8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. MacRanderred2 sentences2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant "suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation" where the court denied him "parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges"); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" and "the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial"); see also Novotny, I 19, 320 P.8d at 1200 CTWle have, in the past. ... merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself." ( 2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant "suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation" where the court denied him "parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges"); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" and "the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial"); see also Novotny, I 19, 320 P.8d at 1200 CTWle have, in the past. ... merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself." ( | 2 | 3 |
People v. Novotnygreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Novotny, ¶ 22, 320 P.3d at 1201 (“Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment due process violation we mistakenly identified in Lefebre could have itself catapulted impairment of a defendant’s ability to shape the jury into this limited class of fundamental constitutional errors, the Supreme Court has since made abundantly clear that no such due process protection exists for state-granted peremptory challenges.”). ¶34 Thus, from my perspective, Novotny did more than foreshadow today’s holding. 2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant “suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation” where the court denied him “parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges”); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” and “the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial”); see also Novotny, ¶ 19, 320 P.3d at 1200 (“[W]e have, in the past . . . merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself.” | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lefebrered2 sentences2016Continuing to emphasize the constitutional dimensions of the case, we concluded that such impairment of the defendant’s ability to shape the jury caused him to “suffer[] a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation” and thus violated “substantial rights.” Id. at 304, 308. 2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant “suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation” where the court denied him “parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges”); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” and “the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial”); see also Novotny, ¶ 19, 320 P.3d at 1200 (“[W]e have, in the past . . . merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself.” | 1 | 2 |
Krutsinger v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See id. at 1058 & n. 1. 122 Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment due process violation we mistakenly identified in Lefebre could have itself catapulted impairment of a defendant's ability to shape the jury into this limited class of fundamental constitutional errors, the Supreme Court has since made abundantly clear that no such due process protection exists for state-granted peremptory challenges. | 1 | 1 |
Watso v. Colorado Department of Social Servicesgreen1 sentence2011People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 632 (Colo.1982); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Watso v. Colo. Dept. of Social Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 304 (Colo.1992). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of AMDgreen1 sentence2011People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 632 (Colo.1982); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Watso v. Colo. Dept. of Social Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 304 (Colo.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2011People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 632 (Colo.1982); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Watso v. Colo. Dept. of Social Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 304 (Colo.1992). 2011People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 632 (Colo.1982); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Watso v. Colo. Dept. of Social Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 304 (Colo.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Tennessee v. Garnergreen2 sentences1989We do not view this cryptic comment as constituting an appeal of the trial court's dismissal of any claims arguably based solely on alleged violations of rights protected by Colorado's Constitution. [7] Prior to the decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 1, 105 S.Ct. at 1694 , most courts adopted a fourteenth amendment due process analysis to address excessive force claims actions arising under § 1983. 1989We do not view this cryptic comment as constituting an appeal of the trial court's dismissal of any claims arguably based solely on alleged violations of rights protected by Colorado's Constitution. [7] Prior to the decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 1, 105 S.Ct. at 1694 , most courts adopted a fourteenth amendment due process analysis to address excessive force claims actions arising under § 1983. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ross v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2014We made clear, however, our understanding that, as the appellate review of a federal conviction, Martinez-Salazar left untouched the Court's earlier suggestion in Ross v. Oklohoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), to the effect that "a defendant does suffer a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation if the trial court's actions deprive him of that to which he is entitled by state law regarding use of peremptory challenges." See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 307 & n. 10 (emphasis added). 2014We made clear, however, our understanding that, as the appellate review of a federal conviction, Martinez-Salazar left untouched the Court's earlier suggestion in Ross v. Oklohoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), to the effect that "a defendant does suffer a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation if the trial court's actions deprive him of that to which he is entitled by state law regarding use of peremptory challenges." See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 307 & n. 10 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2000–2014 |
Pointer v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court has clearly retreated from various implications of earlier opinions, see, eg., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 , 14 S.Ct. 410 , 38 L.Ed. 208 (1894) (peremptory challenges characterized as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused"), and has now expressly rejected the notion that peremptory challenges have any constitutional dimension or purpose, other than as a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury, Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 , 108 S.Ct. 22783 ("[Pleremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. 2014The Supreme Court has clearly retreated from various implications of earlier opinions, see, eg., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 , 14 S.Ct. 410 , 38 L.Ed. 208 (1894) (peremptory challenges characterized as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused"), and has now expressly rejected the notion that peremptory challenges have any constitutional dimension or purpose, other than as a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury, Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 , 108 S.Ct. 22783 ("[Pleremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 56 , 107 S.Ct. 989 . 2005Id. at 56 , 107 S.Ct. 989 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Harlan
green
1 sentence2000However, as Ross, 487 U.S. at 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , states, a defendant does suffer a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation if the trial court's actions deprive him of that to which he is entitled by state law regarding use of peremptory challenges. 10 Our decisions have consistently recognized that, under Colorado law, a defendant suffers reversible prejudice if he is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the trial court failed to remove for cause and he exhausts his peremptory challenges. 11 See Harlan, 8 P.3d at 459 ; Prator, 856 P.2d at 840-42 ; Macrander, 828 P. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Prator
green
2 sentences2000However, as Ross, 487 U.S. at 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , states, a defendant does suffer a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation if the trial court's actions deprive him of that to which he is entitled by state law regarding use of peremptory challenges. 10 Our decisions have consistently recognized that, under Colorado law, a defendant suffers reversible prejudice if he is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the trial court failed to remove for cause and he exhausts his peremptory challenges. 11 See Harlan, 8 P.3d at 459 ; Prator, 856 P.2d at 840-42 ; Macrander, 828 P. 2000However, as Ross, 487 U.S. at 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , states, a defendant does suffer a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation if the trial court's actions deprive him of that to which he is entitled by state law regarding use of peremptory challenges. [10] Our decisions have consistently recognized that, under Colorado law, a defendant suffers reversible prejudice if he is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the trial court failed to remove for cause and he exhausts his peremptory challenges. [11] See Harlan, 8 *308 P.3d at 459; Prator, 856 P.2d at 840-42 ; Macrander | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Swain v. Alabama
red
2 sentences2000"Peremptory challenges serve to `eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides' and `to assure parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them and not otherwise.'" Prator, 856 P.2d at 840 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1964)). 2000"Peremptory challenges serve to `eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides' and `to assure parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them and not otherwise.'" Prator, 856 P.2d at 840 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1964)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.