39 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gitlow v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2015I; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S. Ct. 625 , 69 L. 2015I; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S. Ct. 625 , 69 L. | 2 | 4 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkampred2 sentences2013Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301, 305 , 112 S. Ct. 1904 , 119 L. 2013Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301, 305 , 112 S. Ct. 1904 , 119 L. | 2 | 2 |
City of Bellevue v. Leegreen1 sentence2023See 166 Wn.2d at 583 -86 (citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004), in which the Court invalidated a prior set of suspension procedures for violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause). | 1 | 1 |
City of Redmond v. Mooregreen1 sentence2023See 166 Wn.2d at 583 -86 (citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004), in which the Court invalidated a prior set of suspension procedures for violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause). | 1 | 1 |
City of Redmond v. Mooregreen1 sentence2023See 166 Wn.2d at 583 -86 (citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004), in which the Court invalidated a prior set of suspension procedures for violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nestor Uribe, United States of America v. Leon Alberior Rave-Arias, United States of America v. David Rashgreen1 sentence2012Ed. 2d 521 (1998); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) (“the statutory violation — allowing a convicted felon to serve — did not implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial or the defendants’ constitutional rights”); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (“ ‘The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury does not require an absolute bar on felon-jurors. . . . [T]he guarantee of an impartial jury [protects] against juror bias. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lloyd E. Humphreysgreen1 sentence2012Ed. 2d 521 (1998); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) (“the statutory violation — allowing a convicted felon to serve — did not implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial or the defendants’ constitutional rights”); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (“ ‘The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury does not require an absolute bar on felon-jurors. . . . [T]he guarantee of an impartial jury [protects] against juror bias. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 756563green1 sentence2012Ed. 119 (1902) (treating a motion for new trial like any other untimely motion when it is based on the defendant’s discovery that a juror was a minor and had been convicted of several crimes); Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a felon serving on a jury in violation of state statute did not violate Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 , 119 S. Ct. 500 , 142 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Calderon v. Colemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Oliver
green
2 sentences2015The United State Constitution's Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, directs, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 , 68 S. Ct. 499 , 92 L. 2015The United State Constitution's Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, directs, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 , 68 S. Ct. 499 , 92 L. | 5 | 2014–2015 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2013C Fourteenth Amendment due process and the Jackson standard ¶59 Having demonstrated that our Supreme Court has never decided a Fourteenth Amendment due process proof beyond a reasonable doubt case based upon the incidental restraint concern, we now address the parameters of the Jackson standard to explain why, absent a legislative or judicial narrowing of the definition of “restrain,” the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the incidental restraint concern. ¶60 The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects the accused in a criminal case “against conviction except upon proof beyond 2013The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects the accused in a criminal case "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt ofevery fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 . | 4 | 2013–2014 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2016Ed. 2d 654 (1960), which held that “a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314 . ¶20 In Jackson , the Court’s task was to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard recognized in Winship “constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-14 . ¶21 The Court held that “an e 2016Ed. 2d 654 (1960), which held that “a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314 . ¶20 In Jackson , the Court’s task was to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard recognized in Winship “constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-14 . ¶21 The Court held that “an e | 3 | 2013–2016 |
City of Spokane v. Douglass
green
2 sentences1997City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 176 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). 1997City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 176 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990). | 3 | 1993–1997 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2013Although the right to be present originated in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause applies where defendants are not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against them. 5 State v. Jones, 175 Wn. 2013App. 87, 105 , 303 P.3d 1084 (2013), petition for review filed, No. 89321-7 (Wash. Sept. 26, 2013). ¶13 In general, a stage of trial is “critical” if it presents a possibility of prejudice to the defendant. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dunn
neutral
2 sentences2002The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks. [35] Order Granting Review. [36] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth amendment due process clause does not prevent the use by a state of an information to charge a felony). [37] State v. Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 , 88 S.Ct. 136 , 19 L.Ed.2d 140 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wash.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). [38] See RCW 10.37.050 and RCW 10.37.052. [39] CrR 2.1(a); see 2002The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks. [35] Order Granting Review. [36] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth amendment due process clause does not prevent the use by a state of an information to charge a felony). [37] State v. Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 , 88 S.Ct. 136 , 19 L.Ed.2d 140 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wash.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). [38] See RCW 10.37.050 and RCW 10.37.052. [39] CrR 2.1(a); see | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Berry v. Oliver
green
