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14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yagovane v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Specifically, it noted that obligation included the duty to properly address the forms and that a violation of the requirements of the statute is not "a mere technical error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 2008See Rivera v. State, 106 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Mo.App.2003); Yagovane, 923 S.W.2d at 523 . | 1 | 3 |
Rivera v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Importantly, “[n]otice to both the prosecutor and the appropriate court is considered an essential element; therefore, lack of notice to one is not a mere technical error.” Id. 2008See Rivera v. State, 106 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Mo.App.2003); Yagovane, 923 S.W.2d at 523 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1996A violation of the requirements of the statute is not “a mere technical error.” Smith, 686 S.W.2d at 547 . 1996A violation of the requirements of the statute is not ‘a mere technical error.’ ” Jamison v. State, 918 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo.App.1996)(quoting State v. Jenkins, 778 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo.App.1989) and State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Mo.App.1985)). | 1 | 2 |
Wanda Mayes v. Saint Luke's Hospital of Kansas City, (Consolidated with)Wanda Mayes v. Saint Luke's Hospital of Kansas Citygreen1 sentence2022As recognized in Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hospital of Kansas City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 271 (Mo. banc 2014), caselaw suggests substantial compliance cannot satisfy section 538.225. | 1 | 1 |
Lechner v. Whitesell Ex Rel. Whitesellgreen1 sentence2009Cf. Lechner, 811 S.W.2d at 861 (stating that the appointment of a GAL for a minor child is more than a mere technical defense, but is mandatory and a suit shall not be prosecuted further until such a guardian is appointed). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lassengreen2 sentences2000State v. Lassen, 679 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo.App.1984). 2000State v. Lassen, 679 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence1996A violation of the requirements of the statute is not ‘a mere technical error.’ ” Jamison v. State, 918 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo.App.1996)(quoting State v. Jenkins, 778 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo.App.1989) and State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Mo.App.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Jamison v. Stategreen1 sentence1996A violation of the requirements of the statute is not ‘a mere technical error.’ ” Jamison v. State, 918 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo.App.1996)(quoting State v. Jenkins, 778 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo.App.1989) and State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Mo.App.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howardgreen2 sentences1992For an example of a case involving a mere technical violation, see State v. Howard, 118 Mo. 127 , 24 S.W. 41, 43 (1893), where this Court found no grounds for reversal where an attorney was nominally appointed to defend a client, obtained no confidential information, and later assisted in prosecution. 1992For an example of a case involving a mere technical violation, see State v. Howard, 118 Mo. 127 , 24 S.W. 41, 43 (1893), where this Court found no grounds for reversal where an attorney was nominally appointed to defend a client, obtained no confidential information, and later assisted in prosecution. | 1 | 1 |
Tracy v. Martin Ex Rel. Gunngreen2 sentences1976Nor is the appointment a bare technicality, and it is something more than a mere technical defense that is required of the guardian.” Tracy v. Martin, 363 Mo. 108 , 249 S.W.2d 321, 323 (banc 1952). 1976Nor is the appointment a bare technicality, and it is something more than a mere technical defense that is required of the guardian.” Tracy v. Martin, 363 Mo. 108 , 249 S.W.2d 321, 323 (banc 1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spotts v. Spotts
green
2 sentences1971Nor is the appointment a bare technicality, and it is something more than a mere technical defense that is required of the guardian.” In Spotts v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 917, 931 , 55 S.W.2d 977, 983 , the Supreme Court said: “This court has clearly stated that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for an infant defendant is not a bare technicality and that the office does not involve only perfunctory or shadowy duties, saying : ‘This guardian is to do for him what with riper judgment he would do for himself. 1971Nor is the appointment a bare technicality, and it is something more than a mere technical defense that is required of the guardian.” In Spotts v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 917, 931 , 55 S.W.2d 977, 983 , the Supreme Court said: “This court has clearly stated that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for an infant defendant is not a bare technicality and that the office does not involve only perfunctory or shadowy duties, saying : ‘This guardian is to do for him what with riper judgment he would do for himself. | 2 | 1952–1971 |
State of Missouri v. Tawanda Kunonga
green
1 sentence2024A second exception is when the State "effectively demonstrates that an unpreserved violation of section 600.051 is a mere technical violation having no impact on the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel because the 5 While not an "exception[,]" our Supreme Court "has clarified that section 600.051 is not implicated when a defendant is provided 'standby' or 'hybrid' counsel because the defendant 'has not actually waived counsel.'" Kunonga, 490 S.W.3d at 766 (quoting Hunter, 840 S.W.2d at 860 )). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hunter
green
1 sentence2024A second exception is when the State "effectively demonstrates that an unpreserved violation of section 600.051 is a mere technical violation having no impact on the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel because the 5 While not an "exception[,]" our Supreme Court "has clarified that section 600.051 is not implicated when a defendant is provided 'standby' or 'hybrid' counsel because the defendant 'has not actually waived counsel.'" Kunonga, 490 S.W.3d at 766 (quoting Hunter, 840 S.W.2d at 860 )). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fex v. Michigan
green
2 sentences2011In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 , 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1091 , 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that “the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and the prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” Thus, Carbaugh did not trigger the 180-day limitation period because he did not show that he requested final disposition from the Circuit Court of Maries County, where the detainers were issued. 2011In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 , 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1091 , 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that “the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and the prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” Thus, Carbaugh did not trigger the 180-day limitation period because he did not show that he requested final disposition from the Circuit Court of Maries County, where the detainers were issued. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dennis Allen Brown v. Charles L. Wolff, and Richard H. Bryan, Attorney-General of the State of Nevada
green
1 sentence1985Brown v. Wolff, supra. The agreement is to be construed in favor of the prisoner. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.