section 3051 youth offender parole hearing in California

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2026(Heard, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) Carrillo’s sentence exceeds the sentence in Heard, and the People concede it “unquestionably exceeds the juvenile offender’s natural lifespan.” (See also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 440, 450–451 [10 years plus 130 years to life constituted functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265 , 267–268 [40 years plus 70 years to life].) Carrillo’s youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 does not affect his eligibility to seek section 1170(d) resentencing because section 3051 relief became available only a

2026(Id., subd. (h).) A defendant who qualifies for a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 is entitled to a proceeding in the trial court at which the defendant “may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284 ; see Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451 [offender eligible under section 3051 may request Franklin proceeding despite sentence being final].) B.

2026(Id., subd. (h).) A defendant who qualifies for a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 is entitled to a proceeding in the trial court at which the defendant “may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284 ; see Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451 [offender eligible under section 3051 may request Franklin proceeding despite sentence being final].) B.

2026The statute excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. [Citation.]” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838-839; see § 3051, subd. (h).) In Hardin, the defendant challenged his ineligibility for a section 3051 parole hearing on equal protection grounds.

2026(Barner, at p. 664, citing People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1119 ; People v. K.P. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 331, 343 (K.P.) [rational basis review applies to challenge to firearm enhancements for insanity acquittees]; People v. Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 (Alvarez) [rational basis review applies to firearm enhancement’s differential treatment between offenders who commit crimes with firearms and those who do not]; Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848 [rational basis review applies to challenge to statute prescribing youth offender parole hearings under § 3051].)4 West’s re

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2026(Heard, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) Carrillo’s sentence exceeds the sentence in Heard, and the People concede it “unquestionably exceeds the juvenile offender’s natural lifespan.” (See also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 440, 450–451 [10 years plus 130 years to life constituted functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265 , 267–268 [40 years plus 70 years to life].) Carrillo’s youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 does not affect his eligibility to seek section 1170(d) resentencing because section 3051 relief became available only a

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2026Youth offender parole under section 3051 In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74 , the United States Supreme Court, emphasizing juvenile offenders’ “capacity for change and limited moral culpability,” held that imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

2025(Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800–801.) Valdez notes that “Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) ‘ “uses the phrase 2 PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication ‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” ’ the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.” (Valdez, at p. 800.) The court in Valdez read Heard to say that a sentence of over 100 years to life was “the functional equivalent of LWOP despite yout

2026The statute excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.” (Id. at pp. 838-839; see § 3051, subd. (h); see also People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 , 116; People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 , 484 (Briscoe).) Defendants who were 18 to 25 years old at the time of their offenses but who are ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 due to their sentences are not entitled to a Franklin hearing.

2025(People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 , 127–128 (Williams) [“[T]he Legislature could rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole under section 3051 based on a combination of concerns: the increased risk of recidivism that One Strike offenders pose and the aggravated nature of their offenses.”].) Defendant’s only retort to this precedent is that Eighth Amendment law is “evolving.” In support of this proposition, he cites Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 18 Cal.4th 585 , 600–602, and Justice Liu’s dissent in Williams.

2026(Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279, 281.) “Such a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) And because defendants eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051 are not serving an LWOP term or its functional equivalent, they are ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2026Thus, parole eligibility under section 3051 may render a juvenile offender ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d), because the offender is no longer serving LWOP or its functional equivalent.” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128.) “In reaching this conclusion, we part ways with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby, each of which concluded that the availability of a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 does not render a juvenile offender ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d).” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.) “In our view, the clear inte

2025(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) 12 1054-1061 (Bagsby); accord People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650 , 653; but see People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1260 [availability of section 3051 youth offender parole hearing “moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP”]; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , 1123 [youth offender parole hearing eligibility means defendant is no longer serving LWOP or functional equivalent].) Based on this precedent, juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equi

2019(Ibid.) The issue in Williams was “whether a youth offender granted parole under section 3051 is required to serve a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense committed after 13 age 25.” (Williams, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 797 .) Williams relied on another case addressing this same issue, In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972 .

2018He was sentenced to an additional term of four years, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. ( Id . at pp. 975-976, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 .) After 35 years in prison, the Board found Trejo suitable for parole under section 3051.

2025(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) 12 1054-1061 (Bagsby); accord People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650 , 653; but see People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1260 [availability of section 3051 youth offender parole hearing “moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP”]; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , 1123 [youth offender parole hearing eligibility means defendant is no longer serving LWOP or functional equivalent].) Based on this precedent, juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equi

2025(See Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [“parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render those offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d)”]; but see People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1260 [“The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP”].) 4 equivalent of LWOP,4 and we disagree with him that his “parole eligibility at age 56 will not afford him a life worth living.” Because defendant’s sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWO

2022(People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769 , 776 (Acosta).) In subsequent years, the Legislature expanded eligibility for youth offender parole hearings under section 3051, “‘recogniz[ing] that the maturity process does not end at 18 and in many cases extends to at least 25 years of age.’” (Acosta, at p. 776.) The statutory amendments recognized that young adults, like juveniles, are not yet fully matured and have a lower degree of culpability and an increased potential for rehabilitation compared to adult offenders.

