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5 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc.green1 sentence2016See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (Denying motion for continuance of special appearance hearing and concluding seven months was “ample time” for discovery); see also Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and concluding eighteen months was “more than ample time to conduct discovery”); see also McClure v. Attebury, 20 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had seven months for disco | 1 | 1 |
McClure v. Atteburygreen1 sentence2016See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (Denying motion for continuance of special appearance hearing and concluding seven months was “ample time” for discovery); see also Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and concluding eighteen months was “more than ample time to conduct discovery”); see also McClure v. Attebury, 20 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had seven months for disco | 1 | 1 |
Draper v. Garciagreen1 sentence2016See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (Denying motion for continuance of special appearance hearing and concluding seven months was “ample time” for discovery); see also Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and concluding eighteen months was “more than ample time to conduct discovery”); see also McClure v. Attebury, 20 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had seven months for disco | 1 | 1 |
BMC Software Belgium, NV v. Marchandgreen1 sentence2016See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (Denying motion for continuance of special appearance hearing and concluding seven months was “ample time” for discovery); see also Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and concluding eighteen months was “more than ample time to conduct discovery”); see also McClure v. Attebury, 20 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had seven months for disco | 1 | 1 |
Demouchette v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920 , 107 S.Ct. 3197 , 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Nitla S.A. De C.V.
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Slentz v. American Airlines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Slentz , 817 S.W.2d at 369 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Bell Et Al.
green
1 sentence1994Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920 , 107 S.Ct. 3197 , 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Demouchette v. Texas
green
1 sentence1994Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920 , 107 S.Ct. 3197 , 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
First Baptist Church of Tyler v. Carlton Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence1965But here the materials were not supplied to the owner of the property but to a general contractor. *81 In First Baptist Church of Tyler v. Carlton Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., wr. ref., 173 S.W. 1179 , the materials were furnished to a general contractor, and not the owner, and the court in denying claim of constitutional lien said: “Under the facts appellee was not itself the contractor with the owner of the building, but merely furnished to the contractor, under a contract separately and distinctly with the contractor so to do, the lumber and material for which the lien is claimed. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.