section 1385 order of dismissal in California

2024The Court of Appeal expressed misgivings about the practice, fearing it could elevate “the rule of men above the rule of law” or “stultify [a] statutory scheme.” (People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 (McAlonan); see People v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 668, 671 (Montano).) In Orin, we characterized decisions such as these as reflecting the appellate courts’ “considerable opposition to the granting of dismissals under section 1385 in instances where the People are thereby prevented from prosecuting defendants for offenses of which there is probable cause to believe they are

2019(People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 946 .) Appellate courts have shown considerable opposition to the granting of dismissals under section 1385 in instances where the People are thereby prevented from prosecuting defendants for offenses where there is probable cause to believe they are guilty as charged.

2024The Court of Appeal expressed misgivings about the practice, fearing it could elevate “the rule of men above the rule of law” or “stultify [a] statutory scheme.” (People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 (McAlonan); see People v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 668, 671 (Montano).) In Orin, we characterized decisions such as these as reflecting the appellate courts’ “considerable opposition to the granting of dismissals under section 1385 in instances where the People are thereby prevented from prosecuting defendants for offenses of which there is probable cause to believe they are

1989(People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 986 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) Failure to state the reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid.

1978II Judicial precedent likewise refutes any purported distinction between the terms “court” and “magistrate.” Several cases relating to dismissals under section 1385 refer to magistrates as “courts” or “trial courts.” (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 950, fn. 13 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 ]; People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 15, 17 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Superior Court (Mowry) (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 684, 687 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 886 ]; People v. Curtiss (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 123, 125 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Moreover, Court of Appeal decisions have implicitly sustained the exercis

1978II Judicial precedent likewise refutes any purported distinction between the terms “court” and “magistrate.” Several cases relating to dismissals under section 1385 refer to magistrates as “courts” or “trial courts.” (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 950, fn. 13 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 ]; People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 15, 17 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Superior Court (Mowry) (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 684, 687 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 886 ]; People v. Curtiss (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 123, 125 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Moreover, Court of Appeal decisions have implicitly sustained the exercis

2025He cites People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110 (Chavez I), the Court of Appeal case affirmed in Chavez II, supra. Ahn focuses on language in Chavez I, quoted from People v. Barro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 (Barro), that 9 “the effect of a dismissal under section 1385 is to wipe the slate clean as if the defendant never suffered the prior conviction in the initial instance.

2025He cites People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110 (Chavez I), the Court of Appeal case affirmed in Chavez II, supra. Ahn focuses on language in Chavez I, quoted from People v. Barro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 (Barro), that “the effect of a dismissal under section 1385 is to wipe the slate clean as if the defendant never suffered the prior conviction in the initial instance.

2023(People v. Simpson (1944) 66 Cal. App. 2d 319, 329 [].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 127, 136 [].)” (Barro, at p. 67.) It also reasoned that if the Legislature had intended for dismissals under section 1385 to be able to serve as strikes in future instances, it could revise the statute to include that language.

2023(People v. Simpson (1944) 66 Cal. App. 2d 319, 329 [].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 127, 136 [].)” (Barro, at p. 67.) It also reasoned that if the Legislature had intended for dismissals under section 1385 to be able to serve as strikes in future instances, it could revise the statute to include that language.

2024(Ibid.) The leading case in California for determining when the exercise of the broad dismissal authority under section 1385 triggers application of the double jeopardy bar is Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th 260 .

2024Applying the standard articulated in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 (Hatch), we decide the trial court’s section 1385 dismissal order does not clearly indicate an intent to dismiss for legally insufficient evidence and preclude retrial.

2018Under well-established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power under section 1385 at any time before judgment is pronounced-but not after judgment is final. ( People v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , 524, fn. 11, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ( Romero ).) Yet in the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced.

2018Under well-established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power under section 1385 at any time before judgment is pronounced-but not after judgment is final. ( People v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , 524, fn. 11, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ( Romero ).) Yet in the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced.

1993“It is not enough that on review the reporter’s transcript may show the trial court’s motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason ‘so that all may know why this great power was exercised.’ ” (People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ], italics in original; People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944 .) “Failure to state the reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 503, fn. 7 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 330

1993“It is not enough that on review the reporter’s transcript may show the trial court’s motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason ‘so that all may know why this great power was exercised.’ ” (People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ], italics in original; People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944 .) “Failure to state the reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 503, fn. 7 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 330

1996There was not, of course, a statement of reasons in support of defendant’s claimed striking." (People v. Hunt (1977) 19 Cal.3d 888, 897 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 651 , 568 P.2d 376 ]; see also People v. Superior Court (Flores), supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at pp. 135-136 [failure to state reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid]; People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1410 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 550 ] [statement of reasons required on appeal to sustain a dismissal under section 1385, and silent record insufficient].) In this case, the docket entries preceding the entry regarding dis

