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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Seatongreen2 sentences2025(See People v. Alice, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 679 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 200 [“just as a defendant generally may not raise on appeal a claim not raised at trial [citation], a defendant should not be allowed to raise on habeas corpus an issue that could have been presented at trial”].) 27 responded that he could not comment “whether notice is required or not,” but did not want the question of the scope of notice to delay transient release. 2025(See People v. Alice, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 679 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 200 [“just as a defendant generally may not raise on appeal a claim not raised at trial [citation], a defendant should not be allowed to raise on habeas corpus an issue that could have been presented at trial”].) 27 responded that he could not comment “whether notice is required or not,” but did not want the question of the scope of notice to delay transient release. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2025Relevant law and standard of review “At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. [Citation.] Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal. [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 .) “The prohibition against the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of group bias applies to civil as well as c 2021We conclude the trial court did not err.3 2 Overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 173 . 3Beltcher is African-American, as were the victim and the key prosecution witness. 4 A. Legal Standards As discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150 : “At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds. [Citation.] . . . [¶] When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of pe | 1 | 4 |
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2021(Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, fn. 6 [even if CBA was ambiguous on question of whether employees waived meal breaks under circumstances permitted under California law, preemption establish she suffered meal break violations; testimony of witness designated as most knowledgeable by the defendant and the plaintiff’s expert statistician satisfied representative aspect of PAGA claim by demonstrating corporate practices resulted in numerous meal break violations].) 16 does not bar a claim if “a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective b 2018Federal labor law preempts a state-law claim that is either "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements" or " 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 .) However, it does not preempt a state-law claim merely because a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective-bargaining agreement. ( Id . at p. 398, 107 S.Ct. 2425 .) Here, the Employees' claims do not require an analysis of the Agreement; rather, WinCo ha | 1 | 3 |
Ehret v. Winco Foods, LLCgreen1 sentence2021(Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, fn. 6 [even if CBA was ambiguous on question of whether employees waived meal breaks under circumstances permitted under California law, preemption establish she suffered meal break violations; testimony of witness designated as most knowledgeable by the defendant and the plaintiff’s expert statistician satisfied representative aspect of PAGA claim by demonstrating corporate practices resulted in numerous meal break violations].) 16 does not bar a claim if “a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective b | 1 | 1 |
People v. Silvagreen1 sentence2017(People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386 (Silva).) When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court and counsel must follow a three-step process. | 1 | 1 |
Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.green2 sentences2008Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 761-762 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 700 ] [trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing where a party raises a defense to enforcement of an arbitration agreement; the court cannot rely on allegations in the opposing party’s complaint in “declining to find [an] enforceable agreement to arbitrate”].) But as discussed above, defendants have it backward. 2008Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 761-762 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 700 ] [trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing where a party raises a defense to enforcement of an arbitration agreement; the court cannot rely on allegations in the opposing party’s complaint in “declining to find [an] enforceable agreement to arbitrate”].) But as discussed above, defendants have it backward. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Alice
green
2 sentences2025(See People v. Alice, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 679 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 200 [“just as a defendant generally may not raise on appeal a claim not raised at trial [citation], a defendant should not be allowed to raise on habeas corpus an issue that could have been presented at trial”].) 27 responded that he could not comment “whether notice is required or not,” but did not want the question of the scope of notice to delay transient release. 2025(See People v. Alice, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 679 ; In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 200 [“just as a defendant generally may not raise on appeal a claim not raised at trial [citation], a defendant should not be allowed to raise on habeas corpus an issue that could have been presented at trial”].) 27 responded that he could not comment “whether notice is required or not,” but did not want the question of the scope of notice to delay transient release. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Garrison v. McGowan
neutral
2 sentences1930(Garrison v. McGowan, 48 Cal. 592 .) But this presumption is disputable, and where it is clearly shown, as it is here, that the attorney was not authorized, the party whom he assumed to represent can found no rights upon the unauthorized act.” In that particular case the facts showed clearly that the attorneys purporting to take the appeal had no such authority, which fact was not even questioned by the attorneys then representing the appellant. 1914The fact that an attorney appears on behalf of a party raises a presumption of “authority upon his part to do so.” (Garrison v. McGowan 48 Cal. 592 .) But this presumption is disputable, and where it is clearly shown, as it is here, that the attorney was not authorized, the party whom he assumed to represent can found no rights upon the unauthorized act. | 2 | 1914–1930 |
Title Ins. & Tr. Co. v. California Dev. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1930In Title Ins. etc. Co. v. California etc. Co., 168 Cal. 397 [ 143 Pac. 723 ], the court used the following language: “The fact that an attorney appears on behalf of a party raises a presumption of ‘authority upon his part to do so’. 1930In Title Ins. etc. Co. v. California etc. Co., 168 Cal. 397 [ 143 Pac. 723 ], the court used the following language: “The fact that an attorney appears on behalf of a party raises a presumption of ‘authority upon his part to do so’. | 2 | 1926–1930 |
Unzueta v. Akopyan
green
1 sentence2025Relevant law and standard of review “At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. [Citation.] Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal. [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 .) “The prohibition against the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of group bias applies to civil as well as c | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Assocs. LLC
green
2 sentences2021(Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, fn. 6 [even if CBA was ambiguous on question of whether employees waived meal breaks under circumstances permitted under California law, preemption establish she suffered meal break violations; testimony of witness designated as most knowledgeable by the defendant and the plaintiff’s expert statistician satisfied representative aspect of PAGA claim by demonstrating corporate practices resulted in numerous meal break violations].) 16 does not bar a claim if “a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective b 2021(Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, fn. 6 [even if CBA was ambiguous on question of whether employees waived meal breaks under circumstances permitted under California law, preemption establish she suffered meal break violations; testimony of witness designated as most knowledgeable by the defendant and the plaintiff’s expert statistician satisfied representative aspect of PAGA claim by demonstrating corporate practices resulted in numerous meal break violations].) 16 does not bar a claim if “a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective b | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Johnson v. California
green
1 sentence2021We conclude the trial court did not err.3 2 Overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 173 . 3Beltcher is African-American, as were the victim and the key prosecution witness. 4 A. Legal Standards As discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150 : “At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds. [Citation.] . . . [¶] When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of pe | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Crittenden
red
1 sentence2021(People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83 , 115-116 [women].) “When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court and counsel must follow a three-step process. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
San Francisco Brewing Corp. v. Bowman
green
1 sentence2015(San Francisco Brewing, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 619 .) 13 Timed Out cites to several court cases that it argues shows that invalid agreements under the statute of frauds are inadmissible. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Schulmeyer v. McAllister
green
2 sentences1926(Estate of Schulmeyer, 171 Cal. 340 [ 153 Pac. 233 ].) The fact- that an attorney appears on behalf of a party raises a presumption of “authority upon his part to do so.” But this presumption is disputable, and where it is shown, as it is here, that the attorney was not authorized, the party whom he assumed to represent can found no rights upon the unauthorized act. 1926(Estate of Schulmeyer, 171 Cal. 340 [ 153 Pac. 233 ].) The fact- that an attorney appears on behalf of a party raises a presumption of “authority upon his part to do so.” But this presumption is disputable, and where it is shown, as it is here, that the attorney was not authorized, the party whom he assumed to represent can found no rights upon the unauthorized act. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.