section 47(b) litigation privilege in California

2026The litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47 gives litigants and witnesses “the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213 .) It “promotes the effectiveness of 8 judicial proceedings by encouraging open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) This privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achi

2026The litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47 gives litigants and witnesses “the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213 .) It “promotes the effectiveness of 8 judicial proceedings by encouraging open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) This privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achi

2021When specific legislation provides a ‘safe harbor,’ plaintiffs may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor.” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 182 .) The court then proceeded to give examples of a “safe harbor.” In one case, the plaintiff tried to plead around the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47 by calling the conduct in question “unfair competition.”6 In another, the Attorney General tried to impose UCL liability on wholesalers and retailers for conduct as to which another statute 6 The gravamen of the lawsuit in Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187 ,

2015Because section 425.16 is construed broadly (as is the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) litigation privilege), "it has been established for well over a century that a communication is absolutely immune from any tort liability if it has ' "some relation" ' to judicial proceedings." (Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & 11 Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 , citing Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194 .) In Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 , the court stated: " '[J]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringi

2024(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1064 [“nontort remedies for the allegedly wrongful conduct [include] moving to recall and quash the writ of execution”].) Suing over CAB’s levy is not a remedy: CAB’s collection efforts fall within the absolute privilege of Civil Code section 47, which “limit[s] derivative tort claims arising out of litigation-related misconduct” by “favoring sanctions within the original lawsuit.” (Rusheen, at p. 1063.) 9 DISPOSITION The order denying appellant’s motion to strike is reversed.

2023All Claims Against the County and the DDAs Are Barred by the Litigation Privilege The County and the DDAs argue Stevenson’s claims are barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), which bars actions arising out of “communications ‘(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action’ [citation].” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062 .) As noted in the previous section, all of Stev

2026(Nirschl v. Schiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 386 , 401 citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) As our high court explained, “courts considering the question have concluded that ‘[j]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action 9 or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b),’” “such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.” (Briggs, at p. 1115.) The Legislature has made clear the anti-SLAPP statute should be “

2025Even if we could construe the allegations in the draft complaint to be sufficiently menacing, Hagele’s complaint still lacked minimal merit because 9 the allegations were protected by the litigation privilege.2 “ ‘[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation],[3] [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) “ ‘ “

2025Even if we could construe the allegations in the draft complaint to be sufficiently menacing, Hagele’s complaint still lacked minimal merit because 9 the allegations were protected by the litigation privilege.2 “ ‘[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation],[3] [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) “ ‘ “

2024The litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47 applies to “any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 .) The litigation privilege is “ ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.’ ” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322 .) The privilege is “relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP 4

2025Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made [¶] . . . [¶] in any . . . official proceeding authorized by law.” (Wang v. Hartunian (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 744, 749 [“a report to police is subject to the privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)”].) This privilege exists in part because “the circumstances under which an individual observes or suspects a crime will frequently involve rapidly unfolding events, conflicting information, quick impressions, uncertainty, and a need for haste, so that accuracy is difficult to ensure and an

2024(Schep, at p. 1336; Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 340 (Kachlon).) However, section 47 contains an absolute privilege (the litigation privilege) under subdivision (b) and a qualified privilege (the common interest privilege) under subdivision (c) (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 ), and section 2924, subdivision (d) does not specify which of section 47’s two immunity provisions applies to trustees.

2025Even if we could construe the allegations in the draft complaint to be sufficiently menacing, Hagele’s complaint still lacked minimal merit because 9 the allegations were protected by the litigation privilege.2 “ ‘[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation],[3] [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) “ ‘ “

2023(See Harris v. King (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 [“The absolute privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) applies to all torts other than malicious prosecution, including fraud, negligence and negligent misrepresentation”].) We reject appellant’s claim that, because she “has shown malice in the conduct of [respondents], the privilege is not merely overcome; but it never arises in the first instance.” “The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), . . . is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’” (Act

2019Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) codifies a privilege that applies to a "publication or broadcast" made as part of a "judicial proceeding." ( *527 Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) The principle purpose of this litigation privilege is to "afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." ( Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 , 213, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ( Silberg ).) *243 The privilege applies to all tort actions except malicious prosecution. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d

