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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Merrifield v. Edmondsgreen2 sentences2004(Merrifield v. Edmonds, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 341 ; Heidary v. Yadollahi, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-864; Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, 577, fn. 1 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 309 ] [“The idea that all that remains to be done [in an uncontested hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 594] is for the plaintiffs ‘to prove up damages’ is also erroneous . . . where a defendant who has answered fails to appear for trial, the correct procedure is to proceed with the trial for which the defendant has had notice to which he has failed to respond. 2000Relying primarily on Merrifield v. Edmonds (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 104 ], he contends the judgment resulting from such an uncontested hearing does not constitute a “default judgment.” Merrifield v. Edmunds, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at page 341 , concluded that there is no default judgment under section 594, subdivision (a) under these circumstances: “[W]here a defendant who has answered the complaint receives proper notice of trial but does not appear, the plaintiff may proceed with his case and take judgment. | 1 | 3 |
Avila v. Chuagreen2 sentences2000(Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, 868-869 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ]; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ].) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). 5 A number of recent cases have considered the issue of what constitutes a default for purposes of section 473. 2000(Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, 868-869 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ]; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ].) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). 5 A number of recent cases have considered the issue of what constitutes a default for purposes of section 473. | 1 | 2 |
Yeap v. Leakegreen2 sentences2000For example, in Yeap v. Leake (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 591, 600-601 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 ], decided under the 1992 amendment to section 473 which added the term “or dismissal,” the Court of Appeal concluded the provision should be applied where the default or dismissal occurs under circumstances similar or comparable to a default. 2000For example, in Yeap v. Leake (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 591, 600-601 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 ], decided under the 1992 amendment to section 473 which added the term “or dismissal,” the Court of Appeal concluded the provision should be applied where the default or dismissal occurs under circumstances similar or comparable to a default. | 1 | 2 |
Cisneros v. Vuevegreen2 sentences2000(Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, 868-869 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ]; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ].) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). 5 A number of recent cases have considered the issue of what constitutes a default for purposes of section 473. 2000(Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, 868-869 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ]; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ].) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). 5 A number of recent cases have considered the issue of what constitutes a default for purposes of section 473. | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Goldmangreen2 sentences2004(Merrifield v. Edmonds, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 341 ; Heidary v. Yadollahi, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-864; Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, 577, fn. 1 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 309 ] [“The idea that all that remains to be done [in an uncontested hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 594] is for the plaintiffs ‘to prove up damages’ is also erroneous . . . where a defendant who has answered fails to appear for trial, the correct procedure is to proceed with the trial for which the defendant has had notice to which he has failed to respond. 2004(Merrifield v. Edmonds, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 341 ; Heidary v. Yadollahi, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 862-864; Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, 577, fn. 1 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 309 ] [“The idea that all that remains to be done [in an uncontested hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 594] is for the plaintiffs ‘to prove up damages’ is also erroneous . . . where a defendant who has answered fails to appear for trial, the correct procedure is to proceed with the trial for which the defendant has had notice to which he has failed to respond. | 1 | 1 |
Briley v. Sukoffgreen2 sentences1996(Briley v. Sukoff (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 405, 410 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 452 ].) In some situations a hearing may count as a trial for purposes of the dismissal statutes even though no issues of fact are determined. 1996(Briley v. Sukoff (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 405, 410 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 452 ].) In some situations a hearing may count as a trial for purposes of the dismissal statutes even though no issues of fact are determined. | 1 | 1 |
Don v. Cruzgreen2 sentences1996(See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 113 [ 56 P.2d 950 ], preliminary injunction.) An uncontested hearing to prove up damages for a default judgment, while subject to a new trial motion (see Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 704-705 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]), is not a “trial” for purposes of the dismissal statute. 1996(See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 113 [ 56 P.2d 950 ], preliminary injunction.) An uncontested hearing to prove up damages for a default judgment, while subject to a new trial motion (see Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 704-705 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]), is not a “trial” for purposes of the dismissal statute. | 1 | 1 |
Sheldon v. Landwehrgreen2 sentences1965However, speaking of a trial or hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 594 in absence of a party failing to appear for trial, it has been said, “A proceeding taken against him [a party] in his absence is in the nature of a default.” (Sheldon v. Landwehr (1911) 159 Cal. 778, 782 [ 116 P. 44 ]). 1965However, speaking of a trial or hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 594 in absence of a party failing to appear for trial, it has been said, “A proceeding taken against him [a party] in his absence is in the nature of a default.” (Sheldon v. Landwehr (1911) 159 Cal. 778, 782 [ 116 P. 44 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. Randall S.
green
1 sentence2020“The juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look to the totality of a child’s circumstances when making decisions regarding the child.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201 .) The parties’ suggestion that the juvenile court should accept a stipulation as to Caden’s adoptability at an uncontested hearing in December 2020 makes little sense when a contested permanency planning hearing has already been scheduled for January 2021 at which adoptability is the central issue. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
National Union Fire Insurance v. Lynette C.
green
1 sentence2004(Lynette C., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449 .) As explained above, there is a marked difference between a judgment entered by default, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 585, and a judgment entered after an uncontested hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 594. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Insurance
green
2 sentences2000Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 362 .) As long as there is an attorney's affidavit of fault, the neglect does not have to be excusable. ( Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 860, 868-869 , 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 .) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). [5] A number of recent cases have considered the 2000Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 362 .) As long as there is an attorney's affidavit of fault, the neglect does not have to be excusable. ( Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 860, 868-869 , 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 ; Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 909-910 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 .) The parties initially dispute whether the motion was properly brought under section 473, subdivision (b) as a default but rather should be characterized as a failure to appear at an uncontested hearing pursuant to section 594, subdivision (a). [5] A number of recent cases have considered the | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Superior Oil Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1996(See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 113 [ 56 P.2d 950 ], preliminary injunction.) An uncontested hearing to prove up damages for a default judgment, while subject to a new trial motion (see Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 704-705 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]), is not a “trial” for purposes of the dismissal statute. 1996(See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 113 [ 56 P.2d 950 ], preliminary injunction.) An uncontested hearing to prove up damages for a default judgment, while subject to a new trial motion (see Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 704-705 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]), is not a “trial” for purposes of the dismissal statute. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Langan v. McCorkle
green
2 sentences1996(Langan v. McCorkle (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 805 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 535 ].) However, an uncontested hearing on the facts held after the defendant files an answer but fails to appear at the time set for trial, is a “trial” within the meaning of the dismissal statutes. 1996(Langan v. McCorkle (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 805 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 535 ].) However, an uncontested hearing on the facts held after the defendant files an answer but fails to appear at the time set for trial, is a “trial” within the meaning of the dismissal statutes. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.