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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haik v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2024See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that statutory standing is required only “[i]f the plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim”); see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (engaging in only a statutory standing analysis because the claimants did not make any common-law or constitutional claims); Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (same). ¶33 Second, and relatedly, the traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. | 1 | 1 |
Planned Parenthood Association v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt | 1 | 1 |
Hideout v. Summit Countygreen1 sentence2024See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that statutory standing is required only “[i]f the plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim”); see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (engaging in only a statutory standing analysis because the claimants did not make any common-law or constitutional claims); Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (same). ¶33 Second, and relatedly, the traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. | 1 | 1 |
Bleazard v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2024See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that statutory standing is required only “[i]f the plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim”); see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (engaging in only a statutory standing analysis because the claimants did not make any common-law or constitutional claims); Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (same). ¶33 Second, and relatedly, the traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt 2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carroll G. Bernardgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that party’s claim that tax position was reasonable because based on advise of counsel, waived the privilege); Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that when plaintiff alleged *984 that fraud claim was not time-barred because he was unaware of fraud until informed of it by his attorneys, plaintiff waived privilege under federal rules); Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods., Co., Inc., 930 F.Supp. 45, 48-49 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that where attorney in patent infringemen | 1 | 1 |
Richard L. Conkling, Cross-Appellee. v. Bert S. Turner, Nichols Construction Corp., David R. Carpenter, Cross-Appellantsgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that party’s claim that tax position was reasonable because based on advise of counsel, waived the privilege); Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that when plaintiff alleged *984 that fraud claim was not time-barred because he was unaware of fraud until informed of it by his attorneys, plaintiff waived privilege under federal rules); Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods., Co., Inc., 930 F.Supp. 45, 48-49 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that where attorney in patent infringemen | 1 | 1 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 97,004, 36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761 Chevron Corporation v. Pennzoil Companygreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that party’s claim that tax position was reasonable because based on advise of counsel, waived the privilege); Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that when plaintiff alleged *984 that fraud claim was not time-barred because he was unaware of fraud until informed of it by his attorneys, plaintiff waived privilege under federal rules); Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods., Co., Inc., 930 F.Supp. 45, 48-49 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that where attorney in patent infringemen | 1 | 1 |
Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Products Co.green1 sentence1999See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that party’s claim that tax position was reasonable because based on advise of counsel, waived the privilege); Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that when plaintiff alleged *984 that fraud claim was not time-barred because he was unaware of fraud until informed of it by his attorneys, plaintiff waived privilege under federal rules); Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods., Co., Inc., 930 F.Supp. 45, 48-49 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that where attorney in patent infringemen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Erda Community Assn v. Grantsville
green
1 sentence2024Erda Cmty., 2024 UT App 126, ¶ 33 . ¶20 Just as in Erda Community, here Appellants seem to assert that the Annexation Code violates (1) the right to due process, see Utah Const. art I, § 7, (2) the open courts clause, see id. art. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Carlton v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt 2024See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 , ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6 , ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Adopt | 1 | 2024–2024 |
MacK v. Utah State Department of Commerce
green
1 sentence2014Accordingly, "if a party raises a claim based on the same operative facts or the same transaction, it may be precluded if the other elements of claim preclusion are met." Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Doe v. Maret
green
2 sentences2011Because rule 504(d) is only one way in which the attorney-client privilege may be deemed inapplicable, we need not consider whether the Terrys have alleged that former counsel breached his professional duty. 1 15 In Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶¶ 20-21 , 173 P.3d 848 , the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a] party may also waive the privilege by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case, as where a party raises the defense of good faith reliance on advice of counsel." Id. ¶ 9. 2011Because rule 504(d) is only one way in which the attorney-client privilege may be deemed inapplicable, we need not consider whether the Terrys have alleged that former counsel breached his professional duty. 1 15 In Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶¶ 20-21 , 173 P.3d 848 , the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a] party may also waive the privilege by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case, as where a party raises the defense of good faith reliance on advice of counsel." Id. ¶ 9. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Munson v. Chamberlain
green
2 sentences2011Because rule 504(d) is only one way in which the attorney-client privilege may be deemed inapplicable, we need not consider whether the Terrys have alleged that former counsel breached his professional duty. 1 15 In Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶¶ 20-21 , 173 P.3d 848 , the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a] party may also waive the privilege by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case, as where a party raises the defense of good faith reliance on advice of counsel." Id. ¶ 9. 2011Because rule 504(d) is only one way in which the attorney-client privilege may be deemed inapplicable, we need not consider whether the Terrys have alleged that former counsel breached his professional duty. 1 15 In Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74 , 984 P.2d 980 , overruled on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶¶ 20-21 , 173 P.3d 848 , the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a] party may also waive the privilege by placing attorney-client communications at the heart of a case, as where a party raises the defense of good faith reliance on advice of counsel." Id. ¶ 9. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.