Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1889–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ybarra v. Spangardgreen2 sentences2020(W)ithout the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone’s negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability . . . .’” Jones, 437 A.2d at 1139 , quoting Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 689 . - 13 - J-A08012-20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). 1981The need for an inference of negligence is especially obvious in the situation where a patient submits himself or herself to the care and custody of doctors and nurses, is rendered unconscious, and receives some injury from instrumentalities used or procedures employed in his or her treatment. “. . . [WJithout the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone’s negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and t | 2 | 3 |
Thompson v. County of Alamedagreen2 sentences1988As the Supreme Court of California has perceptively stated: ... duty “ 'is a shorthand statement of a conclusion rather than an aid to analysis in itself ... [it is] only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection____' ” Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally "the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 749-50 , 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 76 , 614 P.2d 728, 734 (1980) (citations omitte 1988As the Supreme Court of California has perceptively stated: ... duty “ 'is a shorthand statement of a conclusion rather than an aid to analysis in itself ... [it is] only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection____' ” Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally "the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 749-50 , 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 76 , 614 P.2d 728, 734 (1980) (citations omitte | 1 | 1 |
Irene Raza v. Walter F. Sullivangreen1 sentence1977See also Raza v. Sullivan, 432 F. 2d 617 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital
green
1 sentence2020(W)ithout the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone’s negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability . . . .’” Jones, 437 A.2d at 1139 , quoting Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 689 . - 13 - J-A08012-20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Turek, Admrx. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.
green
2 sentences1951Turek v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 361 Pa. 512 , 64 A. 2d 779 . 1951Turek v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 361 Pa. 512 , 64 A. 2d 779 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Welch v. Goodwin
neutral
1 sentence1920“There is no stronger or better established principle of law or public policy than that which holds that no one shall be allowed to retain the consideration received by him on a forged instrument, however innocent he may be, unless he can invoke the aid of the doctrine of estoppel”: Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71 . | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Beeson v. Lang
neutral
1 sentence1920It is true, as a general principle, an agent should not be sued when there is a disclosed principal known as such at the inception of the transaction: Beeson v. Lang, 85 Pa. 197, 201 ; Roberts v. Austin, 5 Wh. 313, 315 ; Campbell v. Baker, 2 Watts 83 ; but here the Act of 1849 gives a right of action against the holder of a forged check, whether agent or principal, and does not destroy the common law identity of the agent governed by the legal principles applicable to agents, save only as the Act of 1849 authorizes suit to be brought against an agent. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Campbell v. Baker
green
1 sentence1920It is true, as a general principle, an agent should not be sued when there is a disclosed principal known as such at the inception of the transaction: Beeson v. Lang, 85 Pa. 197, 201 ; Roberts v. Austin, 5 Wh. 313, 315 ; Campbell v. Baker, 2 Watts 83 ; but here the Act of 1849 gives a right of action against the holder of a forged check, whether agent or principal, and does not destroy the common law identity of the agent governed by the legal principles applicable to agents, save only as the Act of 1849 authorizes suit to be brought against an agent. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Roberts v. Austin
green
1 sentence1920It is true, as a general principle, an agent should not be sued when there is a disclosed principal known as such at the inception of the transaction: Beeson v. Lang, 85 Pa. 197, 201 ; Roberts v. Austin, 5 Wh. 313, 315 ; Campbell v. Baker, 2 Watts 83 ; but here the Act of 1849 gives a right of action against the holder of a forged check, whether agent or principal, and does not destroy the common law identity of the agent governed by the legal principles applicable to agents, save only as the Act of 1849 authorizes suit to be brought against an agent. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Hubbard v. Allen
neutral
1 sentence1892The learned judge was therefore entirely right, even without calling in the aid of the principle enforced in Hubbard v. Allen, 123 Pa. 198 , that the licensee is liable for the stipulated royalty if he uses any part of the invention, which clearly covers the present case. | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Packer v. Schrader Mining & Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1889Co., 97 Pa. 379 , and in Salmon Creek Lumber and Mining Co. v. Dusenbury, 110 Pa. 446 . | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Salmon Creek Lumber & Mining Co. v. Dusenbury
neutral
1 sentence1889Co., 97 Pa. 379 , and in Salmon Creek Lumber and Mining Co. v. Dusenbury, 110 Pa. 446 . | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.