nonexclusive list factors in Oregon

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 If defendant had objected, then I doubt the state would have been able to lay a sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 If defendant had objected, then I doubt the state would have been able to lay a sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2024Additional factors can include whether the party alleging a plain error encouraged the error or made a strategic choice not to object to it, State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 523 , 173 P3d 822 (2007),3 and whether the opposing party played a role in causing the error, State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 326-27 , 518 P3d 903 (2022).

2024Additional factors can include whether the party alleging a plain error encouraged the error or made a strategic choice not to object to it, State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 523 , 173 P3d 822 (2007),3 and whether the opposing party played a role in causing the error, State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 326-27 , 518 P3d 903 (2022).

2024Additional factors can include whether the party alleging a plain error encouraged the error or made a strategic choice not to object to it, State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 523 , 173 P3d 822 (2007),3 and whether the opposing party played a role in causing the error, State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 326-27 , 518 P3d 903 (2022).

2024Additional factors can include whether the party alleging a plain error encouraged the error or made a strategic choice not to object to it, State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 523 , 173 P3d 822 (2007),3 and whether the opposing party played a role in causing the error, State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 326-27 , 518 P3d 903 (2022).

2024In Ailes, this court set out a nonexclusive list of factors that a court may consider when determining whether to exercise its discretion to reverse based on a plain error: Cite as 373 Or 1 (2024) 11 “the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the par- ticular case; how the error came to the court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requir- ing preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court was, in some man- ner, presented with both sides of the issu

2024In Ailes, this court set out a nonexclusive list of factors that a court may consider when determining whether to exercise its discretion to reverse based on a plain error: Cite as 373 Or 1 (2024) 11 “the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the par- ticular case; how the error came to the court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requir- ing preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court was, in some man- ner, presented with both sides of the issu

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 If defendant had objected, then I doubt the state would have been able to lay a sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 If defendant had objected, then I doubt the state would have been able to lay a sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2025Cite as 343 Or App 229 (2025) 243 admissibility of the evidence based on the nonexclusive list of factors discussed in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and O’Key, 321 Or at 299-306 .

2025Id. at 716-17 .

2025Id. at 716-17 .

2025Under Vondehn, a court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the belated Miranda warnings were effective, such that sub- sequent statements reflect a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, and Vondehn provides a nonexclusive list of factors Cite as 340 Or App 318 (2025) 323 to consider. 348 Or at 467, 479, 485 .

2025Under Vondehn, a court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the belated Miranda warnings were effective, such that sub- sequent statements reflect a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, and Vondehn provides a nonexclusive list of factors Cite as 340 Or App 318 (2025) 323 to consider. 348 Or at 467, 479, 485 .

2023In considering whether and how long to defer a parole consideration hearing the board applies the factors listed in OAR 255-062-0016.5 5 OAR 255-062-0016 provides this nonexclusive list of factors, one or more of which would support deferral of the parole consideration hearing date: “(1) A determination by the Board, based on the psychological evaluation and all the information available at the hearing, that the inmate has a men- tal or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predisposing him/her to the commission of any crime to a degree rendering the inmate a danger to the

2023In considering whether and how long to defer a parole consideration hearing the board applies the factors listed in OAR 255-062-0016.5 5 OAR 255-062-0016 provides this nonexclusive list of factors, one or more of which would support deferral of the parole consideration hearing date: “(1) A determination by the Board, based on the psychological evaluation and all the information available at the hearing, that the inmate has a men- tal or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predisposing him/her to the commission of any crime to a degree rendering the inmate a danger to the

2004The nonexclusive list of factors to consider includes “the alternative to relying on the hearsay evidence; the importance of the facts sought to be proved by the hearsay statements to the outcome of the proceeding and considerations of economy; the state of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; the degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to the particular hearsay statements; and the consequences of the decision either way.” Id. at 418 .

2004The court stated that “variable circumstances may be considered” when assessing whether proffered hearsay evidence constitutes substantial evidence in a given case and then provided a nonexclusive list of factors: “[1] [T]he alternative to relying on the hearsay evidence; [2] the importance of the facts sought to be proved by the hearsay statements to the outcome of the proceeding and considerations of economy; [3] the state of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; [4] the degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to the particular hearsay statements; and [5] the cons

2026State v. Horton, 327 Or App 256, 264-65 , 535 P3d 338 (2023) (explaining that “our assessment of where [a plain error] falls on the spectrum of ‘likelihood’ of having affected the verdict * * * goes to its ‘gravity’ and to ‘the ends of justice’ ”).

