section 1385 strike conviction in California

2024(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 [dismissal of prior serious felony conviction finding pursuant to section 1385 reviewed for abuse of discretion].) In construing section 1385, subdivision (c) generally, and subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C) specifically, we are guided by long-established principles of statutory interpretation.

2024(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 [dismissal of prior serious felony conviction finding pursuant to section 1385 reviewed for abuse of discretion].) In examining the meaning of section 1385, subdivision (c) generally, and subdivision (c)(2)(B) specifically, we are guided by long-established principles of statutory interpretation.

2026(People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246 , 252-257 (Dain); Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Courts asked to exercise their discretion to dismiss a prior conviction under section 1385, subdivision (a), may not rely on factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes law; instead, they are bound by factors intrinsic to it.

2026(Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 786 .) “Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a ‘judge ... may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.’ ‘In Romero, we held that a trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony, on its own motion, “in 15. furtherance of justice” pursuant to ... section 1385(a).’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 .) A trial court’s failu

2026Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss his prior strike conviction under Penal Code section 1385,1 subdivision (a) and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

2026The parties filed sentencing memoranda and made argument at the September 20, 2024, resentencing hearing. 3 Defendant requested the trial court strike or dismiss five of his prior strike convictions under section 1385, subdivision (a), and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), and dismiss the three-year drug and one-year prior prison term enhancements.

2019Centeno claims the trial court could have struck the robbery conviction under section 1385 as explained in People v. Orabuena (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 84 , 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 ( Orabuena ).

2019Centeno claims the trial court could have struck the robbery conviction under section 1385 as explained in People v. Orabuena (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 84 , 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 ( Orabuena ).

2014Section 1385, however, wipes a defendant’s record clean and “[t]he defendant stands as if he had never been prosecuted for the charged offense.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) Case law affirms our view that a trial court lacks postjudgment jurisdiction to dismiss a final conviction under section 1385.

2014Section 1385, however, wipes a defendant’s record clean and “[t]he defendant stands as if he had never been prosecuted for the charged offense.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) Case law affirms our view that a trial court lacks postjudgment jurisdiction to dismiss a final conviction under section 1385.

2013(See People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 900-901, 906-907 .) Moreover, at no time have the parties taken issue with the trial court’s determination that the prior strike also disqualified defendant from being sentenced to county jail pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h). 3. custody) for day-for-day credits for defendants — even those with prior strike convictions — who serve presentence time in county jail.

2013(See People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 900-901, 906-907 .) 4.

2025And viewing the record as a whole, including the arguments made in the parties briefing, we observe that Reed had invited the court to strike the prior strike conviction under section 1385(c), which Reed argued “necessitates the consideration of mitigating circumstances” and “specifically required courts to ‘consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in [subparagraphs] (A) through (I) are present.’ ” (Italics omitted.) Citing the plain language of the statute and People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke), the

2024Lastly, citing People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 , the court determined that it could not dismiss the prior strike conviction pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c), because the Three Strikes Law is an alternate sentencing scheme and not an enhancement.

2021We find no abuse of discretion. 6 Gant’s several pretrial Romero motions are not at issue here. 9 A trial court may dismiss a prior strike conviction under section 1385 “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) In considering whether to do so, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and h

2021A trial court may dismiss a prior strike conviction under section 1385 “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) In considering whether to do so, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/o

2020(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 503 (Garcia).) Here, the record demonstrates the trial court considered evidence relevant to defendant’s current offense, background, character, and prospects, and arrived at a reasonable decision to deny his Romero motion.

2016(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) When deciding whether to strike a prior conviction, "the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his [or her] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his [or her] background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he [or she] had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Ibid.) "[A] defendant's sentence is als

2018Supp. 7, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 ["a trial court lacks postjudgment jurisdiction to dismiss a final conviction under section 1385"]; People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117 , 122, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 [ruling that the "[u]se of section 1385" to vacate "a long since final judgment of conviction" "would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's strict focus on the language of the statute"]; People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114 , 121, fn. 8, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 [stating that section 1385"has never been held to authorize dismissal of an action after the imposition of sentence and rendition of jud

2018Supp. 7, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 ["a trial court lacks postjudgment jurisdiction to dismiss a final conviction under section 1385"]; People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117 , 122, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 [ruling that the "[u]se of section 1385" to vacate "a long since final judgment of conviction" "would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's strict focus on the language of the statute"]; People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114 , 121, fn. 8, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 [stating that section 1385"has never been held to authorize dismissal of an action after the imposition of sentence and rendition of jud

2009The Three Strikes law provided him with notice that he would be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended. [Citation.] He chose to ignore that notice and commit a subsequent felony.” (Benson, at p. 35.) However, Benson also stated that “a trial court retains discretion in such cases to strike one or more prior felony convictions under section 1385 if the trial court properly concludes that the interests of justice support such action” (Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 36 ), and made this observation in a footnote: “Because the proper exercise of a trial court’s discretion under section 1385 nece

2001We are not faced with that question in the present case, but we believe it is appropriate and prudent to note that in this court’s decision in Benson , we observed that a trial court may strike a prior felony conviction under section 1385, and that we left open the possibility that “there are some circumstances in which two prior felony convictions are so closely connected . . . that a trial court would abuse its discretion under section 1385 if it failed to strike one of the priors.” (People v. Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 36 , and fn. 8.) III For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgm

2019The Rodriguez Court eliminated the unfairness by remanding the matter to the trial court for "a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to section 1385." ( Rodriguez , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 260 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 949 P.2d 31 .) It did not consider whether the error should be reviewed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson ).

