section 12022.7 enhancement in California

2024However, the statute directs the enhancement “shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (g).) Vehicle Code section 2800.3 imposes criminal liability for proximately causing “serious bodily injury.” People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696-697 (Beltran) held a section 12022.7 enhancement cannot be applied to a conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 2800.3 because the terms “serious bodily injury” in the Vehicle Code and “great bodily injury” in section 12022.7 have “substantially the same meaning.” (Beltran, at p. 696; s

2019We are mindful, however, that in arguing Section 12022.7, subdivision (g), applies here, defendant relies heavily on Beltran, in which the court of appeal reversed a Section 12022.7 enhancement after concluding “great bodily injury is an element of the felony offense of evading a pursuing peace officer.” (People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 697 .) As relevant to that case, section 2800.3 provided that a person convicted of evading a peace officer under section 2800.1 could be punished as a felon if he proximately caused death or serious bodily injury.

2026(See People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 935 [great bodily injury enhancements under § 12022.7, subd. (g), “simply do not apply to murder or manslaughter”].) The argument is forfeited because McIntire raises it for the first time in his reply brief and has not shown good cause for failing to raise it sooner.

2021An open plea is “one under which the defendant is not offered any promises. [Citation.] In other words, the defendant 9 Weaver also addressed a separate issue, whether the defendant was properly sentenced for both gross vehicular manslaughter based on the deceased victim, plus a great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7 based on the surviving victim’s injuries, even though the surviving victim was not the subject of a separate charge. ( Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1335.) Weaver was later disapproved on this point by People v. Cook, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 935-937, t

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2021First, although the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement is properly imposed only on defendants “who directly perform the act that causes the physical injury to the victim” (People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 ), the jury instructions given in Savage’s case with respect to that enhancement were not before the superior court and are not part of the record on appeal, even as augmented at the request of the 13 Attorney General.5 Accordingly, there is no way to tell if the jury was properly instructed or if, like the jury in Cole, it was told the enhancement could be found true if

2026Section 12022.7 Enhancement In Hawkins, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 1373 , the court held that a defendant could not be sentenced both for the crime of battery causing serious bodily injury and for the enhancement in section 12022.7 of inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.

2026Section 12022.7 Enhancement In Hawkins, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 1373 , the court held that a defendant could not be sentenced both for the crime of battery causing serious bodily injury and for the enhancement in section 12022.7 of inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.

2023People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14 , 55-57; People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387, 397, 399 .) In this case, the entirety of the sentences on counts 3 and 4, including of necessity the section 12022.7, subdivision (b) enhancements, were stayed pursuant to section 654, with the sentence on count 1 being the primary sentence to be executed.

2017He argues that imposition of both enhancements violates the Penal Code section 654 prohibition against multiple punishments for a single act. 4 This issue was addressed in People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 ] (Arndt), with that court holding the imposition of a Vehicle Code section 23558 multiple victim enhancement in addition to a Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) great bodily injury enhancement violated the *138 statutory proscription against multiple punishments.

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2017(CALCRIM No. 620 ; Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656 , 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Legal cause is the same as proximate cause. ( Lombardo , at p. 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) None of these forms of causation are sufficient to sustain the imposition of a GBI enhancement under section 12022.7(a). ( Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 336, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ; Guzman , supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 764, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 .)

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2024(Id. at pp. 247–248, citing People v. Wells (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 497, 505 (Wells) and People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 631 (Allen).) The Wells court observed that whereas the first paragraph of section 12022.7 specifically stated that enhancements applied to individuals who inflicted great bodily injury during the attempted commission of a felony, the paragraph listing exempted crimes did not specifically include attempts.

1993Thus, the legislation is grounded in a reasonable legislative purpose.” (People v. Wells (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 497, 505 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) “The law is quite clear that while section 12022.7 prohibits enhancement for murder, attempted murder is a separate crime not covered by the statute and may be enhanced.” (People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ].) In the face of this prior analogous authority, there is no reason to construe the statute to exempt attempted manslaughter from the enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury.

