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7 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fiore v. Whitegreen1 sentence2014See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Mapp v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1995Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1083 (1961). 1995Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1083 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences1992Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982). 1992Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences1979In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1934), the Supreme Court held that, “[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder antedated the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but the Court assumed the right was protected by the Fourte 1979In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1934), the Supreme Court held that, “[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder antedated the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but the Court assumed the right was protected by the Fourte | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kendallgreen1 sentence1977See State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1973); State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Iowa 1969). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence1977See State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1973); State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Iowa 1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Commission
green
1 sentence2023Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280 , 283‒84 (Iowa 1991) (finding error was preserved when a party raised a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim even though it never specifically mentioned the due process clause because it could not have been arguing anything other than procedural unfairness). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
City of Panora v. Simmons
green
1 sentence1992City ofPano-ra, 445 N.W.2d at 369 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
2 sentences1979In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1934), the Supreme Court held that, “[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder antedated the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but the Court assumed the right was protected by the Fourte 1979In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1934), the Supreme Court held that, “[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder antedated the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but the Court assumed the right was protected by the Fourte | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1977Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), teaches that the right to counsel, assured federal defendants through the sixth amendment, *553 is a fundamental right guaranteed state court defendants through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 1977Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), teaches that the right to counsel, assured federal defendants through the sixth amendment, *553 is a fundamental right guaranteed state court defendants through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.