Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in New York

1997The fillers which comprised the lineup resembled the defendant in age, weight, height, skin color and race (People v Stokes, 156 AD2d 401 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 925 ; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 910 ; People v Sease, 155 AD2d 391 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 818 ).

1997The fillers which comprised the lineup resembled the defendant in age, weight, height, skin color and race (People v Stokes, 156 AD2d 401 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 925 ; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 910 ; People v Sease, 155 AD2d 391 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 818 ).

1997The fillers which comprised the lineup resembled the defendant in age, weight, height, skin color and race (People v Stokes, 156 AD2d 401 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 925 ; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 910 ; People v Sease, 155 AD2d 391 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 818 ).

1983The Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional aspects in Johnson (supra), yet stated that the provision was invalid in that it was inconsistent with the clear legislative mandate of section 75 of the Civil Service Law.

1980(Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 .) To be without such legitimate claim of entitlement is to have no property right within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.

1979The defendant has met his burden of persuasion that the Assistant District Attorney’s summation would be prejudicial to defendant’s due process rights to a fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, obligatory on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Wolk v Wolk, 70 Misc 2d 620 , supra).

1975The doctrine of vested rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Church v Church, 58 Misc 2d 753 ; Matter of Cohen v Starke, 269 App Div 256 ; 16 C.J.S., § 216) which involves that "fundamental fairness” which is essential to the very concept of justice (Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234 ; People v Leyra, 302 NY 353 ) and embodies the differing rules of "fair play” which through the years have become associated with different types of proceedings (Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 ).

1975The doctrine of vested rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Church v Church, 58 Misc 2d 753 ; Matter of Cohen v Starke, 269 App Div 256 ; 16 C.J.S., § 216) which involves that "fundamental fairness” which is essential to the very concept of justice (Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234 ; People v Leyra, 302 NY 353 ) and embodies the differing rules of "fair play” which through the years have become associated with different types of proceedings (Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 ).

1975The doctrine of vested rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Church v Church, 58 Misc 2d 753 ; Matter of Cohen v Starke, 269 App Div 256 ; 16 C.J.S., § 216) which involves that "fundamental fairness” which is essential to the very concept of justice (Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234 ; People v Leyra, 302 NY 353 ) and embodies the differing rules of "fair play” which through the years have become associated with different types of proceedings (Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 ).

1975Equitable estoppel is also grounded on considerations of "fairness” (see White v La Due & Fitch, 303 NY 122 ; Rothschild v Title Guar. & Trust Co., 204 NY 458 ; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260 ; Áfatter of Adelman v Appleñeld, 22 Mise 2d 95) but there has always been a difference in the manner in which "fairness” is determined under the two doctrines.

1975The doctrine of vested rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Church v Church, 58 Misc 2d 753 ; Matter of Cohen v Starke, 269 App Div 256 ; 16 C.J.S., § 216) which involves that "fundamental fairness” which is essential to the very concept of justice (Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234 ; People v Leyra, 302 NY 353 ) and embodies the differing rules of "fair play” which through the years have become associated with different types of proceedings (Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 ).

1975Equitable estoppel is also grounded on considerations of "fairness” (see White v La Due & Fitch, 303 NY 122 ; Rothschild v Title Guar. & Trust Co., 204 NY 458 ; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260 ; Áfatter of Adelman v Appleñeld, 22 Mise 2d 95) but there has always been a difference in the manner in which "fairness” is determined under the two doctrines.

1975The doctrine of vested rights derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (Church v Church, 58 Misc 2d 753 ; Matter of Cohen v Starke, 269 App Div 256 ; 16 C.J.S., § 216) which involves that "fundamental fairness” which is essential to the very concept of justice (Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234 ; People v Leyra, 302 NY 353 ) and embodies the differing rules of "fair play” which through the years have become associated with different types of proceedings (Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 ).

1975Equitable estoppel is also grounded on considerations of "fairness” (see White v La Due & Fitch, 303 NY 122 ; Rothschild v Title Guar. & Trust Co., 204 NY 458 ; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260 ; Áfatter of Adelman v Appleñeld, 22 Mise 2d 95) but there has always been a difference in the manner in which "fairness” is determined under the two doctrines.

1972In Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), the court designated the right as within the ‘ liberty ’ assurance of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.

1972In Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971), the Eighth Circuit identified the right as the ‘ freedom to govern one’s personal appearance ’ and retained under the Ninth Amendment.