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5 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2013–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Empower Texans, Incorporated v. Charlie Gergreen1 sentence2025Moreover, there has been insufficient time to receive “complete judicial review.” Empower Texans, Inc. v. Geren, 977 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978)). | 1 | 1 |
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellottigreen1 sentence2025Moreover, there has been insufficient time to receive “complete judicial review.” Empower Texans, Inc. v. Geren, 977 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Texas a & M University-Kingsville v. Yarbroughgreen1 sentence2023Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence2023See Matthews, 484 S.W.3d at 418 . | 1 | 1 |
Drexel Corporation v. Edgewood Development, Ltdgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Drexel Corp. v. Edgewood Dev., Ltd., 417 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (describing voluntary-cessation doctrine and concluding UDJA claim was not moot because party “has retained an ‘unfettered ability’ to insist that [other party] make payments that [other party] denies it owes” under contract between parties); Lakey v. Taylor, 278 S.W.3d 6, 12 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (concluding “Department may not moot this appeal by voluntarily abandoning the policy at issue ‘without any binding admission or extrajudicial action that would prevent a recu | 1 | 1 |
Lakey v. Taylor Ex Rel. Shearergreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Drexel Corp. v. Edgewood Dev., Ltd., 417 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (describing voluntary-cessation doctrine and concluding UDJA claim was not moot because party “has retained an ‘unfettered ability’ to insist that [other party] make payments that [other party] denies it owes” under contract between parties); Lakey v. Taylor, 278 S.W.3d 6, 12 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (concluding “Department may not moot this appeal by voluntarily abandoning the policy at issue ‘without any binding admission or extrajudicial action that would prevent a recu 2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.green2 sentences2013See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 727 , 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) (explaining that under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, the party who contends that its failure to pursue the claim renders the case moot bears the “formidable burden” to establish that it “could not reasonably be expected to resume” the same conduct). 2013See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 727 , 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) (explaining that under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, the party who contends that its failure to pursue the claim renders the case moot bears the “formidable burden” to establish that it “could not reasonably be expected to resume” the same conduct). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.