2026State v. Horton, 327 Or App 256, 264-65 , 535 P3d 338 (2023) (explaining that “our assessment of where [a plain error] falls on the spectrum of ‘likelihood’ of having affected the verdict * * * goes to its ‘gravity’ and to ‘the ends of justice’ ”).

2026We consider the Cite as 350 Or App 689 (2026) 699 totality of the circumstances and ask whether law enforce- ment created a “police-dominated atmosphere,” using a nonexclusive list of factors, including: “(1) the location of the encounter; (2) the length of the encounter; (3) the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant; and (4) the defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter.” Rodriguez, 337 Or App at 735 (citing Shaff, 343 Or at 645 , and Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 640-41 ).

2026We consider the Cite as 350 Or App 689 (2026) 699 totality of the circumstances and ask whether law enforce- ment created a “police-dominated atmosphere,” using a nonexclusive list of factors, including: “(1) the location of the encounter; (2) the length of the encounter; (3) the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant; and (4) the defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter.” Rodriguez, 337 Or App at 735 (citing Shaff, 343 Or at 645 , and Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 640-41 ).

2026We consider the Cite as 350 Or App 689 (2026) 699 totality of the circumstances and ask whether law enforce- ment created a “police-dominated atmosphere,” using a nonexclusive list of factors, including: “(1) the location of the encounter; (2) the length of the encounter; (3) the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant; and (4) the defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter.” Rodriguez, 337 Or App at 735 (citing Shaff, 343 Or at 645 , and Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 640-41 ).

2024Otherwise the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 331 Or App 338 (2024) 341 The board found that petitioner’s institutional employment history (factor 2) and disciplinary history (fac- tor 3) weighed in his favor.

2022Kunze, 337 Or at 141 .

2016Defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to merge those verdicts and asks us to exercise our discretion to correct the assigned error as an “error of law apparent on the record,” also known as a “plain error.” See ORAP 5.45(1) (authorizing review of errors apparent on the record); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (describing requirements for plain error review); see also Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (setting out a nonexclusive list of factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to exercise discretion to cor

2016Defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to merge those verdicts and asks us to exercise our discretion to correct the assigned error as an “error of law apparent on the record,” also known as a “plain error.” See ORAP 5.45(1) (authorizing review of errors apparent on the record); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (describing requirements for plain error review); see also Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (setting out a nonexclusive list of factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to exercise discretion to cor

2015The presumption may be rebutted “by a preponderance of the evidence” such as that described in the nonexclusive list of factors in ORS 109.119(4)(b): “In deciding whether the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) * * * has been rebutted and whether to award custody * * * over the objection of the legal parent, the court may consider factors including, but not limited to, the following, which may be shown by the evidence: “(A) The legal parent is unwilling or unable to care adequately for the child; “(B) The petitioner or intervenor is or recently has been the child’s primary caretaker; “(

2014Not every element needs to be present to find an employer to be a successor; the facts must be considered together to reach a decision.” Id.

2012Peeples, 345 Or at 219-20 ; see Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (providing a nonexclusive list of factors that appellate courts should consider in determining whether to address unpreserved claims of error, including “whether the trial court was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct any error”).

2012ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) (2007)[ 16 ] identified a nonexclusive list of factors that a court should consider in awarding maintenance support: “(i) The duration of the marriage; “(ii) The age of the parties; “(in) The health of the parties, including their physical, mental and emotional condition; “(iv) The standard of living established during the marriage; “(v) The relative income and earning capacity of the parties, recognizing that the wage earner’s continuing income may be a basis for support distinct from the income that the supported spouse may receive from the distribution of marital proper

2011In particular, the court noted that, in considering “[t]he extent to which the marital estate has already benefited from the contribution,” ORS 107.105(l)(d)(B)(iv), “the relevant inquiry is how much the marital estate has already realized the benefits of the spouse’s contributions compared to how much the marital estate would ultimately realize as the benefits of those contributions.” Harris, 349 Or at 414 .