5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kelly v. Timber Lakes Propertygreen2 sentences2022See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ¶ 37 , 86 P.3d 699 (“Whatever irregularities [the debtor] may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if there were a resulting effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.”) (quotation simplified). 20191079-CA 27 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes ¶52 Kelly contends that the trustee’s failure to wait the full three-month period is not a mere technical violation. 2022See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ¶ 37 , 86 P.3d 699 (“Whatever irregularities [the debtor] may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if there were a resulting effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.”) (quotation simplified). 20191079-CA 27 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes ¶52 Kelly contends that the trustee’s failure to wait the full three-month period is not a mere technical violation. | 2 | 2 |
Timm v. Dewsnupgreen2 sentences2022See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ¶ 37 , 86 P.3d 699 (“Whatever irregularities [the debtor] may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if there were a resulting effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.”) (quotation simplified). 20191079-CA 27 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes ¶52 Kelly contends that the trustee’s failure to wait the full three-month period is not a mere technical violation. 2022See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ¶ 37 , 86 P.3d 699 (“Whatever irregularities [the debtor] may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if there were a resulting effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.”) (quotation simplified). 20191079-CA 27 2022 UT App 23 Kelly v. Timber Lakes ¶52 Kelly contends that the trustee’s failure to wait the full three-month period is not a mere technical violation. | 2 | 2 |
Bank of America v. Adamsongreen2 sentences2022Indeed, he asserts that “the assumption that the trustor would use this full time was the basis for the Utah Supreme Court holding that in most cases a trustee’s deed cannot be voided for ‘technical defects’ in the foreclosure process after the foreclosure sale.” In support of this contention, he points to the Court’s statement that the requirement “that a trustor assert her rights before the trustee’s sale . . . is consistent with the statutory right to cure the default, which also must be exercised during the three-month grace period before a trustee’s sale is held.” Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 16 2022Indeed, he asserts that “the assumption that the trustor would use this full time was the basis for the Utah Supreme Court holding that in most cases a trustee’s deed cannot be voided for ‘technical defects’ in the foreclosure process after the foreclosure sale.” In support of this contention, he points to the Court’s statement that the requirement “that a trustor assert her rights before the trustee’s sale . . . is consistent with the statutory right to cure the default, which also must be exercised during the three-month grace period before a trustee’s sale is held.” Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 16 | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences2026A. Notice ¶23 “A mere technical violation of a rule is insufficient to justify relief without a showing of prejudice.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 42 , 342 P.3d 789 (cleaned up); see Utah R. 2026A. Notice ¶23 “A mere technical violation of a rule is insufficient to justify relief without a showing of prejudice.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 42 , 342 P.3d 789 (cleaned up); see Utah R. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012The district court, however, has discretion to decide how to handle noncompliance with rule 7 and may require strict compliance with the rule or may “regard the failure to comply with the rule as a mere technical violation and consider the motion on its merits.” Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 1077 . 2012The district court, however, has discretion to decide how to handle noncompliance with rule 7 and may require strict compliance with the rule or may “regard the failure to comply with the rule as a mere technical violation and consider the motion on its merits.” Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ¶ 24 , 208 P.3d 1077 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Company
green
2 sentences1978Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Co., 29 Utah 2d 83 , 505 P.2d 298 ; 66 C.J.S. 1978Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Co., 29 Utah 2d 83 , 505 P.2d 298 ; 66 C.J.S. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp.
green
2 sentences1978NOTES [1] Section 76-4-8, repealed in 1973, provided in contrast to the present language: "Any person who uses for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, or upon any postal card, the name, portrait or picture of any person . ." [1] U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 76-9-405, enacted by Laws of Utah 1973, Ch. 196. [2] 2 Utah 2d 256 , 272 P.2d 177 (1954). [1] Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Co., 29 Utah 2d 83 , 505 P.2d 298 ; 66 C.J.S. 1978NOTES [1] Section 76-4-8, repealed in 1973, provided in contrast to the present language: "Any person who uses for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, or upon any postal card, the name, portrait or picture of any person . ." [1] U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 76-9-405, enacted by Laws of Utah 1973, Ch. 196. [2] 2 Utah 2d 256 , 272 P.2d 177 (1954). [1] Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Co., 29 Utah 2d 83 , 505 P.2d 298 ; 66 C.J.S. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.