burden of proof standard in Tennessee

5 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
In Re Audrey S.green tennctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Bingham green tenncrimapp · 1995 1 sentence 1998In support of this position, he contends that the court erred in holding “that the burden was on the Defendant to show the Court that he was entitled to be granted probation.” In State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 455-456 , this court distinguished between the burden of proof for presumption of an alternative sentence and probation: It should be pointed out that determining whether a defendant is entitled to an alternative sentence necessarily requires a separate inquiry from that of determining whether the defendant is entitled to full probation.	1	1998–1998
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine green scotus · 1981 2 sentences 1998Upon review of federal case law, we adopt the burden of proof analysis employed in Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 1998Upon review of federal case law, we adopt the burden of proof analysis employed in Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).	1	1998–1998
Ake v. Oklahoma green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1989Defendant asks the Court to reconsider two issues involved in the guilt-innocent phase of the first trial, to wit, the trial judge’s instruction allegedly shifting the burden of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 403 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) and denial of appointment of a psychiatrist to aid defendant, allegedly in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). 1989Defendant asks the Court to reconsider two issues involved in the guilt-innocent phase of the first trial, to wit, the trial judge’s instruction allegedly shifting the burden of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 403 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) and denial of appointment of a psychiatrist to aid defendant, allegedly in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).	1	1989–1989
Sandstrom v. Montana green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1989Defendant asks the Court to reconsider two issues involved in the guilt-innocent phase of the first trial, to wit, the trial judge’s instruction allegedly shifting the burden of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 403 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) and denial of appointment of a psychiatrist to aid defendant, allegedly in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). 1989Defendant asks the Court to reconsider two issues involved in the guilt-innocent phase of the first trial, to wit, the trial judge’s instruction allegedly shifting the burden of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 403 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) and denial of appointment of a psychiatrist to aid defendant, allegedly in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).	1	1989–1989
Houston v. State green tenn · 1980 2 sentences 1982Melson's argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, supra ; State v. Pritchett, supra ; State v. Dicks, supra ; State v. Houston, supra . 1982Melson’s argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982); State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Pritchett, supra; State v. Dicks, supra; State v. Houston, supra. Melson argues that TCA § 39-2404(j) is unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to specify what mitigating circumstances have been considered and found to be absent and insufficient to outweigh the agg	1	1982–1982
State v. Coleman green tenn · 1981 2 sentences 1982Melson's argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, supra ; State v. Pritchett, supra ; State v. Dicks, supra ; State v. Houston, supra . 1982Melson’s argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982); State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Pritchett, supra; State v. Dicks, supra; State v. Houston, supra. Melson argues that TCA § 39-2404(j) is unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to specify what mitigating circumstances have been considered and found to be absent and insufficient to outweigh the agg	1	1982–1982
State v. Pritchett green tenn · 1981 2 sentences 1982Melson's argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, supra ; State v. Pritchett, supra ; State v. Dicks, supra ; State v. Houston, supra . 1982Melson’s argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982); State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Pritchett, supra; State v. Dicks, supra; State v. Houston, supra. Melson argues that TCA § 39-2404(j) is unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to specify what mitigating circumstances have been considered and found to be absent and insufficient to outweigh the agg	1	1982–1982
State v. Johnson green tenn · 1982 2 sentences 1982Melson's argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, supra ; State v. Pritchett, supra ; State v. Dicks, supra ; State v. Houston, supra . 1982Melson’s argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982); State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Pritchett, supra; State v. Dicks, supra; State v. Houston, supra. Melson argues that TCA § 39-2404(j) is unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to specify what mitigating circumstances have been considered and found to be absent and insufficient to outweigh the agg	1	1982–1982
State v. Dicks green tenn · 1981 2 sentences 1982Melson's argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, supra ; State v. Pritchett, supra ; State v. Dicks, supra ; State v. Houston, supra . 1982Melson’s argument that the statute, TCA § 39-2404(f) and (g), fails to specify the burden of proof and standard of proof to be used in determining whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances has previously been addressed, State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982); State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Pritchett, supra; State v. Dicks, supra; State v. Houston, supra. Melson argues that TCA § 39-2404(j) is unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to specify what mitigating circumstances have been considered and found to be absent and insufficient to outweigh the agg	1	1982–1982

Where else courts name it

TX 79 (1903–2025) MO 68 (1935–2020) LA 55 (1952–2024) IL 49 (1963–2026) CA 42 (1923–2026) WA 24 (1978–2024) KS 23 (1968–2024) CT 19 (1979–2020) FL 17 (1989–2018) OH 15 (1990–2025) NY 13 (1949–2012) WI 12 (1979–2026) OK 11 (1924–2011) KY 11 (1975–2025) IN 11 (1975–2019) MD 11 (1933–2011) DE 9 (1973–2026) NJ 9 (1978–2021) AZ 9 (1986–2020) PA 9 (1968–2019) MA 9 (1973–2019) UT 8 (1986–2025) MS 8 (1987–2004) NE 8 (1992–2018) ME 7 (1978–2017) MN 7 (1959–2005) MI 7 (1985–2005) HI 7 (1974–2013) VA 6 (1980–2020) NC 6 (1925–2009) CO 6 (1991–2025) TN 5 (1982–2020) AL 4 (1958–2000) OR 4 (1976–2025) NH 4 (1988–2022) DC 4 (1979–2022) AK 4 (1970–1995) IA 3 (1984–2024) SC 3 (1995–2008) AR 3 (1989–2002) MT 3 (1968–2004) WY 3 (1991–2006) NM 2 (1969–1974) WV 2 (2014–2021) SD 2 (1998–1998) GA 2 (1972–2022) VT 2 (1985–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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