right to make defense in Rhode Island

2021Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely - 34 - that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 .

2021Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely - 34 - that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 .

2013However, these constitutional provisions “also allow!] a defendant in a criminal trial to represent himself, provided that his waiver of counsel is valid.” Id. (citing State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I.2001); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”).

2013It is well settled that “[t]his Court employs a two-prong analysis to review the validity of a defendant’s waiver of counsel: first, we must determine whether the waiver was ‘voluntary’; then, we must determine whether it was ‘knowing and intelligent.’ ” State v. Brumfield, 900 A.2d 1151, 1153 (R.I.2006) (quoting Laurence, 848 A.2d at 253 ).

2006See Fogarty v. Near North Insurance Brokerage, Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that counsel’s failure to offer alternative language for jury instruction waived the right to make that instruction the basis for an appeal); United States v. Phillips, 522 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that defendant’s tender of an alternative instruction, without explaining why his requested instruction better states the law limited the court’s review of the jury instructions).

2006See Fogarty v. Near North Insurance Brokerage, Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that counsel's failure to offer alternative language for jury instruction waived the right to make that instruction the basis for an appeal); United States v. Phillips, 522 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that defendant's tender of an alternative instruction, without explaining why his requested instruction better states the law limited the court's review of the jury instructions).

2006See Fogarty v. Near North Insurance Brokerage, Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that counsel’s failure to offer alternative language for jury instruction waived the right to make that instruction the basis for an appeal); United States v. Phillips, 522 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that defendant’s tender of an alternative instruction, without explaining why his requested instruction better states the law limited the court’s review of the jury instructions).

2006See Fogarty v. Near North Insurance Brokerage, Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that counsel's failure to offer alternative language for jury instruction waived the right to make that instruction the basis for an appeal); United States v. Phillips, 522 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that defendant's tender of an alternative instruction, without explaining why his requested instruction better states the law limited the court's review of the jury instructions).

2006Cf. Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843 , 848 n. 7 (R.I.2005) (responsibility of suggesting redaction or cautionary instruction falls on the proponent); State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 518 (R.I.2004) (counsel's failure to remind trial justice to give jury instruction that was previously agreed upon constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review).

2006Cf. Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843 , 848 n. 7 (R.I.2005) (responsibility of suggesting redaction or cautionary instruction falls on the proponent); State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 518 (R.I.2004) (counsel's failure to remind trial justice to give jury instruction that was previously agreed upon constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review). [20] After defendant's objection to the instruction on "page 15," the trial justice probed the merits of his objection by offering a hypothetical scenario on implied threats.

1980In State v. Spivey, 114 R.I. 43, 48 , 328 A.2d 414, 417 (1974), this court held that a defendant has a right to make an inquiry about a prospective juror’s racial feelings or beliefs.

1980In State v. Spivey, 114 R.I. 43, 48 , 328 A.2d 414, 417 (1974), this court held that a defendant has a right to make an inquiry about a prospective juror’s racial feelings or beliefs.