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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences2014Like the second sentence of Instruction 83, these instructions do "not suffice to absolve the infirmity" present in Instruction 33, see Francis, 471 U.S. at 322 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , because they are "generalized instructions [that] do not clarify the mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in" Instruction 33, see Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 23 , 284 P.3d 695 ; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . 2014Like the second sentence of Instruction 83, these instructions do "not suffice to absolve the infirmity" present in Instruction 33, see Francis, 471 U.S. at 322 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , because they are "generalized instructions [that] do not clarify the mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in" Instruction 33, see Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 23 , 284 P.3d 695 ; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Tarafagreen1 sentence2014Furthermore, even where a separate instruction directly contradicts a mandatory presumption by restating the presumption in permissive form, this is not sufficient to cure the faulty instruction because this court has " 'no way of knowing which of the ... irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict." " Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 22 , 284 P.3d 695 (quoting Francis, 471 U.S. at 322 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 ); see also State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Utah 1986) (concluding that despite the existence of a separate instruction to the jury that a presumption that the de | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chambers
green
2 sentences1988The Utah Supreme Court in Chambers and this court in Turner found that the instruction in question was a mandatory rebuttable presumption as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Franklin and was thus unconstitutional. 709 P.2d at 326 ; 736 P.2d at 1045 . 1988Therefore, even if the first instruction did not meet the definition of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, use of the second instruction would itself have required reversal because it relieved the state of its burden of proof. 709 P.2d at 326 . | 2 | 1987–1988 |
State v. Kelson
green
2 sentences2014Like the second sentence of Instruction 83, these instructions do "not suffice to absolve the infirmity" present in Instruction 33, see Francis, 471 U.S. at 322 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , because they are "generalized instructions [that] do not clarify the mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in" Instruction 33, see Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 23 , 284 P.3d 695 ; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . 2014Like the second sentence of Instruction 83, these instructions do "not suffice to absolve the infirmity" present in Instruction 33, see Francis, 471 U.S. at 322 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , because they are "generalized instructions [that] do not clarify the mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in" Instruction 33, see Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 23 , 284 P.3d 695 ; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 319 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences1988The Utah Supreme Court in Chambers and this court in Turner found that the instruction in question was a mandatory rebuttable presumption as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Franklin and was thus unconstitutional. 709 P.2d at 326 ; 736 P.2d at 1045 . 1988In both cases, the constitutionally defective instruction was followed by yet another instruction which defined “prima facie” as “a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.” 709 P.2d at 326 ; 736 P.2d at 1044 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1988Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case does not fit within the Chambers-Tumer definition of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, it nonetheless has the effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the standard articulated in In re Winship, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. at 1072-1073 . 1988Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case does not fit within the Chambers-Tumer definition of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, it nonetheless has the effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the standard articulated in In re Winship, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. at 1072-1073 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1987In Franklin , the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the use of a mandatory rebuttable presumption in a criminal jury instruction. 2 Franklin extended the prior decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), which held that an instruction with an apparent irrebuttable presumption bearing on a criminal defendant’s malice was unconstitutional. 1987In Franklin , the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the use of a mandatory rebuttable presumption in a criminal jury instruction. 2 Franklin extended the prior decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), which held that an instruction with an apparent irrebuttable presumption bearing on a criminal defendant’s malice was unconstitutional. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.