mandatory rebuttable presumption (California) · Go Syfert
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mandatory rebuttable presumption in California

12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Yates v. Evattred
scotus · 1991 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–2004
2 sentences

2004The high court observed that "when a mandatory rebuttable presumption is applied in a case with no rebutting evidence, [it] render[s] the presumption conclusive in its operation." ( Yates, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 406, fn. 10 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 .) The mandatory rebuttable presumptions addressed in Carella and Yates are analytically indistinct: both operated conclusively in the particular trial — in Carella due to instructional error, and in Yates due to the defendant's failure to rebut the presumption.

2004The high court observed that "when a mandatory rebuttable presumption is applied in a case with no rebutting evidence, [it] render[s] the presumption conclusive in its operation." ( Yates, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 406, fn. 10 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 .) The mandatory rebuttable presumptions addressed in Carella and Yates are analytically indistinct: both operated conclusively in the particular trial — in Carella due to instructional error, and in Yates due to the defendant's failure to rebut the presumption.

33
People v. Dobsongreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Barner may prove his sanity by showing, generally at the end of one year in an outpatient program, that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see Dobson II, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 ; People v. Endsley, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 101 [restoration of sanity under § 1026.2 is the only route to release where the longest term of imprisonment is for life].) In general, a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find

2024Barner may prove his sanity by showing, generally at the end of one year in an outpatient program, that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see Dobson II, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 ; People v. Endsley, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 101 [restoration of sanity under § 1026.2 is the only route to release where the longest term of imprisonment is for life].) In general, a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find

22
People v. Endsleygreen
calctapp · 2018 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Barner may prove his sanity by showing, generally at the end of one year in an outpatient program, that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see Dobson II, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 ; People v. Endsley, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 101 [restoration of sanity under § 1026.2 is the only route to release where the longest term of imprisonment is for life].) In general, a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find

2024Barner may prove his sanity by showing, generally at the end of one year in an outpatient program, that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see Dobson II, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 ; People v. Endsley, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 101 [restoration of sanity under § 1026.2 is the only route to release where the longest term of imprisonment is for life].) In general, a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find

22
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2024
2 sentences

2005(Evid.Code, § 600, subd. (a); People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 182 , 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 ; see also Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 .) Such presumptions may violate the defendant's right to due process in a criminal case, where the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption may have the effect of lessening this burden on the element to which it applies. ( McCall, at p. 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 .) Although an MDO proceeding is civil in nature, the People are required to

2005(Evid.Code, § 600, subd. (a); People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 182 , 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 ; see also Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 .) Such presumptions may violate the defendant's right to due process in a criminal case, where the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption may have the effect of lessening this burden on the element to which it applies. ( McCall, at p. 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 .) Although an MDO proceeding is civil in nature, the People are required to

14
People v. McCallgreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2024
2 sentences

2005(Evid.Code, § 600, subd. (a); People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 182 , 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 ; see also Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 .) Such presumptions may violate the defendant's right to due process in a criminal case, where the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption may have the effect of lessening this burden on the element to which it applies. ( McCall, at p. 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 .) Although an MDO proceeding is civil in nature, the People are required to

2005(Evid.Code, § 600, subd. (a); People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 182 , 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 ; see also Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 .) Such presumptions may violate the defendant's right to due process in a criminal case, where the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption may have the effect of lessening this burden on the element to which it applies. ( McCall, at p. 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 , 82 P.3d 351 .) Although an MDO proceeding is civil in nature, the People are required to

13
Patterson v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023(Id. at p. 701; see also Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 317 [Mullaney “held unconstitutional a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted to the defendant a burden of persuasion on the question of intent”]; Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 215 [“Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense”].) 71 PEOPLE v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J.

11
Francis v. Franklingreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023(Id. at p. 701; see also Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 317 [Mullaney “held unconstitutional a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted to the defendant a burden of persuasion on the question of intent”]; Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 215 [“Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense”].) 71 PEOPLE v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, J.

11
Fajota v. Fajotagreen
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015(See In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498 [“The presumption [under section 3044] is rebuttable, but the court must apply the presumption in any situation in which a finding of domestic violence has been made”].) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the statute directs that the trial court “shall consider all of the . . . factors” enumerated in section 3044, subdivision (b).

11
People v. Sorensengreen
cal · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(Id. at p. 936.) However, Moore also cited the Use Note to CALJIC No. 16.152, which erroneously retained language from the time when the instruction provided for a mandatory rebuttable presumption: “Do not give this instruction if evidence has been, received tending to prove that the failure to provide was not willful or was not without lawful excuse.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 16.152 (Spring 2007 ed.) p. 1092.) From this the court then concluded that as “the CALJIC Committee explains, the rebuttable presumption created by [Penal Code] section 270 is a presumption affecting the burden of produci

2007(Id. at p. 936.) However, Moore also cited the Use Note to CALJIC No. 16.152, which erroneously retained language from the time when the instruction provided for a mandatory rebuttable presumption: “Do not give this instruction if evidence has been, received tending to prove that the failure to provide was not willful or was not without lawful excuse.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 16.152 (Spring 2007 ed.) p. 1092.) From this the court then concluded that as “the CALJIC Committee explains, the rebuttable presumption created by [Penal Code] section 270 is a presumption affecting the burden of produci