2024Specifically, the CDCR noted that, in People v. Gonzalez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 (Gonzalez), the Court of Appeal held that a defendant could not be given separate sentences for enhancements under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), and 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C)—one of the terms had to be stayed.

2023Defendant also argues that the grounds for dismissal of an enhancement set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(F) apply, i.e., “[t]he current offense is not a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5” However, the People are correct that section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8) states that violent felonies include “[a]ny felony in 5 which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on a person other than an accomplice, which has been charged and proved as provided for in Section 12022.7 . . . .” (See also People v. Gonzalez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1330 [defendant’s infl

2015(See People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 [“ ‘serious bodily injury,’ as used in section 4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who, in the commission of a [specified] felony . . . , personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, or death, to any person other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) 10 243, is ‘ “essentially equivalent” ’ to ‘ “great bodily injury,” ’ a

2015(See People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 752 [abrasions, contusions, bruising and swelling may establish great bodily injury]; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148 [loss of consciousness may qualify as “serious bodily injury” 4].) Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the great bodily injury enhancement in the interests of justice under section 1385. 4 It is well-established that “ ‘serious bodily injury,’ as used in section 243, is ‘ “essentially equivalent” ’ to ‘ “great bodily injury,” ’ as used . . . in the section 12022.7 enhancement for

2016In other words, Taylor argues that “serious” is not “great.” California law is to the contrary. “‘[S]erious bodily injury,’ as used in section 243, is ‘“essentially equivalent”’ to ‘“great bodily injury,”’ as used . . . in the section 12022.7 enhancement for the infliction of such injury on a person during the commission of a felony.” (People v. Wade, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 ; see People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1870 [“a felony battery committed by means of ‘serious 33 bodily injury’ (Pen.

2015(See People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 752 [abrasions, contusions, bruising and swelling may establish great bodily injury]; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148 [loss of consciousness may qualify as “serious bodily injury” 4].) Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the great bodily injury enhancement in the interests of justice under section 1385. 4 It is well-established that “ ‘serious bodily injury,’ as used in section 243, is ‘ “essentially equivalent” ’ to ‘ “great bodily injury,” ’ as used . . . in the section 12022.7 enhancement for

2024(Cf. People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 424 [intent to inflict great bodily injury not required for an enhancement under § 12022.7]; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735 , 743 [“although in theory, a finding that a defendant personally used a firearm does not in itself prove a defendant is the actual killer [citation], the facts of a particular case may support only that conclusion”]; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 , 598 [“Because an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) [for personal discharge of a firearm] does not require that the defendant acted e

2022The trial court did not rely on this enhancement when determining appellant’s eligibility for relief, and instead noted that it had “not been able to find any authority for the proposition that enhancement under section 12022.7 precludes relief as a matter of law.” (Accord, People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 424 [section 12022.7 does not require that a defendant intend to inflict great bodily injury; “[i]t makes no difference whether defendant intentionally inflicted the injury . . . or the injury was inflicted accidentally”].) 8 Section 1170.95, as enacted by S.B. 1437, permits indiv

2025(See, e.g., People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 , 489-490.) Accordingly, we conclude that the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement must be stricken because great bodily injury is an element of battery with serious bodily injury within the meaning of subdivision (g).

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2021(See People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1130 .) Second, the trial court imposed two 3-year terms for the great bodily injury enhancements under section 12022.7.

2015(People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1130 .) Specifically, associated with count 1, the court stayed the enhancements under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), 12022.53, subdivision (b), and 12022.53, subdivision (c).

2016(People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163 .) We agree with the People’s concluding point that although the section 12022.7 enhancement is inapplicable to this case, on remand the trial court may reconsider defendant’s sentence, subject to the limitation defendant’s sentence cannot exceed the trial court’s original sentence.

