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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2015McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (“The pro se defendant must be allowed ... to question witnesses.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (providing that the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense”). ¶ 10 Of course, this does not mean that the right of a self-represented defendant to personally conduct cross-examination is absolute. 2015McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (“The pro se defendant must be allowed ... to question witnesses.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (providing that the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense”). ¶ 10 Of course, this does not mean that the right of a self-represented defendant to personally conduct cross-examination is absolute. | 1 | 2 |
Quijada v. Quijadagreen1 sentence2021Id. at 221, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 1 |
McKaskle v. Wigginsgreen2 sentences2015McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (“The pro se defendant must be allowed ... to question witnesses.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (providing that the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense”). ¶ 10 Of course, this does not mean that the right of a self-represented defendant to personally conduct cross-examination is absolute. 2015McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (“The pro se defendant must be allowed ... to question witnesses.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (providing that the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense”). ¶ 10 Of course, this does not mean that the right of a self-represented defendant to personally conduct cross-examination is absolute. | 1 | 1 |
Pendley v. Powersgreen2 sentences1990The administrator ... cannot be allowed to favor one creditor and prejudice another by pleading the statute of limitations as to some claims and not as to others, and denying to the interested creditors the right to make the defense, on the ground that it is a personal privilege. 129 Ga. 69 , 58 S.E. 653, 654 (1907). 1990The administrator ... cannot be allowed to favor one creditor and prejudice another by pleading the statute of limitations as to some claims and not as to others, and denying to the interested creditors the right to make the defense, on the ground that it is a personal privilege. 129 Ga. 69 , 58 S.E. 653, 654 (1907). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Craig
green
2 sentences2015Although the face-to-face component of cross-examination is not “easily dispensed with,” Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 , 110 S.Ct. 3157 , denying a face-to-face confrontation will not violate the Confrontation Clause when it is “necessary to further an important public policy” and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured, id. 2015Although the face-to-face component of cross-examination is not “easily dispensed with,” Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 , 110 S.Ct. 3157 , denying a face-to-face confrontation will not violate the Confrontation Clause when it is “necessary to further an important public policy” and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured, id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Troska v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1976After setting forth the facts in eviden-tiary detail, the hearing officer stated: “ . . . it is felt that the facts of this case as hereinabove set forth distinguish it from those case's in which late filings of claims and/or REQUESTS FOR HEARING were excused; that the late filing of a claim will not be excused even if it arises out of the ignorance of the injured workman and even if that ignorance arises out of the failure of the doctor or the failure of the employer to advise the workman of the right to make a claim for compensation, Bluma v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 358 , 439 P.2d 1976After setting forth the facts in eviden-tiary detail, the hearing officer stated: “ . . . it is felt that the facts of this case as hereinabove set forth distinguish it from those case's in which late filings of claims and/or REQUESTS FOR HEARING were excused; that the late filing of a claim will not be excused even if it arises out of the ignorance of the injured workman and even if that ignorance arises out of the failure of the doctor or the failure of the employer to advise the workman of the right to make a claim for compensation, Bluma v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 358 , 439 P.2d | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Bluma v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1976After setting forth the facts in eviden-tiary detail, the hearing officer stated: “ . . . it is felt that the facts of this case as hereinabove set forth distinguish it from those case's in which late filings of claims and/or REQUESTS FOR HEARING were excused; that the late filing of a claim will not be excused even if it arises out of the ignorance of the injured workman and even if that ignorance arises out of the failure of the doctor or the failure of the employer to advise the workman of the right to make a claim for compensation, Bluma v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 358 , 439 P.2d 1976After setting forth the facts in eviden-tiary detail, the hearing officer stated: “ . . . it is felt that the facts of this case as hereinabove set forth distinguish it from those case's in which late filings of claims and/or REQUESTS FOR HEARING were excused; that the late filing of a claim will not be excused even if it arises out of the ignorance of the injured workman and even if that ignorance arises out of the failure of the doctor or the failure of the employer to advise the workman of the right to make a claim for compensation, Bluma v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 358 , 439 P.2d | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Pioneer Constructors v. Symes
green
2 sentences1975They may waive the rules established by the courts to govern the admission of evidence, the same as they may waive the rule established by the legislature, that certain contracts must be in writing; and a waiver may be inferred from the failure of the party, for whose benefit the rule was made, to object in due season, or in some way to insist upon compliance with the law.” Accord, Pioneer Constructors v. Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954). 1975They may waive the rules established by the courts to govern the admission of evidence, the same as they may waive the rule established by the legislature, that certain contracts must be in writing; and a waiver may be inferred from the failure of the party, for whose benefit the rule was made, to object in due season, or in some way to insist upon compliance with the law.” Accord, Pioneer Constructors v. Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Crane v. French
green
1 sentence1928The true rule is well stated in Crane v. French, supra; “The reason is, that the right to make the defense is not only a private right to the individual, but it is founded on public policy, which is promoted by his making the defense, and contravened by his refusal to make it. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.