2022(Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 (conc. opn. of Dato, J.); Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 (maj. opn. of Goethals, J., joined by Bedsworth, Acting P. J.); People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016 , 1041 (conc. opn. of Segal, J.); In re Jones, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486-487 (conc. opn. of Pollak, P. J., joined by Streeter, J.); see also Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436, fn. 7 [acknowledging tension between § 3051’s parole eligibility scheme and equal protection principles]; People v. Escamilla (Mar. 18, 2021, F077568) [nonpub. opn.] (maj. opn. of Meeh

2026(Heard, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) Carrillo’s sentence exceeds the sentence in Heard, and the People concede it “unquestionably exceeds the juvenile offender’s natural lifespan.” (See also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 440, 450–451 [10 years plus 130 years to life constituted functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265 , 267–268 [40 years plus 70 years to life].) Carrillo’s youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 does not affect his eligibility to seek section 1170(d) resentencing because section 3051 relief became available only a

2025(See People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 , 267-268; see also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 450-451.) His potential eligibility for youth offender parole under section 3051 does not alter that conclusion.

2022Assuming without deciding that Esquivel is similarly situated to other youth offenders eligible for parole hearings under section 3051 (see Miranda, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 183, review granted), Esquivel bears the burden to “negative every conceivable basis that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881 .) Esquivel relies on Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 183 to support his claim that no rational basis exists for the “Legislature to afford youth offender parole hearings to first degree murderers while denying them to One 10 Esquivel “does not di

2022Courts of Appeal are split as to whether excluding persons like Robinson sentenced under the One Strike law from youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 holding it does and People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475 , holding it does not.

2024It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a 6 meaningful opportunity for release established.”3 (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; see In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 431 [“Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were established by the Legislature in 2013, following a series of United States and California Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile offenders.”].) Section 3051 initially applied to offenses committed before the offender turned 18

2023It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a 6 meaningful opportunity for release established.”3 (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; see In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 431 [“Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were established by the Legislature in 2013, following a series of United States and California Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile offenders.”].) Section 3051 initially applied to offenses committed before the offender turned 18

2026(See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220 , 230–231, quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [“ ‘A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.’ ”].) Nothing in our decision precludes Nowden from filing in the trial court a motion for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 and/or a motion for a proceeding pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 . 23 DO, J.

2026(See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220 , 230-231, quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [“ ‘A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.’ ”].) Nothing in our decision precludes Nowden from filing in the trial court a motion for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 and/or a motion for a proceeding pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 . 23 DO, J.

2025(Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800–801.) Valdez notes that “Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) ‘ “uses the phrase 2 PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication ‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” ’ the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.” (Valdez, at p. 800.) The court in Valdez read Heard to say that a sentence of over 100 years to life was “the functional equivalent of LWOP despite yout

2025Relying on Lopez, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at page 654 , those courts reasoned that because section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), uses the phrase “ ‘was sentenced,’ ” eligibility for relief depends only on the character of the original sentence imposed, not the sentence being served at the time of the petition.

2025(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) 12 1054-1061 (Bagsby); accord People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650 , 653; but see People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 , 1260 [availability of section 3051 youth offender parole hearing “moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP”]; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117 , 1123 [youth offender parole hearing eligibility means defendant is no longer serving LWOP or functional equivalent].) Based on this precedent, juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equi

2025(People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058 , 1062 (Thompson) [Attorney General “concedes that a juvenile offender’s sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of life without parole. [He] further concedes that denying relief to that category of juvenile offenders violates equal protection guarantees”].) Based on the Attorney General’s concession, the court in People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650 observed that under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th, “the Attorney General concedes the trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s eligibility for a youthful offender parole

2021It determined the defendant was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1131 .) Our Supreme Court held the trial court must provide a defendant “and the prosecution an opportunity to supplement the record” with information and “the trial court may exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (Id. at pp.

2021It determined the defendant was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1131 .) Our Supreme Court held the trial court must provide a defendant “and the prosecution an opportunity to supplement the record” with information and “the trial court may exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (Id. at pp.

2026Such a sentence constitutes a de facto [LWOP] sentence.” (Id. at p. 629.) The court further explained that Franklin did not require a different result because although defendant’s “sentence as it currently operates is no longer the functional equivalent of [LWOP], this does not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto 8 [LWOP] sentence at the time it was imposed.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629, italics omitted.) The opinions in People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 and People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 followed Heard’s reasoning, finding that the availability

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v.

