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20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Booker v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Relevant circumstances may include – but are not limited to – the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine 2016“Relevant circumstances may include — but are not limited to — the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 n. 8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So.2d 1079, 1088 (Fla.2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine .... | 8 | 8 |
Melbourne v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Relevant circumstances may include – but are not limited to – the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine 2018“Relevant circumstances may include – but are not limited to – the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine | 6 | 6 |
Murray v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1120 (citations omitted). 2014“Relevant circumstances may include—but are not limited to—the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So. 2d] at 764 n.8 (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine . . | 5 | 5 |
In Re Estate of Carpentergreen2 sentences1997As for a determination of whether a substantial beneficiary was active in the procurement of the will, our supreme court in In re Carpenter's Estate outlined the following nonexclusive list of factors for the court's consideration: a) presence of the beneficiary at the execution of the will; b) presence of the beneficiary on those occasions when the testator expressed a desire to make a will; c) recommendation by the beneficiary of an attorney to draw the will; d) knowledge of the contents of the will by the beneficiary prior to execution; e) giving of instructions on preparation of the will b 1985See Carpenter, 253 So.2d at 702 (setting forth a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining active procurement, of which, at least five are present in the instant case). | 1 | 2 |
Taylor v. Kennedygreen1 sentence2023Consistent with a trilogy of landmark Florida Supreme Court cases, the courts of this state have uniformly held this 3 statutory provision only authorizes “parents’ visitation rights and does not extend to nonparents.” Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 , 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)); see also Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[C]hapter 61, Florida Statutes, does not allow non-parents to seek custody or visitation.”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA1999) (quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, | 1 | 1 |
Kazmierazak v. Querygreen1 sentence2023Consistent with a trilogy of landmark Florida Supreme Court cases, the courts of this state have uniformly held this 3 statutory provision only authorizes “parents’ visitation rights and does not extend to nonparents.” Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 , 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)); see also Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[C]hapter 61, Florida Statutes, does not allow non-parents to seek custody or visitation.”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA1999) (quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Pasikgreen1 sentence2023Consistent with a trilogy of landmark Florida Supreme Court cases, the courts of this state have uniformly held this 3 statutory provision only authorizes “parents’ visitation rights and does not extend to nonparents.” Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 , 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)); see also Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[C]hapter 61, Florida Statutes, does not allow non-parents to seek custody or visitation.”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA1999) (quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, | 1 | 1 |
Wakeman v. Dixongreen1 sentence2023Consistent with a trilogy of landmark Florida Supreme Court cases, the courts of this state have uniformly held this 3 statutory provision only authorizes “parents’ visitation rights and does not extend to nonparents.” Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 , 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)); see also Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[C]hapter 61, Florida Statutes, does not allow non-parents to seek custody or visitation.”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA1999) (quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, | 1 | 1 |
Alg v. Jfdgreen1 sentence2013On appeal, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to determine “whether there is logic and justification for the result.” A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85 So.3d 527, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980) (internal quotation mark omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Bader v. Badergreen1 sentence2013The statute then sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider in establishing parental responsibility, § 61.13(8)(a)-(t), but the. court is not required to make specific findings other than on the ultimate fact of the child’s best interests, Bader v. Bader, 639 So.2d 122, 124-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Canakaris v. Canakarisgreen1 sentence2013On appeal, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to determine “whether there is logic and justification for the result.” A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85 So.3d 527, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980) (internal quotation mark omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Harper Ex Rel. Daley v. Tolergreen1 sentence2012Daley v. Toler, 884 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“The Restatement sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors that are relevant to making the judgment whether a particular relationship is an employment (servant) relationship or an independent contractor relationship^]” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Mikler v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Id. at 957-58 ; see also Mikler v. State, 829 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Slappy
green
2 sentences2018“Relevant circumstances may include – but are not limited to – the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine 2016“Relevant circumstances may include — but are not limited to — the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special treatment.” [Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 n. 8] (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988)); see also Booker v. State, 773 So.2d 1079, 1088 (Fla.2000) (“[W]e provided a nonexclusive list of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether the reason given for exercising a peremptory challenge is genuine .... | 9 | 1991–2018 |
State v. Townsend
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 957-58 ; see also Mikler v. State, 829 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2004The "extent of control" referred to in Restatement section 220(2)(a) has been recognized as the "most important factor in determining whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee." Kane Furniture, 506 So.2d at 1064 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Reed v. State
green
1 sentence1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Florida Bar v. Griggs
green
1 sentence1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Floyd v. State
green
1 sentence1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Reynolds v. State
green
2 sentences1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr 1991How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in this case[.]" (Citations omitted.) [13] Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1301 . [14] Reed, 560 So.2d at 206 . [15] Slappy, 522 So.2d at 24 ; Floyd, 569 So.2d at 1229 . [16] See also Reynolds, 576 So.2d at 1302 , wherein the court directed that the qualities of neutrality, reasonableness, and non-pr | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Galloway Farms, Inc. v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Andrews v. Adams
green
1 sentence1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Men's International Professional Tennis Council v. Volvo North America Corp.
green
1 sentence1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kibler v. State
green
1 sentence1989Torres v. State, 541 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Kibler v. State, 501 So.2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). [2] In Slappy , the court set forth a nonexclusive list of factors which weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Torres v. State
neutral
1 sentence1989Torres v. State, 541 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Kibler v. State, 501 So.2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). [2] In Slappy , the court set forth a nonexclusive list of factors which weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.