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5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a 2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a | 1 | 2 |
Rossi v. Thomas F. Jackson Co.green2 sentences2006See Rossi v. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 462-63 , 181 A. 539 (1935) (discussing statute at issue in Bremner and stating “[i]t seems clear that this statute [enacted by Public Acts 1927, c. 307, § 5] was passed . . . with the legislative purpose to ensure to an innocent employee the right to make his claim if he had been unaware of his right to compensation which had arisen more than one year before, and for the protection of the employer by limiting this right in any event to a period of three years”); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 506 , 64 A.2d 715 (1949) (relying on 2006See Rossi v. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 462-63 , 181 A. 539 (1935) (discussing statute at issue in Bremner and stating “[i]t seems clear that this statute [enacted by Public Acts 1927, c. 307, § 5] was passed . . . with the legislative purpose to ensure to an innocent employee the right to make his claim if he had been unaware of his right to compensation which had arisen more than one year before, and for the protection of the employer by limiting this right in any event to a period of three years”); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 506 , 64 A.2d 715 (1949) (relying on | 1 | 1 |
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Portergreen2 sentences2006See Rossi v. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 462-63 , 181 A. 539 (1935) (discussing statute at issue in Bremner and stating “[i]t seems clear that this statute [enacted by Public Acts 1927, c. 307, § 5] was passed . . . with the legislative purpose to ensure to an innocent employee the right to make his claim if he had been unaware of his right to compensation which had arisen more than one year before, and for the protection of the employer by limiting this right in any event to a period of three years”); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 506 , 64 A.2d 715 (1949) (relying on 2006See Rossi v. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 462-63 , 181 A. 539 (1935) (discussing statute at issue in Bremner and stating “[i]t seems clear that this statute [enacted by Public Acts 1927, c. 307, § 5] was passed . . . with the legislative purpose to ensure to an innocent employee the right to make his claim if he had been unaware of his right to compensation which had arisen more than one year before, and for the protection of the employer by limiting this right in any event to a period of three years”); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 506 , 64 A.2d 715 (1949) (relying on | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Holbrook
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a | 1 | 2017–2017 |
County of Okanogan, Washington v. National Marine Fisheries Service
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a 2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Whelan
green
2 sentences2017In State v. Whelan , supra, 200 Conn. at 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , our Supreme Court determined that an out-of-court statement is admissible as substantive evidence if (1) the statement is a prior inconsistent statement, (2) it is signed by the declarant, (3) the declarant has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein, and (4) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. 2017In State v. Whelan , supra, 200 Conn. at 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , our Supreme Court determined that an out-of-court statement is admissible as substantive evidence if (1) the statement is a prior inconsistent statement, (2) it is signed by the declarant, (3) the declarant has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein, and (4) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Peeler
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a 2017See, e.g., Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the sixth amendment "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense ... for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"); State v. Bonilla , 317 Conn. 758 , 772, 120 A.3d 481 (2015) ("[o]ur well established approach to jury instructions and defenses respects the defendant's right to control the conduct of his own defense" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Peeler , 265 Conn. 460 , 470, 828 A.2d 1216 (2003) (observing that "a primary purpose of the sixth a | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Putnoki
green
2 sentences1997State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 219 n.6, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986). 9 Although we note that Connecticut’s persistent felony offender scheme requires a proceeding that does, indeed, have many trial-like attributes — the defendant is charged under a specific criminal statute, the defendant must stand trial or plead guilty to the charge, and the state bears the burden of producing evidence that establishes the defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender beyond a reasonable doubt — we need not decide at this time whether double jeopardy is implicated by the state’s appeal because we conclude t 1997State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 219 n.6, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986). 9 Although we note that Connecticut’s persistent felony offender scheme requires a proceeding that does, indeed, have many trial-like attributes — the defendant is charged under a specific criminal statute, the defendant must stand trial or plead guilty to the charge, and the state bears the burden of producing evidence that establishes the defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender beyond a reasonable doubt — we need not decide at this time whether double jeopardy is implicated by the state’s appeal because we conclude t | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Broyoska v. Norwalk Lock Co.
neutral
1 sentence1946In Broyoska v. Norwalk Lock Co., 8 Conn. Sup. 381, the company in whose employ the plaintiff was when the disease originated was also exonerated under the statutory limitation. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.