2015(People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 882, 887-888 [elements of torture are infliction of great bodily injury as defined in section 12022.7 and specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering].) The court imposed an unstayed three-year term on each 54 defendant for the section 12022.7 enhancement appended to the robbery count, and defendants assert on appeal this was error.27 Defendants argue, and the People do not dispute, that section 654 applies to enhancements that go to the nature of the offense and can bar multiple punishment for the same aspect of a criminal act (People v

2023“Because the ‘great bodily injury’ contemplated by section 12022.7 is substantially the same as the ‘serious bodily injury’ element of section 243, subdivision (d) [citation], the section 12022.7 enhancement cannot be applied to the crime of battery with serious bodily injury unless it involves domestic violence.” (People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531 .) There was no allegation of domestic violence here. 7 actually charged and convicted.” (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1072 .) Had the trial judge that took appellant’s plea provided further clarity, there would have been no conf

2022(Hawkins, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 .) The Hawkins court reasoned: “Because the ‘great bodily injury’ contemplated by section 12022.7 is substantially the same as the ‘serious bodily injury’ element of section 243, subdivision (d) [citation], the section 12022.7 enhancement cannot be applied to the crime of battery with serious bodily injury unless it involves domestic violence.” (Ibid.) On reply, defendant argues that in this case a section 12022.7 enhancement was never charged and “[t]he legislature has specifically imposed a pleading and proof requirement in section 667.5, subdivisio

2012(People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451 , 999 P.2d 675 ]; accord, People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1871 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 ]; People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1141 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 371 ]; see also People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ] [“substantially the same meaning”]; but see People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 26 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 ] [although the “usual assumption” is that the p

2012(People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451 , 999 P.2d 675 ]; accord, People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1871 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 ]; People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1141 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 371 ]; see also People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ] [“substantially the same meaning”]; but see People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 26 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 ] [although the “usual assumption” is that the p

2022That statute provides, “Any person who personally inflicts [GBI] on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) However, defendant’s liability for Alex’s assault on Johnny with the knife was premised on aiding and abetting, and “a person who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhancement penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 692 (Ollo); accord, People

2009(Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 571 .)’ ” (Bland at p. 337 , italics omitted, quoting People v. Rodriguez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 341, 348-349 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ].) Thus, Bland simply reiterated Cole's rationale that another person’s infliction of great *620 bodily injury does not derivatively impose liability for the sentence enhancement under section 12022.7.

2017(CALCRIM No. 620 ; Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656 , 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Legal cause is the same as proximate cause. ( Lombardo , at p. 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) None of these forms of causation are sufficient to sustain the imposition of a GBI enhancement under section 12022.7(a). ( Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 336, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ; Guzman , supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 764, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 .)

2017(CALCRIM No. 620 ; Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656 , 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Legal cause is the same as proximate cause. ( Lombardo , at p. 665, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) None of these forms of causation are sufficient to sustain the imposition of a GBI enhancement under section 12022.7(a). ( Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 336, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ; Guzman , supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 764, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 .)

2021(See, e.g., People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531 [“Because the ‘great bodily injury’ contemplated by section 12022.7 is substantially the same as the ‘serious bodily injury’ element of section 243, subdivision (d) [citation], the section 12022.7 enhancement cannot be applied to the crime of battery with serious bodily injury unless it involves domestic violence”]; see also People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1558-1559 [because “great bodily injury is an element of mayhem . . . an enhancement for great bodily injury cannot be imposed”].) 6 sentence of eight years on count 1

2014(People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1575 ; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1558-1560 .) D.

2015Just because the crime of burglary may have been complete for purposes of a conviction "does not dictate the conclusion that the crime is complete for all purposes." (People v. Walls (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 447, 453 (Walls), italics added [burglary with sentence enhancement under § 12022.7], quoted approvingly in People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 424 (Elder) [robbery with sentence enhancement under § 12022.7].) As applicable here, section 2933.1, subdivision (a) limits the amount of "worktime credit" for "any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Secti

1983In People v. Walls (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 447 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 460 ], the court held that a section 12022.7 enhancement (great bodily injury) could lie where the injury was inflicted after the actual entry.

