Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1973–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Leastergreen2 sentences1982Because the trial judge in Williams reiterated the proper burden of proof standard numerous times during the charge, we were persuaded that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the charge taken as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” Id., quoting from Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972). 1979As we said in Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972), "[tjhere is no reasonable likelihood that the charge taken as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” The defendant argues that this case is controlled by Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 588 (1978), in which we held that we would review jury instructions on self-defense even absent an objection at trial, when the instruction was arguably deficient with respect to constitutional standards articulated after the trial was over. | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2015Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Collinsgreen1 sentence1985See Commonwealth v. Collins, 374 Mass. 596, 600 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bowdengreen2 sentences1982Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 481 (1980), we discussed the fact that the possible burden-shifting language in the alibi instruction was “mitigated by the repeated references to the Commonwealth’s bearing the burden of proof.” In particular, the judge there reiterated the burden of proof standard immediately before, during, and immediately after the alibi instruction. 1982Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 481 (1980), we discussed the fact that the possible burden-shifting language in the alibi instruction was “mitigated by the repeated references to the Commonwealth’s bearing the burden of proof.” In particular, the judge there reiterated the burden of proof standard immediately before, during, and immediately after the alibi instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Palmaringreen1 sentence1980Likewise in Palmarin the court noted that “there was sufficient emphasis placed upon the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to mitigate the effect of the Webster language quoted in the charge.” Palmarin, supra at 804. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen1 sentence1979As we said in Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972), "[tjhere is no reasonable likelihood that the charge taken as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” The defendant argues that this case is controlled by Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 588 (1978), in which we held that we would review jury instructions on self-defense even absent an objection at trial, when the instruction was arguably deficient with respect to constitutional standards articulated after the trial was over. | 1 | 1 |
Hale v. Massachusetts Parking Authoritygreen1 sentence1973Thus, in the case, of Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse Co., 344 Mass. 674 , the Supreme Judicial Court said, at page . 676: “While the burden of proving negligence would continue to rest upon the plaintiff the receipt of the coat by the defendant and its disappearance while in the possession of the defendant, which offers no explanation of the disappearance, would permit a finding that the defendant was negligent .... this means that the burden of going forward with the evidence falls-upon the defendant. ” See also, Hale v. Mass. Parking Authority, 358 Mass. 470, 471 (where the court.hel | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Demiko McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc ., 845 F.3d 794 , 799 (7th Cir. 2017). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1995In McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 667 (1977), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the severe time constraints on an independent candidate for filing original nomination papers and the principal objective of the election laws to ensure that the public will may be expressed through the electoral process, by permitting access by a candidate to the ballot, require that the burden of proof to challenge signatures on an original nomination petition be placed on the objector to the signatures. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Commission
green
1 sentence1988In Forbes Library, supra, we adopted for unlawful discharge cases a “but for” standard, and placed on an employee the burden of *509 persuading the trier of fact that he would not have been discharged but for a discriminatory animus. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
1 sentence1982Because the trial judge in Williams reiterated the proper burden of proof standard numerous times during the charge, we were persuaded that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the charge taken as a whole could have led the jury to ignore the reasonable doubt test.” Id., quoting from Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-417 (1972). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse, Inc.
green
1 sentence1973Thus, in the case, of Bean v. Security Fur Storage Warehouse Co., 344 Mass. 674 , the Supreme Judicial Court said, at page . 676: “While the burden of proving negligence would continue to rest upon the plaintiff the receipt of the coat by the defendant and its disappearance while in the possession of the defendant, which offers no explanation of the disappearance, would permit a finding that the defendant was negligent .... this means that the burden of going forward with the evidence falls-upon the defendant. ” See also, Hale v. Mass. Parking Authority, 358 Mass. 470, 471 (where the court.hel | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.