Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lehr v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu 2014This is particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in "[iJInherent differences" between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 582-83 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportunities to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 , 1083 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, "nothing in the E | 3 | 3 |
State v. Cloptengreen2 sentences2024And in State v. Clopten, our supreme court permitted expert testimony that would help juries “recognize potential problems with eyewitness testimony” (though it stopped short of “adopt[ing] an outright presumption” of admissibility). 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 25, 49 , 223 P.3d 1103 . ¶64 But even so, as indicated, our cases still hold that a district court generally retains discretion whether to permit expert testimony in a given case. 2024And in State v. Clopten, our supreme court permitted expert testimony that would help juries “recognize potential problems with eyewitness testimony” (though it stopped short of “adopt[ing] an outright presumption” of admissibility). 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 25, 49 , 223 P.3d 1103 . ¶64 But even so, as indicated, our cases still hold that a district court generally retains discretion whether to permit expert testimony in a given case. | 1 | 1 |
Conatser v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2012See Green, 2008 UT 48, 116 , 89 P.3d 97 . | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Greengreen2 sentences2012See Green, 2003 UT 48, ¶ 16 , 89 P.3d 97 . 2012See Green, 2003 UT 48, ¶ 16 , 89 P.3d 97 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2014This is particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in "[iJInherent differences" between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 582-83 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportunities to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 , 1083 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, "nothing in the E 2014This is particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in "[iJInherent differences" between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 582-83 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportunities to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 , 1083 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, "nothing in the E | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Friehe v. Schaad
green
2 sentences2014This is particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in "[iJInherent differences" between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 582-83 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportunities to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 , 1083 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, "nothing in the E 2014This is particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in "[iJInherent differences" between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 582-83 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportunities to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 , 1083 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, "nothing in the E | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.