2019Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) codifies a privilege that applies to a "publication or broadcast" made as part of a "judicial proceeding." ( *527 Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) The principle purpose of this litigation privilege is to "afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." ( Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 , 213, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ( Silberg ).) *243 The privilege applies to all tort actions except malicious prosecution. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d

2021The litigation privilege under section 47, subdivision (b)3 “ ‘applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 .) 3 Section 47, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part, “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) In any . . . (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law,

2014(Id. at p. 355.) This privilege " 'absolutely protects litigants and other participants from being sued on the basis of communications they make in the context of family law proceedings.' [Citation.]" (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 956 , quoting Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302 ; Begier, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 882 ; Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1270 .) "Any other rule would surely spawn a second layer of litigation between a former spouse or a spouse currently seeking 21 a dissolution whose goal it is to make his or her forme

2002In June 1995, Dr. Hassan filed a complaint against Mercy, asserting causes of action for defamation, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, and negligent interference with an economic relationship, all forms of injurious falsehood subject to the privileges in section 47 and following, including section 43.8. ( Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386 , 182 Cal. Rptr. 438 .) Mercy's inclusion of the Jensen memorandum in the materials sent to Roseville is the source of Dr. Hassan's claims.

2002In June 1995, Dr. Hassan filed a complaint against Mercy, asserting causes of action for defamation, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, and negligent interference with an economic relationship, all forms of injurious falsehood subject to the privileges in section 47 and following, including section 43.8. ( Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386 , 182 Cal. Rptr. 438 .) Mercy's inclusion of the Jensen memorandum in the materials sent to Roseville is the source of Dr. Hassan's claims.

1990(Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ]; see Kilgore v. Younger, supra, 30 Cal.3d 770, 782 .) We recently held in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 212 , that the privilege of section 47(2) extends to any communication: “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (See, e.g., Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1124 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 315

1990(Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ]; see Kilgore v. Younger, supra, 30 Cal.3d 770, 782 .) We recently held in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 212 , that the privilege of section 47(2) extends to any communication: “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (See, e.g., Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1124 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 315

2006(See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] [abuse of process does not lie for filing and maintenance of prior lawsuit, even if done for an improper purpose].) Likewise, the interference with contract claim appears barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

2006(See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] [abuse of process does not lie for filing and maintenance of prior lawsuit, even if done for an improper purpose].) Likewise, the interference with contract claim appears barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

2023(Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 364 (Hagberg).) Similarly, complaints to a governmental agency are absolutely privileged by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), which “protects ‘ “communication to an official administrative agency . . . designed to prompt action by that agency . . . .” ’ ” (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015 ; accord, Hagberg, at pp. 360-361 [reports to “ ‘ “public 16 authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing” ’ ” are subject to privilege in Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)]; Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal

2005(Id. at p. 746.) The court of appeal held: “While we agree that a report to police is subject to the privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), we conclude that placing someone under a ‘citizen’s arrest’ is not a ‘publication or broadcast’ within the meaning of section 47, and thus not privileged, [f] In Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 ], the Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege shields a citizen from liability based on a report to police of potential criminal activity: ‘[A] communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an offici

2026“Section 47, subdivision (c) extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests.” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 287 .) “This privilege applies to communications between church members on church matters.” (Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1556 .) Plaintiffs argue the common interest privilege is inapplicable here because the recipients of the e-mail were affiliated with different dioceses.

2021(Ibid.; see also Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065 .) Because there is no factual dispute over the content of the statements Lopez made at the press conference and in the Los Angeles Times article, whether the privilege is applicable is a question of law. ( Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 278-279.) Legislative Proceeding Privilege Section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a “privileged publication” is one made “[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . .” Construing section 47, subdivision (b) p

2016“Thus, statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require any showing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest. [Citations.]” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 .) Moreover, “communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation] . . . [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16. [C

2014(Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 29 .) The privilege governs "not only testimony in court and statements made in pleadings, but also statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit, whether in preparation for anticipated litigation or to investigate the feasibility of filing a lawsuit." (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 361 (Hagberg).) The section 47(b) unqualified privilege also applies to statements made to police officers to report suspected criminal activity.