2023(See Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 102–103 [concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing as a matter of equal protection]; Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 864 [concluding that “the differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced under the Three Strikes law for purposes of early parole consideration for youth offenders is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of addressing recidivism and does not violate equal protection”]; Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167 [holding that “the differential treatment of youth offenders

2022(Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 (conc. opn. of Dato, J.); Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 (maj. opn. of Goethals, J., joined by Bedsworth, Acting P. J.); People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016 , 1041 (conc. opn. of Segal, J.); In re Jones, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486-487 (conc. opn. of Pollak, P. J., joined by Streeter, J.); see also Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436, fn. 7 [acknowledging tension between § 3051’s parole eligibility scheme and equal protection principles]; People v. Escamilla (Mar. 18, 2021, F077568) [nonpub. opn.] (maj. opn. of Meeh

2021Section 3051 “Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were established by the Legislature in 2013, following a series of United States and California Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile offenders.” (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 , 431; see Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham); Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller); Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 (Roper).) Section 3051 “provides that an offender who committed a ‘controlling offense’ as a youth is entitled to a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ a

2019“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 .) However, although equal protection principles do not entitle defendant to resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), the exclusion of LWOP offenders between the ages of 18 and 25 from the right to a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051 does not necessarily withstand scrutiny under those principles.

2024Consequently, any plausible reason for distinguishing between [two classes] need not exist in every scenario in which the statutes might apply.” (Johnson v. Dept. of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887 .) Thus, the Legislature could choose to exclude young adults sentenced to LWOP from the relief otherwise available to other young adult offenders under section 3051 without jeopardizing the entire remedial scheme.

2024Consequently, any plausible reason for distinguishing between [two classes] need not exist in every scenario in which the statutes might apply.” (Johnson v. Dept. of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887 .) Thus, the Legislature could choose to exclude young adults sentenced to LWOP from the relief otherwise available to other young adult offenders under section 3051 without jeopardizing the entire remedial scheme.

2026(See People v. Mason (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 411 , 415.) Prince argues section 3501, subdivision (h), violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions because it treats young adult offenders serving LWOP sentences differently than other young adult offenders sentenced to non- 5 LWOP terms, and differently than juveniles sentenced to LWOP.

2025The statute excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of [LWOP] for a crime committed after the age of 18. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 838-839; see also § 3051, subd. (h) [“This section shall not apply . . . to cases in which an individual is sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age”].) Individuals eligible for a youth offender parole hearing are entitled to a Franklin proceeding, which provides “an opportunity to make a record of youth-related mitigating evidence relevant to a future parole hearing.” (People

2026(Isayev, at p. 1142.) Specifically, we rejected Heard’s reasoning that “because section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), uses the phrase “ ‘was sentenced,’ ” eligibility for relief depends only on the character of the original sentence imposed, not the sentence being served at the time of the petition.” (Ibid.) We explained that in enacting section 1170, subdivision (d), the Legislature sought “to provide (certain) juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms an avenue ‘to seek recall of their sentences and resentencing to a term that includes an opportunity for parole.’ ” (Isayev, at p. 1142, quoting In re

2025Citing In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040 , Tamayo admits section 1170(d)(1)(A) “was never designed to correct constitutional violations.” And Tamayo does not argue his sentence is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.6 Instead, by invoking Heard, Tamayo is arguing that denying him the benefits of section 1170(d)(1)(A) violates his right to equal protection. “[I]n contrast to a cruel and unusual punishment analysis, the equal protection inquiry asks whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature to treat certain individuals differently 6 He acknowledges that “[t]he possibility of yout

2025(See, e.g., People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 , 487 [although Hardin II foreclosed one of multiple challenges to the defendant’s exclusion from early parole consideration under § 3051, another survived and entitled him to a Franklin hearing]; People v. Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 [“Any offender that brings a Cook motion must establish his entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing in his moving papers (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 ), which is how Sands raised the equal protection issue”].) Before us, Vu provides potential claims regarding eligibility, which h

2023(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278 .) Stated differently, the laws “effectively reform[ed] the parole eligibility date of a [youth] offender’s original sentence so that the longest possible term of incarceration before parole eligibility is 25 years.” (Id. at p. 281; see People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116 , 125 [“section 3051 is, in part, a sentencing statute”]; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193 , 205 [section 3051 “ ‘impacts the length of sentence served.’ ”]; In re Hoze (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 309 , 315 [“For youth offenders granted parole under section 3051, the statute overr

2024Agreeing with Hardin, the Court of Appeal raised for comparison two hypothetical offenders who would be eligible for a section 3051 parole hearing: (1) “a 20 year old who shot and killed his victim one day, committed a robbery the next, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life”; and (2) an individual “who committed multiple violent crimes . . . and received a parole-eligible indeterminate life term that far exceeded his or her life expectancy.” (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 289.) In the court’s view, these crimes “cannot rationally” be considered less severe than “

2023In part, Alvez relies upon People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 , review granted January 11, 2023, S277487 (Hardin) and sympathetic statements by reviewing courts inviting the Legislature to reconsider the parole hearing exclusion of section 3051, subdivision (h).