burden of proof standard in California

2014(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 211 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 , 158 P.3d 763 ].) The federal Constitution does not require the jury to achieve unanimity as the aggravating circumstances or that it be given a burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding the existence of aggravating factors, *333 finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the appropriate penalty.

2014(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 211 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 , 158 P.3d 763 ].) The federal Constitution does not require the jury to achieve unanimity as the aggravating circumstances or that it be given a burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding the existence of aggravating factors, *333 finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the appropriate penalty.

2009(Ibid.; People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627; People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1068 .) “Nor do our jury instructions require jury unanimity on mitigating factors or mislead a jury into believing that such unanimity is required.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733 , 74 P.3d 820 ].) The use of such words in the sentencing factors statute as “extreme” (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)), “reasonably believed” (§ 190.3, factor (f)), and “impaired” (§ 190.3, factor (h)) is constitutional.

2008(People v. Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 935 ; People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1066; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573.) The jury need not agree unanimously as to aggravating factors, or make specific findings or find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist (except for other unadjudicated violent criminal activity), that such factors outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate punishment.

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2024(California Veterinary Medical Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 548-549 [“Local ordinances within the scope of a city’s traditional police powers are presumed valid: The party challenging the ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.”]; County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 [“Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption[,] the [party challenging the ordinance] must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.”]; Corona-Norco Unified Sch

2007(People v. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22 , 139 P.3d 492 ; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 , 101 P.3d 568 .) "The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination. [Citations.]" *888 (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 , 101 P.3d 568 ; see People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316-317 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 , 73 P.3d 43

2007(People v. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22 , 139 P.3d 492 ; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 , 101 P.3d 568 .) "The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination. [Citations.]" *888 (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 , 101 P.3d 568 ; see People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316-317 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 , 73 P.3d 43

2005We disagree. “[W]e have consistently held that instructions similar to those given in this case adequately explain the jury’s sentencing responsibilities and are not impermissibly vague.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 600 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ].) In light of our rejection of defendant’s claims of instructional error, we necessarily reject his further assertion that the cumulative effect of instructional error violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. *499 D.

2005We disagree. “[W]e have consistently held that instructions similar to those given in this case adequately explain the jury’s sentencing responsibilities and are not impermissibly vague.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 600 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ].) In light of our rejection of defendant’s claims of instructional error, we necessarily reject his further assertion that the cumulative effect of instructional error violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. *499 D.

2015(People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 621 , 125 S.Ct. 738 ], Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , and their progeny, have not altered these conclusions.

2014(People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ] do not compel a different result.

2015(People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 621 , 125 S.Ct. 738 ], Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , and their progeny, have not altered these conclusions.

2015(People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 621 , 125 S.Ct. 738 ], Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , and their progeny, have not altered these conclusions.

2026(See People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 826 [finding the standard burden of proof instruction, “coupled with the directive to ‘consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of the others,’ fully apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to both forms of proof”].) We consequently conclude it was not reasonably likely the jury misapplied these instructions on the whole to convict with a lower burden. 17 III The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Under Section 1385 The defendants finally assert the trial court abused its discretion when declining to strike

2015“In light of the newness” of Proposition 47 when Rivas-Colon’s “petition was heard, as well as his contention defense counsel’s failure to raise the issues constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the claims on the merits.” (People v. Losa (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 789, 792, fn. 4 [ 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 ] [declining to apply *449 forfeiture principles to the defendant’s burden of proof claim on a petition for recall of sentence and resentencing under § 1170.126, also known as Prop. 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012].) 3 Having reached this result, we need not consider Rivas-

2015“In light of the newness” of Proposition 47 when Rivas-Colon’s “petition was heard, as well as his contention defense counsel’s failure to raise the issues constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the claims on the merits.” (People v. Losa (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 789, 792, fn. 4 [ 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 ] [declining to apply *449 forfeiture principles to the defendant’s burden of proof claim on a petition for recall of sentence and resentencing under § 1170.126, also known as Prop. 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012].) 3 Having reached this result, we need not consider Rivas-

2015(See People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 693; People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 52 .) “ ‘ “ ‘The jury need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance is proved (except for other crimes), that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty. [Citations.] The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding agg

2015(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 960 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 200 P.3d 898 ].) The death penalty law does not require that the jury achieve unanimity regarding aggravating circumstances or that it be instructed on a burden of proof or standard of proof for finding the existence of aggravating factors, *786 finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the appropriate penalty.

2015(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 960 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 200 P.3d 898 ].) The death penalty law does not require that the jury achieve unanimity regarding aggravating circumstances or that it be instructed on a burden of proof or standard of proof for finding the existence of aggravating factors, *786 finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the appropriate penalty.

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2015We express no opinion on what evidence the trial court may consider when ruling on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18. 4 “[T]he basic structure of Proposition 47 is strikingly similar to Proposition 36” and “much of the appellate interpretation of Proposition 36 is likely relevant in the interpretation of Proposition 47.” (Couzens & Bigelow, supra, § 25:1, p. 25-2.) Numerous courts have adopted the reasoning from Kaulick, including People v. Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 663 [ 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 ] (“denial of a recall petition” brought pursuant to Prop. 36

2014(People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ] do not compel a different result.