mere technical violation in New York

1961Insistence on the observance of the rule makes for the orderly administration of justice, and is not the enforcement of a mere technical rule of practice.” (Rothschild v. Haviland, 172 App. Div. 562, 563 ; see, also, Benadon v. Antonio, 10 A D 2d 40.) A defendant in default does not establish a right to relief merely by presenting a proposed answer, containing denials and affirmatory defenses alleged principally in eonelusory form.

1932Insistence on the observance of the rule makes for the orderly administra tion of justice, and is not the enforcement of a mere technical rule of practice.” (Rothschild v. Haviland, 172 App. Div. 562, 563 .) Notwithstanding the fact that defendant, on the 13th day of October, 1931, knew that a judgment had been entered against him, he neglected to take any action for a period of over four months and not until after execution had been issued to the sheriff of Niagara county.

1921Devaney v. Greene ( 89 App. Div. 296, 299 ) Woodward, J., says: “ While it is true that the statute vests the discretion in the police commissioner of determining the punishment, it is hardly possible that the Legislature intended that the extreme penalty should under ordinary circumstances be visited upon a police officer for a mere technical violation of a rule which is not shown to have prejudiced any rights of the public or interfered with the proper discipline of the department.” (See, also, People ex rel.

1909Devney v. Greene ( 89 App. Div. 296, 299 ), “ While it is true that the statute vests the discretion in the police commissioner of determining the punishment, it is hardly possible that the Legislature intended that the extreme penalty should under ordinary circumstances be visited upon a police officer for a mere technical violation of a rule which is not shown to have prejudiced any rights of the public or interfered with the proper discipline of the department,” and I am clearly of opinion that the evidence before the commissioner did not warrant the conclusion that the relator had been gui

2023Although the failure to pursue suppression "does not necessarily equate to a deprivation of meaningful representation, counsel may still be deemed ineffective in the rare case where a defendant shows the absence of a strategic or legitimate explanation in counsel's strategy not to" ( People v Zeh , 144 AD3d 1395 , 1396 [3d Dept 2016[*10]] [internal citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 954 [2017]).

2023Although the failure to pursue suppression "does not necessarily equate to a deprivation of meaningful representation, counsel may still be deemed ineffective in the rare case where a defendant shows the absence of a strategic or legitimate explanation in counsel's strategy not to" ( People v Zeh , 144 AD3d 1395 , 1396 [3d Dept 2016[*10]] [internal citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 954 [2017]).

2018In People v Williams ( 26 NY2d 62 [1970]), after both parties had exercised peremptory challenges, the court allowed the People to make a peremptory challenge to a previously unchallenged juror.

2017The court’s conclusion of bad faith stemming from the lateness of the report was purely speculative (see Thomas, 213 AD2d at 252 ).

2017The investigator’s delay in publishing the written report amounted to a mere technical violation of the collective bargaining agreement, as petitioner received timely notice of the allegations, as well as an opportunity to respond, prior to the issuance of the report (see Matter of Freytes v City of New York, 146 AD3d 678 [1st Dept 2017]).

2002In addition, Jamesway cannot be held liable for selling the firearm to Candido, since the shooting by Bussey was an unforeseeable independent intervening cause, which superseded any negligence on the part of Jamesway in the sale of the rifle (see, Jantzen v Leslie Edelman of N.Y., 206 AD2d 406 ; Robinson v Howard Bros, of Jackson, 372 So 2d 1074, 1076 [Miss]).

1995Nevertheless, the mere technical violation of a statute will not provide the requisite "practical or reasonable causal connection” (Morales v City of New York, 70 NY2d 981, 984 ).

1993As a final matter, we note that claimant’s failure to comply with the service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) did not constitute a mere technical error, as claimant contends, but resulted in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction (see, Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 723 ); such failure is fatal (see, Matter of Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 177 AD2d 762, 763 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ).

1993As a final matter, we note that claimant’s failure to comply with the service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) did not constitute a mere technical error, as claimant contends, but resulted in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction (see, Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 723 ); such failure is fatal (see, Matter of Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 177 AD2d 762, 763 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ).

1993As a final matter, we note that claimant’s failure to comply with the service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) did not constitute a mere technical error, as claimant contends, but resulted in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction (see, Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 723 ); such failure is fatal (see, Matter of Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 177 AD2d 762, 763 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ).

1989Inasmuch as the deficiency in the petition was not a mere technical challenge, there was no equitable basis for authorizing a write-in primary and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in so doing (see, Matter of Quaglia v Lefever, 143 AD2d 238 ; Matter of Santoro v Kujawa, 133 AD2d 534 ; cf., Matter of Schwarzfeld v D’Apice, 133 AD2d 203, 204 ).

1989Inasmuch as the deficiency in the petition was not a mere technical challenge, there was no equitable basis for authorizing a write-in primary and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in so doing (see, Matter of Quaglia v Lefever, 143 AD2d 238 ; Matter of Santoro v Kujawa, 133 AD2d 534 ; cf., Matter of Schwarzfeld v D’Apice, 133 AD2d 203, 204 ).

1989Inasmuch as the deficiency in the petition was not a mere technical challenge, there was no equitable basis for authorizing a write-in primary and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in so doing (see, Matter of Quaglia v Lefever, 143 AD2d 238 ; Matter of Santoro v Kujawa, 133 AD2d 534 ; cf., Matter of Schwarzfeld v D’Apice, 133 AD2d 203, 204 ).

1987The court cited People v Crandall ( 108 AD2d 413 ), in which the Appellate Division, Third Department, was faced with a similar question, in the context of article 690 of the Criminal Procedure Law.

1987As we noted only recently in Chapman (supra, at 501-502 ), CPL 190.40 (2) (a), "the keystone of our modern immunity rules”, was enacted "to eliminate the confusing thicket of decisional law and overlapping legislative provisions that had evolved both before and after the enactment of the predecessor provision”.

1985Co., 227 NY 411, 417 ).

1976Tune v Rubin, 81 Misc 2d 254 ) or a mere technical violation not going to the substance of a condition of parole (Arciniega v Freeman, 404 US 4 ; People ex rel.

1976Maggio v Casscles, 28 NY2d 415, 418 , supra).

1976Tune v Rubin, 81 Misc 2d 254 ) or a mere technical violation not going to the substance of a condition of parole (Arciniega v Freeman, 404 US 4 ; People ex rel.