2019The Rodriguez Court eliminated the unfairness by remanding the matter to the trial court for "a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to section 1385." ( Rodriguez , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 260 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 949 P.2d 31 .) It did not consider whether the error should be reviewed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson ).

2019The Rodriguez Court eliminated the unfairness by remanding the matter to the trial court for "a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to section 1385." ( Rodriguez , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 260 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 949 P.2d 31 .) It did not consider whether the error should be reviewed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson ).

2019The Rodriguez Court eliminated the unfairness by remanding the matter to the trial court for "a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to section 1385." ( Rodriguez , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 260 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 949 P.2d 31 .) It did not consider whether the error should be reviewed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ) or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson ).

2018Supp. 7, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 ["a trial court lacks postjudgment jurisdiction to dismiss a final conviction under section 1385"]; People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117 , 122, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 [ruling that the "[u]se of section 1385" to vacate "a long since final judgment of conviction" "would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's strict focus on the language of the statute"]; People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114 , 121, fn. 8, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 [stating that section 1385"has never been held to authorize dismissal of an action after the imposition of sentence and rendition of jud

2015(See People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 [trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s petty theft conviction under section 1385 years after defendant completed his sentence was “void [as] an act in excess of jurisdiction”]; People v. Espinoza (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4-9 [relief under section 1385 must be sought while there is still an on-going action, not by postjudgment motion unrelated to any proceeding then pending before the court].) Appellant noticed an appeal, and a certificate of probable cause was issued.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014(See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072-1074 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344 , 202 P.3d 427 ]; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1099 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 202 P.3d 436 ]; People v. Shokur (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406-1407 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 ].) Appellant claims that these cases are inapposite because he is not bringing petitions for habeas corpus, coram nobis, or a nonstatutory motion, and these cases do not address or foreclose section 1385 relief.

2014We will restrictively interpret section 1385 “where there is a statutory scheme designed to effect a particular result and where the invocation of section 1385 would nullify that result.” (People v. Luckett (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 37 ].) Moreover, the power to eliminate a conviction under section 1385 as envisioned by appellant would be more expansive and enduring than that granted under section 1016.5, or petitions for writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and mandate — none of which are available to appellant.

2014We will restrictively interpret section 1385 “where there is a statutory scheme designed to effect a particular result and where the invocation of section 1385 would nullify that result.” (People v. Luckett (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 37 ].) Moreover, the power to eliminate a conviction under section 1385 as envisioned by appellant would be more expansive and enduring than that granted under section 1016.5, or petitions for writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and mandate — none of which are available to appellant.

2004Most Courts of Appeal have held that such a decision is reviewable for abuse of discretion. 5 But one Court of Appeal has stated that “[t]here is no authority granting the appellate courts the ability to review a court’s informed decision to not exercise its section 1385 power in the furtherance of justice.” (People v. Benevides (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 728, 735 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ], fn. omitted (Benevides).) According to Benevides , a court should “not reweigh the circumstances of the case to determine whether, in [its] opinion, the trial court should have, or properly refrained from, exercisi

2004Most Courts of Appeal have held that such a decision is reviewable for abuse of discretion. 5 But one Court of Appeal has stated that “[t]here is no authority granting the appellate courts the ability to review a court’s informed decision to not exercise its section 1385 power in the furtherance of justice.” (People v. Benevides (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 728, 735 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ], fn. omitted (Benevides).) According to Benevides , a court should “not reweigh the circumstances of the case to determine whether, in [its] opinion, the trial court should have, or properly refrained from, exercisi

2026(Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1193 , 1207; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160-161 ; see also Dain at p. 256 .) Those intrinsic factors, as guided by generally applicable sentencing principles, require the court to “consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [a defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had n

2026(Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1193, 1207; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160-161; see also Dain at p. 256.) Those intrinsic factors, as guided by generally applicable sentencing principles, require the court to “consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [a defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not

2026(People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246 , 252-257 (Dain); Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Courts asked to exercise their discretion to dismiss a prior conviction under section 1385, subdivision (a), may not rely on factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes law; instead, they are bound by factors intrinsic to it.

2026(People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 252-257 (Dain); Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Courts asked to exercise their discretion to dismiss a prior conviction under section 1385, subdivision (a), may not rely on factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes law; instead, they are bound by factors intrinsic to it.