1994In any ... (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law. . . .’ Plaintiff concedes, as he must, that an arbitration hearing falls within the scope of the privilege because of its analogy to a judicial proceeding.” (Id. at p. 364, italics added.) The court then continued: “Nonetheless, [plaintiff] urges that the ‘tortious nature and purpose’ of defendant’s alleged action takes his cause of action outside the privilege of section 47 . . . .” (Ibid.) The court in Ribas then analyzed and rejected this argument, concluding that the purpose of the “judicial proc

1994In any ... (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law. . . .’ Plaintiff concedes, as he must, that an arbitration hearing falls within the scope of the privilege because of its analogy to a judicial proceeding.” (Id. at p. 364, italics added.) The court then continued: “Nonetheless, [plaintiff] urges that the ‘tortious nature and purpose’ of defendant’s alleged action takes his cause of action outside the privilege of section 47 . . . .” (Ibid.) The court in Ribas then analyzed and rejected this argument, concluding that the purpose of the “judicial proc

2019Courts have held, *810 for example, that the absolute litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) -a provision that operates "as a limitation on liability, precluding use of ... protected communications and statements as the basis for a tort action other than for malicious prosecution" ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634 , 638, fn. 1, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 , italics omitted)-is an affirmative defense subject to principles of forfeiture and waiver ( Stevens v. Snow (1923) 191 Cal. 58 , 64, 214 P. 968 ; see also, e.g., Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4t

2019Courts have held, *810 for example, that the absolute litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) -a provision that operates "as a limitation on liability, precluding use of ... protected communications and statements as the basis for a tort action other than for malicious prosecution" ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634 , 638, fn. 1, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 , italics omitted)-is an affirmative defense subject to principles of forfeiture and waiver ( Stevens v. Snow (1923) 191 Cal. 58 , 64, 214 P. 968 ; see also, e.g., Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4t

2023For the purposes of section 47’s qualified privilege, “malice” means that the defendant (1) “ ‘was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff,’ ” or (2) “ ‘lacked reasonable grounds for [its] belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.’ ” (Sanborn v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413 ; Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 721 ; Civ. Code, § 48a, subd. (d)(4) [defining “actual malice” as “hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff”].) The purpose of this privilege is to bar any tort action based on a prote

2022If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.” [Citation.]’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘On review of an order granting JNOV, we “‘must resolve any conflict in the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the jury’s verdict.’”’” (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047-1048 .) The Court Did Not Err by Granting the JNOV Motion A. Privilege Under Section 47 To be actionable as defamation, a statement cannot be privileged. (§§ 45, 46; Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 68

1993There, we also upheld the recovery of statutory penalties for violations of Penal Code section 632, noting that the right to such penalties accrued “at the moment of the violation [and] is not barred by the judicial privilege.” ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 365 .) However, we applied the privilege of section 47(b) to bar plaintiff’s tort claims for damages resulting from the testimonial use of the contents of the overhead conversation, finding “the purpose of the . . . [litigation] privilege ... no less relevant” to plaintiff’s claim. ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 364 .) In Kimmel v. Goland, supra, 51 Cal.3d 202 , we

1993There, we also upheld the recovery of statutory penalties for violations of Penal Code section 632, noting that the right to such penalties accrued "at the moment of the violation [and] is not barred by the judicial privilege." ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 365 .) However, we applied the privilege of section 47(b) to bar plaintiff's tort claims for damages resulting from the testimonial use of the contents of the overhead conversation, finding "the purpose of the ... [litigation] privilege ... no less relevant" to plaintiff's claim. ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 364 .) In Kimmel v. Goland, supra, 51 Cal.3d 202 , we a

2017We note that the Legislature specifically prohibited certain litigation related activity when it passed the Rosenthal Act in 1977, presumably aware of the extant broad litigation privilege in section 47." ( Komarova , at pp. 339-340, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) The court recognized, however, that whether application of the litigation privilege would render the Rosenthal Act significantly inoperable was "a closer question." ( Komarova , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 340 , 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) The defendant argued there was no need to find an exception to the litigation privilege for Rosenthal Act cl

2017We note that the Legislature specifically prohibited certain litigation related activity when it passed the Rosenthal Act in 1977, presumably aware of the extant broad litigation privilege in section 47." ( Komarova , at pp. 339-340, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) The court recognized, however, that whether application of the litigation privilege would render the Rosenthal Act significantly inoperable was "a closer question." ( Komarova , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 340 , 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 .) The defendant argued there was no need to find an exception to the litigation privilege for Rosenthal Act cl

