aid doctrine in Oregon

2016Conversely, in State v. Agnes, 118 Or App 675 , 848 P2d 1237 (1993), and State v. Tabib, 238 Or App 725 , 243 P3d 814 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 131 (2011), we concluded that the warrantless entries into the defendants’ homes were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

2016Conversely, in State v. Agnes, 118 Or App 675 , 848 P2d 1237 (1993), and State v. Tabib, 238 Or App 725 , 243 P3d 814 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 131 (2011), we concluded that the warrantless entries into the defendants’ homes were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

2016Conversely, in State v. Agnes, 118 Or App 675 , 848 P2d 1237 (1993), and State v. Tabib, 238 Or App 725 , 243 P3d 814 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 131 (2011), we concluded that the warrantless entries into the defendants’ homes were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

2016Conversely, in State v. Agnes, 118 Or App 675 , 848 P2d 1237 (1993), and State v. Tabib, 238 Or App 725 , 243 P3d 814 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 131 (2011), we concluded that the warrantless entries into the defendants’ homes were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

2016Conversely, in State v. Agnes, 118 Or App 675 , 848 P2d 1237 (1993), and State v. Tabib, 238 Or App 725 , 243 P3d 814 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 131 (2011), we concluded that the warrantless entries into the defendants’ homes were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

1979In Lundy v. Morgan, 31 Or App 151, 154 , 570 P2d 84 (1977), we held that: "ORS 183.490 is not designed to allow a court to compel an agency to exercise its discretion in a particular manner; rather, it is designed to allow a court to compel an agency to exercise its discretion, or to act in accordance either with its statutory obligations or those obligations imposed by agency rule.” In Lundy , the plaintiff sought to have the court compel the Employment Division to grant him a retroactive merit salary increase.

1979In Lundy v. Morgan, 31 Or App 151, 154 , 570 P2d 84 (1977), we held that: "ORS 183.490 is not designed to allow a court to compel an agency to exercise its discretion in a particular manner; rather, it is designed to allow a court to compel an agency to exercise its discretion, or to act in accordance either with its statutory obligations or those obligations imposed by agency rule.” In Lundy , the plaintiff sought to have the court compel the Employment Division to grant him a retroactive merit salary increase.

1976To invoke the aid of the doctrine, a plaintiff must still show that any negligence on his part was no more than a cause contributing to his injury, and not another equally probable, responsible cause of the accident.” 3 This is to be distinguished from a situation in which it is equally or more probable that the event occurred because of plaintiff’s alleged negligent conduct rather than because of defendant’s alleged negligent conduct. 4 See also, Wynn v. Sundquist, 259 Or 125, 133 , 485 P2d 1085 (1971), which further explains the rule: "* * * [I]n order for a statement in such a report to be

1976To invoke the aid of the doctrine, a plaintiff must still show that any negligence on his part was no more than a cause contributing to his injury, and not another equally probable, responsible cause of the accident.” 3 This is to be distinguished from a situation in which it is equally or more probable that the event occurred because of plaintiff’s alleged negligent conduct rather than because of defendant’s alleged negligent conduct. 4 See also, Wynn v. Sundquist, 259 Or 125, 133 , 485 P2d 1085 (1971), which further explains the rule: "* * * [I]n order for a statement in such a report to be

1957Defendant argues in his brief that: “Good cause *681 manifestly is not shown by mere indulgence in inferences and presumptions that courts or judges will not violate the law.” But a presumption is evidence (ORS 41.310); it is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts (ORS 41.340); and unless overcome by other evidence, its effect is to establish the presumed fact, State v. Parr, 54 Or 316, 322 , 103 P 434 .

1957Defendant argues in his brief that: “Good cause *681 manifestly is not shown by mere indulgence in inferences and presumptions that courts or judges will not violate the law.” But a presumption is evidence (ORS 41.310); it is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts (ORS 41.340); and unless overcome by other evidence, its effect is to establish the presumed fact, State v. Parr, 54 Or 316, 322 , 103 P 434 .

1943In numerous cases the question has arisen upon the contention of the insurance company, that the action Avas barred by the statute of limitations, and the courts have held that the cause of action did not accrue and the statute, therefore, did not commence to run until the lapse of seven years from the time of disappearance, for the reason that “there were not sufficient facts presented to prove the death of the insured without the aid of the presumption arising after the expiration of *375 seven years’ absence”: Howard v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 197 Wash. 230, 236 .