2 sentences2002The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks. [35] Order Granting Review. [36] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth amendment due process clause does not prevent the use by a state of an information to charge a felony). [37] State v. Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 , 88 S.Ct. 136 , 19 L.Ed.2d 140 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wash.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). [38] See RCW 10.37.050 and RCW 10.37.052. [39] CrR 2.1(a); see 2002State v. Dunn, 70 Wn.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wn.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Haner
green
2 sentences2002The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks. [35] Order Granting Review. [36] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth amendment due process clause does not prevent the use by a state of an information to charge a felony). [37] State v. Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 , 88 S.Ct. 136 , 19 L.Ed.2d 140 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wash.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). [38] See RCW 10.37.050 and RCW 10.37.052. [39] CrR 2.1(a); see 2002The court in Hodges follows the reasoning in Barnes and Franks. [35] Order Granting Review. [36] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111 , 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) (states are not required to indict felony defendants by use of a grand jury; the Fourteenth amendment due process clause does not prevent the use by a state of an information to charge a felony). [37] State v. Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572 , 424 P.2d 897 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 , 88 S.Ct. 136 , 19 L.Ed.2d 140 (1967); State v. Haner, 95 Wash.2d 858 , 631 P.2d 381 (1981). [38] See RCW 10.37.050 and RCW 10.37.052. [39] CrR 2.1(a); see | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Benton v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1986The constitutional guaranty binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 23 L. 1986The constitutional guaranty binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 23 L. | 2 | 1971–1986 |
Klopfer v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1985Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 , 18 L. 1985Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 , 18 L. | 2 | 1970–1985 |
Amunrud v. Board of Appeals
green
1 sentence2024App. 45, 52 , 309 P.3d 1221 (2013) (quoting 20 No. 58113-2-II Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 216 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Nielsen v. Department of Licensing
green
2 sentences2024The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause “‘confers both procedural and substantive protections.’” Nielsen v. Dep’t of Licensing, 177 Wn. 2024App. 45, 52 , 309 P.3d 1221 (2013) (quoting 20 No. 58113-2-II Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 216 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Drope v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2020State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800 , 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 , 95 S. Ct. 896, 904 , 43 L. 2020State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800 , 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 , 95 S. Ct. 896, 904 , 43 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Wicklund
green
2 sentences2020State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800 , 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 , 95 S. Ct. 896, 904 , 43 L. 2020State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800 , 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 , 95 S. Ct. 896, 904 , 43 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Alexander
green
1 sentence2017App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984). 61 Alexander, 76 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Everett v. Moore
green
1 sentence2017App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984). 61 Alexander, 76 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Vaughn
green
1 sentence2015The United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry is entirely consistent with the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Vaughn, 101 Wn.2d -13 No. 70296-3-1/14 604, 607-08, 682 P.2d 878 (1984), decided almost three decades earlier. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Knowles
green
1 sentence2014App. 367, 373 , 957 P.2d 797 (1998)); see Virginia v. Black, outside the range of acceptable choices." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 The First Amendment, by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, bars a state from "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Gregory
red
1 sentence2013The source of that problem is this court's decisions in State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631 , 781 P.2d 483 (1989) and State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Camara
red
2 sentences2013The source of that problem is this court's decisions in State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631 , 781 P.2d 483 (1989) and State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). 2013The source of that problem is this court's decisions in State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631 , 781 P.2d 483 (1989) and State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Gregory
red
1 sentence2013The source of that problem is this court's decisions in State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631 , 781 P.2d 483 (1989) and State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Schaaf v. Highfield
green
2 sentences2013Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21 , 896 P.2d 665 (1995). ¶12 Two clauses of the United States Constitution limit a state’s power to tax interstate commerce: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and (2) the “dormant” commerce clause implied by article I, section 8, clause 3. 2013Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21 , 896 P.2d 665 (1995). ¶12 Two clauses of the United States Constitution limit a state’s power to tax interstate commerce: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and (2) the “dormant” commerce clause implied by article I, section 8, clause 3. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Malloy v. Hogan green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Hurtado v. California green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Boyd v. United States red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Weeks v. United States red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Grant green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kentucky v. Whorton green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Osborne v. Adams County green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Civil Rights Cases green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Faircloth v. Old National Bank neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Green v. United States green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Hamilton v. Alabama green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.