1987(See also Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 386, 390-391 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 438 ].) [6] While courts have argued about the scope of the privilege (see Barbary Coast Furniture Co. v. Sjolie (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 319, 332-335 [ 213 Cal. Rptr. 168 ]), it is clear that "the privilege has been applied to publications which were private communications between parties and which communications were related not only to actual but potential court actions." ( Rosenthal, supra, 135 Cal. App.3d at p. 126 .) (3a) Unless some other exception to the privilege applies, it seems clea

1987(See also Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386, 390-391 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 438 ].) 6 While courts have argued about the scope of the privilege (see Barbary Coast Furniture Co. v. Sjolie (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 319, 332-335 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]), it is clear that “the privilege has been applied to publications which were private communications between parties and which communications were related not only to actual but potential court actions.” (Rosenthal, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 126 .) Unless some other exception to the privilege applies, it seems clear to us that

2024(Schep, at p. 1336; Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 340 (Kachlon).) However, section 47 contains an absolute privilege (the litigation privilege) under subdivision (b) and a qualified privilege (the common interest privilege) under subdivision (c) (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 ), and section 2924, subdivision (d) does not specify which of section 47’s two immunity provisions applies to trustees.

2024(Schep, at p. 1336; Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 340 (Kachlon).) However, section 47 contains an absolute privilege (the litigation privilege) under subdivision (b) and a qualified privilege (the common interest privilege) under subdivision (c) (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 ), and section 2924, subdivision (d) does not specify which of section 47’s two immunity provisions applies to trustees.

2006The so-called official duty privilege reposes in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which states with remarkable succinctness: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [][] (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.” Within the factual context of this case, the most important court decision impacting the question of whether Herrera’s statements fell within the official duty privilege is Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 640 P.2d 793 ].

2006The so-called official duty privilege reposes in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which states with remarkable succinctness: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [][] (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.” Within the factual context of this case, the most important court decision impacting the question of whether Herrera’s statements fell within the official duty privilege is Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 640 P.2d 793 ].

2023(See, e.g., Trinity, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006 [“To defeat an anti-SLAPP motion, cross-complainants must overcome any substantive defenses that exist.”].) Thus, it is well-established that “a plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing where the litigation privilege precludes liability.” (Malin, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302 , quoting Digerati, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 888 ; see Trinity, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007; Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 ; 3 We are not persuaded that Srinivasan’s arguments concerning the litigation privilege under Civi

2021Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, at 17 pp. 384-385.) The second step of the section 425.16 analysis requires a plaintiff to establish separately a probability of prevailing on each distinct claim for relief: “[T]he plaintiff must make the requisite showing as to each challenged claim that is based on allegations of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 392.) The litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47 applies to “any communication (1) made in judicial

2026(Cf. Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1144, fn. 3 [in dicta, reasoning that Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d) does not apply to statements made in anticipation of litigation].) Wilson correctly notes that the litigation privilege found in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protects prelitigation activity.

2021(Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) The Hawran court said, “[i]t is questionable whether a press release so widely disseminated to the public at large . . . can meet the requirements of the official proceeding privilege.” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283 .) The court cited Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 , in which the court declined to apply the litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b), to press conferences or press releases, “explaining that the ‘ “connection or logical relation” which a communication must bear to litigation in order for the privile

2023The case law does not support this position. “‘[J]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation], . . . such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1115 , quoting Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784 ; see also Hansen v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1544 [“communications

2016“Thus, statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require any showing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest. [Citations.]” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 .) Moreover, “communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation] . . . [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16. [C

2025Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made [¶] . . . [¶] in any . . . official proceeding authorized by law.” (Wang v. Hartunian (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 744, 749 [“a report to police is subject to the privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)”].) This privilege exists in part because “the circumstances under which an individual observes or suspects a crime will frequently involve rapidly unfolding events, conflicting information, quick impressions, uncertainty, and a need for haste, so that accuracy is difficult to ensure and an

2005(Id. at p. 746.) The court of appeal held: “While we agree that a report to police is subject to the privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), we conclude that placing someone under a ‘citizen’s arrest’ is not a ‘publication or broadcast’ within the meaning of section 47, and thus not privileged, [f] In Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 ], the Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege shields a citizen from liability based on a report to police of potential criminal activity: ‘[A] communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an offici