2001(See, e.g., People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 463 P.2d 400 ] [enhanced punishment under former § 213 for great bodily injury “in the course of commission of [a] robbery”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 714 [enhanced punishment under former §§ 213, 264, & 461 for great bodily injury during the commission of burglary]; People v. Johnson, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 598 [enhancement under § 12022.7 for great bodily injury “in the commission or attempted commission of’ receiving stolen property]; People v. Heston (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 471 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 ] [enhanceme

1984In addition, we acknowledge that “ ‘[sjerious bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ are essentially equivalent elements.” (People v. Corning (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 83, 90-91 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 27 ], citing People v. Kent (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 130, 136-137 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 35 ].) The term “great bodily injury,” defined for purposes of enhancement in Penal Code section 12022.7 as “significant or substantial physical injury,” has been held to include a broken jaw (People v. Johnson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 598, 609 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]) and a broken hand (People v. Kent, supra).

2021An open plea is “one under which the defendant is not offered any promises. [Citation.] In other words, the defendant 9 Weaver also addressed a separate issue, whether the defendant was properly sentenced for both gross vehicular manslaughter based on the deceased victim, plus a great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7 based on the surviving victim’s injuries, even though the surviving victim was not the subject of a separate charge. ( Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1335.) Weaver was later disapproved on this point by People v. Cook, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 935-937, t

2021An open plea is “one under which the defendant is not offered any promises. [Citation.] In other words, the defendant 9 Weaver also addressed a separate issue, whether the defendant was properly sentenced for both gross vehicular manslaughter based on the deceased victim, plus a great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7 based on the surviving victim’s injuries, even though the surviving victim was not the subject of a separate charge. ( Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1335.) Weaver was later disapproved on this point by People v. Cook, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 935-937, t

2025Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape (count 11) and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), that the victim was a minor 14 years of age or older (§ 264, subd. (c)(2)), and that he inflicted great bodily injury during the rape (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c)(1)), & (d)(6)), in exchange for a stipulated sentence and that the remaining charges would be dismissed pursuant to a Harvey waiver.3 The court sentenced defendant pursuant to the negotiated disposition—a 25-years-to-life sentence for count 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 . 3 11 and a stayed three-ye

2024(See People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 .) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 11 years in prison, consisting of the middle term of seven years on count five, one year, or one-third the middle term, on count one, a concurrent low term of two years on count seven, one year, one-third of the three-year term, for the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement, and two years for the section 12022.1 enhancement.

2023(People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1066 ; see also People v. Reyes-Tornero (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 368 , 378–379 [following Oates].) In this situation, the enhancements “ ‘simply follow from’ ” the defendant’s substantive convictions and “ ‘do not constitute separate crimes or offenses, but simply are the basis for the imposition of additional punishment for the underlying substantive offense.’ ” (Oates, at p. 1066; see Reyes-Tornero, at pp. 379 & 380.) Thus, because section 654 does not apply to the Titus’s conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling, it does not apply to the related

2016This result is contrary to the notion that “ ‘[a] defendant who commits an act of violence ... by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.’ ” 7 (Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1063 .) I encourage the Supreme Court to consider whether Oates should apply when multiple section 12022.7 enhancements are applied to a single great bodily injury. 8 Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 1, 2017, S238652.

2015(People v. Brown, supra, at pp. 272–273.) Similarly, in People v. Corban (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1111 , the appellate court upheld the imposition of a section 12022.7 enhancement appended to a conviction for child endangerment, even though the defendant also was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death of that same child.

2015In People v. Corban (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1118-1119 , the defendant pleaded no contest to a count of involuntary manslaughter and 1 a violation of section 273a, admitting a section 12022.7 enhancement attached to the latter, then argued on appeal that the enhancement was improper because only a section 12022.95 enhancement could apply where the victim died.