11
People v. Laughlingreen
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

11
People v. Rodergreen
cal · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004(See Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 .) In deciding whether a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case is mandatory or permissive, "the jury instructions generally will be controlling, although their interpretation may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it." ( Ibid. ) Because a mandatory rebuttable presumption "tells the trier of fact that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts," it is

2004(See Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 .) In deciding whether a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case is mandatory or permissive, "the jury instructions generally will be controlling, although their interpretation may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it." ( Ibid. ) Because a mandatory rebuttable presumption "tells the trier of fact that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts," it is

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Jennings green
cal · 2010
1 sentence

2023Mullaney thus is not inconsistent with Rogers or our subsequent cases holding that instructions on issues such as provocation or accident amount to pinpoint instructions that are “ ‘required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 675 .) We therefore hold, consistent with Rogers and Rivera, that the trial court here did not err by failing to provide an instruction on provocation when one was not requested by defendant at trial. 3.

12023–2023
Ellis v. Lyons CA2/5 green
calctapp · 2016
1 sentence

2022(Ellis v. Lyons (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 404, 415 .) After the court rendered its custody order, Dana’s attorney sought clarification as to whether the court had, in fact, made a finding that Jared had perpetrated domestic violence.

12022–2022
People v. Moore green
calctapp · 1998
1 sentence

2018(Id. at pp. 938-939.) 6 Beltran also pointed out that the “holding in Moore is particularly puzzling because the opinion specifically acknowledges that CALJIC No. 16.152 was originally drafted as a mandatory rebuttable presumption, but had to be changed to a permissive inference in order to conform to Roder. ( Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 937-938.) 12 statutory alcohol presumption was rephrased as a permissive inference instruction in order to conform to Roder, but that the Bench Notes incorrectly retained the limitations reserved for mandatory rebuttable presumptions.

12018–2018
People v. Williams green
calctapp · 2005
2 sentences

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

12006–2006
People v. Pinkston green
calctapp · 2003
2 sentences

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

2006(People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 1027-1028 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ], citing People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ] & People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ].) The rule set forth in section 2800.2, subdivision (b)—that three or more point violations constitute willful and wanton disregard—“is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.” (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) Three point violations are willful and wanton disregard by definition, so there is nothi

12006–2006
Burg v. Municipal Court green
cal · 1983
2 sentences

2004Article 2 contains Evidence Code sections 620, 622, 623, and 624. [9] There is but one conclusive presumption in the Penal Code: Penal Code section 1016, which provides that "A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged...." [10] Accord, Hoffman, Thinking About Presumptions: The `Presumption' of Agency from Ownership as Study Specimen (1997) 48 Ala. L.Rev. 885, 898 ("Careful verbalists have, however, renounced the notion of `irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions, recognizi

2004Article 2 contains Evidence Code sections 620, 622, 623, and 624. [9] There is but one conclusive presumption in the Penal Code: Penal Code section 1016, which provides that "A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged...." [10] Accord, Hoffman, Thinking About Presumptions: The `Presumption' of Agency from Ownership as Study Specimen (1997) 48 Ala. L.Rev. 885, 898 ("Careful verbalists have, however, renounced the notion of `irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions, recognizi

12004–2004
People v. Flood green
cal · 1998
2 sentences

2004(See, e.g., People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 677 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as a "mandatory conclusive presumption"]; and People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as an "improper conclusive presumption"].) [15] In Yates , the high court addressed another mandatory rebuttable presumption that was conclusive as to the defendant, but did not, as it did in Carella , refer to it as a conclusive presumption.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 677 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as a "mandatory conclusive presumption"]; and People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as an "improper conclusive presumption"].) [15] In Yates , the high court addressed another mandatory rebuttable presumption that was conclusive as to the defendant, but did not, as it did in Carella , refer to it as a conclusive presumption.

12004–2004
People v. Cox green
cal · 2000
2 sentences

2004(See, e.g., People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 677 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as a "mandatory conclusive presumption"]; and People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as an "improper conclusive presumption"].) [15] In Yates , the high court addressed another mandatory rebuttable presumption that was conclusive as to the defendant, but did not, as it did in Carella , refer to it as a conclusive presumption.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 677 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as a "mandatory conclusive presumption"]; and People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [referring to the mandatory rebuttable presumption in Carella as an "improper conclusive presumption"].) [15] In Yates , the high court addressed another mandatory rebuttable presumption that was conclusive as to the defendant, but did not, as it did in Carella , refer to it as a conclusive presumption.

12004–2004

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

FL 15 (1986–2008) CA 12 (1993–2024) IL 11 (1990–2021) IN 7 (1991–2016) UT 6 (1985–2026) AL 4 (1984–2015) PA 4 (2000–2016) ME 3 (1973–1990) OH 3 (1995–2004) GA 3 (1986–1991) OK 3 (1986–2004) ND 2 (1989–1991) MO 2 (2013–2015) CO 2 (1987–2016) NC 2 (1988–2005) HI 2 (1995–1998) MT 2 (1990–1992) WI 2 (1980–1985) MD 2 (2003–2006) VA 2 (2006–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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