aid analysis in California

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

2009Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have “a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” (White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “ ‘Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397 .) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analy

2009Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have "a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property." ( White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 .) (5) "`Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally "the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act. . . .'" [Citation.]" ( Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397 .) "A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely `"a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to a

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

2014That being the case, the reconsideration motion is significant because, as I noted, it included the "evidence" plaintiffs proffered (after the trial court already had granted summary judgment against them) in an attempt to establish ISEC owed them a duty of care. 5 question of law, is particularly amendable to resolution by summary judgment." (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465 .) "A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely '"a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis . . . . '[D]uty,' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expressi

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

2010Under them, `a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by [the] negligence' of school personnel `responsible for student supervision.'" ( Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 , 968 P.2d 522 ], fn. & citations omitted.) (Undesignated section references are to the Government Code.) "To say that someone owes another a duty of care `"is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... `[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations

2010Under them, `a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by [the] negligence' of school personnel `responsible for student supervision.'" ( Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 , 968 P.2d 522 ], fn. & citations omitted.) (Undesignated section references are to the Government Code.) "To say that someone owes another a duty of care `"is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... `[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations

2003“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].) However, “To say that someone owes another a duty of care ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which

2003“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].) However, “To say that someone owes another a duty of care ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which

1998No Common Law Duty Runs To Hoff To say that someone owes another a duty of care "`is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... "[D]uty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' [Citation.]" ( Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 .) "[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should

1998No Common Law Duty Runs To Hoff To say that someone owes another a duty of care "`is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... "[D]uty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' [Citation.]" ( Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 .) "[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should

2017(Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), Torts, § 732, p. 60.) Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. (6 Witkin, supra, § 748 at p. 83.) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis. . . . ‘[D]uty,’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff i

1995Duty, in the context of negligence analysis, has been said to be “ ‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 *955 Cal.2d 728, 734 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], quoting from Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 53, pp. 332-333; cf. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51

2007Plaintiffs acknowledge that “[w]hether a duty is owed is simply a shorthand way of phrasing what is '“the essential question—whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.’”” (J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ].) Indeed, “duty ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself ....

2007Plaintiffs acknowledge that “[w]hether a duty is owed is simply a shorthand way of phrasing what is '“the essential question—whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.’”” (J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ].) Indeed, “duty ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself ....

2014That being the case, the reconsideration motion is significant because, as I noted, it included the "evidence" plaintiffs proffered (after the trial court already had granted summary judgment against them) in an attempt to establish ISEC owed them a duty of care. 5 question of law, is particularly amendable to resolution by summary judgment." (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 465 .) "A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely '"a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analysis . . . . '[D]uty,' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expressi

2009Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have “a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” (White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “ ‘Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397 .) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analy

2009Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have “a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” (White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “ ‘Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397 .) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analy

2009Code, § 1714.) This applies to public utilities, which have “a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of [their] personal and real property.” (White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “ ‘Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397 .) “A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely ‘ “a shorthand statement . . . rather than an aid to analy

1982It [duty] is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself .... ’”” (Derrick v. Ontario Community Hospital (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 145, 152 [120 *339 Cal.Rptr. 566]; Commercial Standard Ins.

1977But it should be *750 recognized that ‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” [Citation omitted.]’ [Citation.] [H] The principal policy considerations are: ‘[1] the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [2] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [3] the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injuiy suffered, [4] the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, [5] the policy of preventi

2003The Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘To say that someone owes another a duty of care “ ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” [Citation.]’ (Hoff v. Vacaville

2003The Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘To say that someone owes another a duty of care “ ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” [Citation.]’ (Hoff v. Vacaville

2003The Supreme Court has explained: "`To say that someone owes another a duty of care "`is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . "[D]uty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' [Citation.]" [Citation.] "[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done." [Citation.]' ( Hoff v. Vacaville

2003The Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘To say that someone owes another a duty of care “ ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” [Citation.]’ (Hoff v. Vacaville

1995Duty, in the context of negligence analysis, has been said to be “ ‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 *955 Cal.2d 728, 734 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], quoting from Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 53, pp. 332-333; cf. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51

1995Duty, in the context of negligence analysis, has been said to be “ ‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 *955 Cal.2d 728, 734 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], quoting from Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 53, pp. 332-333; cf. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51

2018The Duty of Care and Third Party Conduct A duty of care is an essential element of a negligence cause of action. ( Regents , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 618 , 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) "The determination whether a particular relationship supports a duty of care rests on policy and is a question of law. [Citation.]" ( Id . at p. 620, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) " 'A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely " 'a shorthand statement ... rather than an aid to analysis. ... "[D]uty," is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of thos

2018The Duty of Care and Third Party Conduct A duty of care is an essential element of a negligence cause of action. ( Regents , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 618 , 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) "The determination whether a particular relationship supports a duty of care rests on policy and is a question of law. [Citation.]" ( Id . at p. 620, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) " 'A judicial conclusion that a duty is present or absent is merely " 'a shorthand statement ... rather than an aid to analysis. ... "[D]uty," is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of thos

2003“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].) However, “To say that someone owes another a duty of care ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which

2003“Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].) However, “To say that someone owes another a duty of care ‘ “is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.... ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which

2009But it should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) *Page 12 As a general rule, a person is liable for injuries caused by his or her failure to exercise reasonable care. ( Patterson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 821 , 828 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 ].) However, the decision to depart from this general rule requires courts to balance the following policy considerations, whi

2009Foreseeability of Harm “The foreseeability of the harm, though not determinative, has become the chief factor in duty analysis.” (Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 ] (Scott).) Indeed, SCE places heavy emphasis on this factor.

1982But it should be recognized that “duty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ (Prosser, Law of Torts, ... at pp. 332-333.)” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ].) “Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judg

1982But it should be recognized that “duty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ (Prosser, Law of Torts, ... at pp. 332-333.)” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ].) “Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judg

1966There is no occasion for asserting that a boundary has been established by agreement, unless the description in the conveyance in reality designates a different boundary. ‘It is only where the true location is subsequently ascertained that actions of this kind arise. ’ ” In Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, 707-708 , the court noted that: “It is not required that the true location be absolutely unascertainable (Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 489 [ 119 P. 893 ]); that an accurate survey from the calls in the deed is possible (Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495, 498 [ 173 P.

1921“This condition exists in virtually every case in which the aid of the rule is sought.” (Silva v. Azevedo, 178 Cal. 498, *17 [ 173 Pac. 930 ] ; Loustalot v. McKeel, 157 Cal. 641 , [ 108 Pac. 707 ] ; Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 489 , [ 119 Pac. 893 ].) The land claimed by the plaintiffs was originally in the possession of one Marjory Shuler, who entered the same as a homestead about the year 1879.