of factors that courts should consider when determining whether the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. 845 S.W.2d at 880 ; Davis, 259 S.W.3d at 782 .

2017A non-exclusive list of these factors was set forth by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2010In Ex parte Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) we addressed the issue of double-jeopardy and legislative intent, and we "laid out a non-exclusive list of factors to consider when examining if two offenses are the same in the context of multiple punishment." Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d at 371 .

2026In evaluating whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the well-known non-exclusive list of factors set forth in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462 , 6 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002)).

2026In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 4 “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ).

2019He refers specifically to the non-exclusive list of factors enumerated in Suniga — 131 Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim.

2017He refers specifically to the non-exclusive list of factors enumerated in Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim.

2018In Evans v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals provided a non- exclusive list of factors that tend to establish a link between a defendant and a given quantity of illegal drugs. 202 S.W.3d 158 , 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim.

2011We review challenges to "knowing" possession and "intent to deliver" by reviewing various factors discussed in Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (discussing a non-exclusive list of factors that Texas courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination, to establish possession of a controlled substance); Triplett v. State, 292 S.W.3d 205, 208-09 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2009, pet. ref'd) (discussing same); Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (discussing same); and, Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.

2026In evaluating whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the well-known non-exclusive list of factors set forth in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462 , 6 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002)).

2026In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the courts are guided by the non-exclusive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 4 “[T]he State need not prove all of the factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ).

2011We review challenges to "knowing" possession and "intent to deliver" by reviewing various factors discussed in Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (discussing a non-exclusive list of factors that Texas courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination, to establish possession of a controlled substance); Triplett v. State, 292 S.W.3d 205, 208-09 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2009, pet. ref'd) (discussing same); Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (discussing same); and, Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.

2011We review challenges to "knowing" possession and "intent to deliver" by reviewing various factors discussed in Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (discussing a non-exclusive list of factors that Texas courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination, to establish possession of a controlled substance); Triplett v. State, 292 S.W.3d 205, 208-09 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2009, pet. ref'd) (discussing same); Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14[th] Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (discussing same); and, Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Te

2011Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707 , 713-14 (Tex. Crim.

2005See Whitsey v. State , 796 S.W.2d 707 , 713 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989).

2011Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699 .

2011Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699 .

2009See Reese v. State , 33 S.W.3d 238, 240-41 (Tex. Crim.

2007Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 240-41 (Tex.Crim.

2021See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; see also Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) (citing Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)).

2019See Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) (citing Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d Valadez v. State Page 4 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); see also Alexander v. State, No. 10- 12-00224-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9918 , at **9-10 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2019Valley Citizens' Council , 478 U.S. at 566 , 106 S.Ct. 3088 (recognizing that "considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party's counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate"); Arthur Andersen , 945 S.W.2d at 818-19 (explaining that for contingent fee cases, the jury must decide reasonable and necessary fees in light of the work performed in that case, and reflecting the non-exclusive list of factors, arriving at a specific dollar amount).

2014Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997) (providing a non-exclusive list of factors for the factfinder to consider when determining the reasonableness of a fee).

2005Martinez v. City of San Antonio , 40 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers , 29 S.W.3d at 145; Dickson Constr ., 5 S.W.3d at 356.

2003Martinez v. City of San Antonio, 40 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers, 29 S.W.3d at 145 ; Dickson Constr., 5 S.W.3d at 356 .

2005See Johnson v. State , 879 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, no pet.) The Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated a non-exclusive list of factors for the trial court to consider in weighing race-neutral explanations.

2003See Johnson v. State , 879 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, no pet.) The Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated a non-exclusive list of factors for the trial court to consider in weighing race-neutral explanations.

2021See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; see also Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) (citing Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)).

2017See Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) (citing Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); see also Alexander v. State, No. 10- 12-00224-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9918 , at **9-10 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2008See Gammill , 972 S.W.2d at 720 (citing Robinson , 923 S.W.2d at 557 ); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 , 125 L.

2005Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 ; see Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, No. 02-0557, 2004 WL 3019227, at *4 (Tex. 2004).

2018See Norris v. State, 788 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d); Buckley v. State, 758 S.W.2d 339 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988), aff’d, 786 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Norris v. State, 788 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d); Buckley v. State, 758 S.W.2d 339 , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988), aff’d, 786 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id. at 621 .

2007In Dang v. State , the court of criminal appeals generated a non-exclusive list of factors to evaluate time limits on closing arguments under the abuse of discretion standard: (1) the quantity of the evidence, (2) the duration of the trial (3) conflicts in the testimony, (4) the seriousness of the offense, (5) the complexity of the case, (6) whether counsel used the time allotted efficiently, and (7) whether counsel set out what issues were not discussed because of the time limitation. 154 S.W.3d 616, 619, 621 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Gammill , 972 S.W.2d at 720 (citing Robinson , 923 S.W.2d at 557 ); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 , 125 L.

2004The supreme court has identified a non-exclusive list of factors which can be considered in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. 1 See Gammill , 972 S.W.2d at 720 ; see also Daubert , 509 U.S. at 593-95 , 113 S. Ct. at 2796-98 .

2005Martinez v. City of San Antonio , 40 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers , 29 S.W.3d at 145; Dickson Constr ., 5 S.W.3d at 356.

2003Martinez v. City of San Antonio, 40 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers, 29 S.W.3d at 145 ; Dickson Constr., 5 S.W.3d at 356 .

2021In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance seeking more time for discovery, we consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: “the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.” Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004).

2015McAleer, 394 S.W.3d at 617 . -To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance that seeks additional time for discovery, we consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: “the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.” Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161 .

2015Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151-52 .

2014Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151–52.