5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ragsdale v. Fishlergreen1 sentence2024See id. ¶ 23; see also Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29 , ¶ 60, 491 P.3d 835 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eaglegreen2 sentences2011See id. § 76-2-402(5). 1 Although a defendant's entitlement to a defense-of-others instruction is "conditioned upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the proposed instruction," State v. Hoagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1218 (Utah 1980), a requested instruction should be given "if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it," State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 2011See id. § 76-2-402(5). [1] Although a defendant's entitlement to a defense-of-others instruction is "conditioned upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the proposed instruction," State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980), a requested instruction should be given "if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it," State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2011See id. § 76-2-402(5). 1 Although a defendant's entitlement to a defense-of-others instruction is "conditioned upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the proposed instruction," State v. Hoagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1218 (Utah 1980), a requested instruction should be given "if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it," State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 2011See id. § 76-2-402(5). [1] Although a defendant's entitlement to a defense-of-others instruction is "conditioned upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the proposed instruction," State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980), a requested instruction should be given "if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it," State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barnhartgreen2 sentences2004Thus, we referenced a nonexclusive list of factors that could bear on the determination, and noted that “the statute is intended to prevent intoxicated persons from causing harm by apprehending them before they operate a vehicle.” Id. at 477-78 . 4 Finally, we made clear that “a person need not actually move[ ] a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control.” Id. at 477 (citation omitted). ¶ 23 Notably, the approach we adopted in Barnhart comports with the approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions in which sim 2004Thus, we referenced a nonexclusive list of factors that could bear on the determination, and noted that “the statute is intended to prevent intoxicated persons from causing harm by apprehending them before they operate a vehicle.” Id. at 477-78 . 4 Finally, we made clear that “a person need not actually move[ ] a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control.” Id. at 477 (citation omitted). ¶ 23 Notably, the approach we adopted in Barnhart comports with the approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions in which sim | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wiggsgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
Kingsley v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
Savage v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lovegreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
People v. Eyengreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. City of Montgomerygreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini 2004See, e.g., Farley v. City of Montgomery, 677 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“Whether one is in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (stating “a person may exercise actual physical control over a vehicle without making active attempts to operate it”); State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324 , 897 P.2d 626, 628 (1995) (“We find it preferable, as in other cases, to allow the trier of fact to consider the totality of the circumstances in determini | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Blauveltgreen2 sentences1997Specifically, the Commission considers the following nonexclusive list of factors: "(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of ser 1997Specifically, the Commission considers the following nonexclusive list of factors: "(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of ser | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kaisergreen2 sentences1997Specifically, the Commission considers the following nonexclusive list of factors: "(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of ser 1997Specifically, the Commission considers the following nonexclusive list of factors: "(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of ser | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust
green
2 sentences2024UTAH CODE § 75-7-1004(1). ¶52 In Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust, 2012 UT 47 , 289 P.3d 408 , we adopted a nonexclusive list of factors to consider when determining whether to award attorney fees under Utah Code subsection 75-7-1004(1). 2024UTAH CODE § 75-7-1004(1). ¶52 In Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust, 2012 UT 47 , 289 P.3d 408 , we adopted a nonexclusive list of factors to consider when determining whether to award attorney fees under Utah Code subsection 75-7-1004(1). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
West Valley City v. Coyle
green
2 sentences2019This nonexclusive list of factors is not to be rigidly applied; indeed, "[t]here is no single set of factors that must be considered when conducting a proportionality review." Coyle , 2016 UT App 149 , ¶ 30, 380 P.3d 327 . 2019This nonexclusive list of factors is not to be rigidly applied; indeed, "[t]here is no single set of factors that must be considered when conducting a proportionality review." Coyle , 2016 UT App 149 , ¶ 30, 380 P.3d 327 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Burgess v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2019Burgess , 2017 UT App 186 , ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 937 (quoting Harmon I , 2005 UT App 274 , ¶ 18, 116 P.3d 973 ). 2019Burgess , 2017 UT App 186 , ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 937 (quoting Harmon I , 2005 UT App 274 , ¶ 18, 116 P.3d 973 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon
green
2 sentences2019In Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon ( Harmon I ), 2005 UT App 274 , 116 P.3d 973 , this court identified a nonexclusive list of factors-known as the Harmon factors-that may be considered in determining the proportionality of a sanction: (1) whether the employee has "an exemplary service record," (2) whether the evidence of misconduct is tenuous, (3) whether the employee has been dishonest, (4) whether there are numerous violations, (5) whether there has been "ineffective progressive discipline," (6) "whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties and significantly impede 2019In Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon ( Harmon I ), 2005 UT App 274 , 116 P.3d 973 , this court identified a nonexclusive list of factors-known as the Harmon factors-that may be considered in determining the proportionality of a sanction: (1) whether the employee has "an exemplary service record," (2) whether the evidence of misconduct is tenuous, (3) whether the employee has been dishonest, (4) whether there are numerous violations, (5) whether there has been "ineffective progressive discipline," (6) "whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties and significantly impede | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.