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39 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1995–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holt Atherton Industries, Inc. v. Heinegreen2 sentences2025Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 86 (“[W]hen an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages.”). 2024Compare Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellers, 651 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. 1982) (setting aside a default judgment and remanding for a new trial because “the petition does not state a cause of action”), with Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]hen an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages.”), and Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (reaffirm | 27 | 36 |
Lefton v. Griffithgreen2 sentences2015Mental Anguish "when an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages [HN8] An award for mental anguish damages must following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate be supported either by direct evidence of the nature, du- disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of ration, and severity of the plaintiff's mental anguish, unliquidated damages." Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 86 ; see thereby establishing a substantial interruption in the also Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. plaintiff's daily routine, or by circumstantia 2006The supreme court has instructed that “when an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages.” Heine , 835 S.W.2d at 86 ; see also Lefton v. Griffith , 136 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (remanding for new trial on economic damages and mental anguish damages, but affirming attorney fee award). | 3 | 3 |
Jackson v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2009Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine , 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992); Jackson v. Gutierrez , 77 S.W.3d 898, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (reversing and remanding damages for pain and suffering award when amount could not be distinguished from that awarded for mental anguish damages); see also Tex. R. 2004See Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 86 (holding that when damages awarded in a default judgment after an uncontested hearing are supported by either legally or factually insufficient evidence, we must remand the case for a new trial on those damage issues); Jackson v. Gutierrez, 77 S.W.3d 898, 904 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (reversing and remanding the trial court’s awards for medical expenses, mental anguish, pain and suffering, and automobile repair, and affirming the award for lost wages). | 3 | 3 |
Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lermagreen2 sentences2024Compare Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellers, 651 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. 1982) (setting aside a default judgment and remanding for a new trial because “the petition does not state a cause of action”), with Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]hen an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages.”), and Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (reaffirm 2012Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992)). | 2 | 2 |
Argyle Mechanical, Inc. v. Unigus Steel, Inc.green2 sentences2020See Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) (holding that when appellate court sustains no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following no-answer default judgment, appropriate disposition is to remand for trial on issue of unliquidated damages); see also Argyle Mech., Inc. v. Unigus Steel, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, no pet.) (if no-evidence point sustained as to unliquidated damages 17 In a subpoint to its third issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that AES and IES are alter egos becaus 2019See Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) (holding that when appellate court sustains no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following no-answer default judgment, appropriate disposition is to remand for trial on issue of unliquidated damages); see also Argyle Mech., Inc. v. Unigus Steel, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. App.— 18 Dallas 2005 , no pet.) (if no-evidence point sustained as to unliquidated damages resulting from no-answer default judgment, appropriate disposition is remand for new trial on issue of unliquidated damages). | 2 | 2 |
Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellersgreen1 sentence2024Compare Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellers, 651 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. 1982) (setting aside a default judgment and remanding for a new trial because “the petition does not state a cause of action”), with Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]hen an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages.”), and Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (reaffirm | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Benavidesgreen1 sentence2023We do not, however, render a take nothing judgment against the Colters as to the mental anguish damages. “[W]hen an appellate court sustains a no evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of –26– unliquidated damages.” Holt Atherton Indus., 835 S.W.2d at 86 ; Armstrong v. Benavides, 180 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (explaining that, although appellate courts generally reverse and render when sustaining a legal sufficiency challenge, “an exce | 1 | 1 |
Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2018We assume, without deciding, that Lucio’s stipulation functions as a pleading under Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g), for XL New York’s second issue. 15 appellate court sustains a no-evidence point after an uncontested hearing on unliquidated damages following a no-answer default judgment, the appropriate disposition is a remand for a new trial on the issue of unliquidated damages). 2018Instead, the gravamen of XL New York’s second issue is that “Lucio should be held to his [s]tipulation.” We agree, see Capitol Brick, 722 S.W.2d at 401 , but the way the default judgment is crafted makes modification of the judgment or suggesting a remittitur impractical from our vantage point. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sharm, Inc. v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2024Sharm, Inc. v. Martinez, 900 S.W.2d 777 , 786 n.9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, no writ) (citing Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1992)). 17 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp.
green
2 sentences2013See Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 86 ; Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 734 ; see also Lefton, 136 S.W.3d at 280 (remanding for new trial on economic damages and mental anguish damages, but affirming attorney fee award). 2013See Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 86 ; Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 734 ; see also Lefton, 136 S.W.3d at 280 (remanding for new trial on economic damages and mental anguish damages, but affirming attorney fee award). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
green
2 sentences1995In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of five municipal ordinances which prohibited animal cruelty, ritualistic sacrifice of animals, and the slaughter of animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses. 1995In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of five municipal ordinances which prohibited animal cruelty, ritualistic sacrifice of animals, and the slaughter of animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.