1996There was not, of course, a statement of reasons in support of defendant’s claimed striking." (People v. Hunt (1977) 19 Cal.3d 888, 897 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 651 , 568 P.2d 376 ]; see also People v. Superior Court (Flores), supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at pp. 135-136 [failure to state reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid]; People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1410 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 550 ] [statement of reasons required on appeal to sustain a dismissal under section 1385, and silent record insufficient].) In this case, the docket entries preceding the entry regarding dis

2026But that is not what the statute says, and we are not allowed to rewrite the statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386 , 397, overruled on other grounds by Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024 , italics in original.) Anticipating our rejection of his automatic dismissal argument, defendant alternatively contends that both subdivisions (c)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(H) of section 1385 warrant dismissal of the challenged enhancement.

2025(See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [despite “the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of justice” inquiry’”]; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287 , 291 [“We conclude that section 1385(c)(2)(C) does not mandate dismissal of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would endanger public safety”]; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233 , 239 [“the trial court has discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh g

2014The Trial Court Properly Denied Relief Under Section 1385 Section 1385, subdivision (a), in relevant part, provides “[t]he judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” Section 1385 contemplates only dismissal of criminal actions, or a part thereof (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 521-522, 523, 524 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 994 P.2d 354 ]), but not sentencing factors or historical facts (In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1137 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 , 70 P.

2014The Trial Court Properly Denied Relief Under Section 1385 Section 1385, subdivision (a), in relevant part, provides “[t]he judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” Section 1385 contemplates only dismissal of criminal actions, or a part thereof (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 521-522, 523, 524 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 994 P.2d 354 ]), but not sentencing factors or historical facts (In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1137 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 , 70 P.

2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision

2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision

2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision

2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision

1976(People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 ].) “Since an order of dismissal under Penal Code section 1385 is a matter of public concern (People v. Superior Court (Schomer) 13 Cal.App.3d 672, 680 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 651 ]), proper dismissal under the section requires a balancing of society’s interest against that of the defendant.” (People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 986-987 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) The trial court must consider the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society represented by the prosecution (People v. Orin, supra, at p.

1976(People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 ].) “Since an order of dismissal under Penal Code section 1385 is a matter of public concern (People v. Superior Court (Schomer) 13 Cal.App.3d 672, 680 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 651 ]), proper dismissal under the section requires a balancing of society’s interest against that of the defendant.” (People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 986-987 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) The trial court must consider the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society represented by the prosecution (People v. Orin, supra, at p.

1969Section 1387 of the Penal Code provides: "An order for the dismissal of the action, made as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor. . . ." (Cf. People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 770 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) Section 1387 applies to dismissals under section 1385 of the Penal Code. ( People v. Aiken (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 343 , 345 [ 238 P.2d 1019 ].) The March 29, 1966, order of dismissal in the interests of justice upon the municipal court's own motion was a final disposition made pursuant to section 1385 of the Penal Code (

1969Section 1387 of the Penal Code provides: "An order for the dismissal of the action, made as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor. . . ." (Cf. People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 770 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) Section 1387 applies to dismissals under section 1385 of the Penal Code. ( People v. Aiken (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 343 , 345 [ 238 P.2d 1019 ].) The March 29, 1966, order of dismissal in the interests of justice upon the municipal court's own motion was a final disposition made pursuant to section 1385 of the Penal Code (

1969(Cf. People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal.App. 2d Supp. 768, 770 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) Section 1387 applies to dismissals under section 1385 of the Penal Code.

1969(Cf. People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal.App. 2d Supp. 768, 770 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) Section 1387 applies to dismissals under section 1385 of the Penal Code.

2024The Court of Appeal expressed misgivings about the practice, fearing it could elevate “the rule of men above the rule of law” or “stultify [a] statutory scheme.” (People v. McAlonan (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 (McAlonan); see People v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 668, 671 (Montano).) In Orin, we characterized decisions such as these as reflecting the appellate courts’ “considerable opposition to the granting of dismissals under section 1385 in instances where the People are thereby prevented from prosecuting defendants for offenses of which there is probable cause to believe they are

1975Courts have recognized that society, represented by the People, has a legitimate interest in “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged.” (People v. Davis, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d 890, 898 .) “ ‘[A] dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court (Montano) (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 668, 671 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 925 ].) Permitting trial judges to make liberal use of section 1385 to avoid criminal prosecutions where probable cause exists to believe conviction is warranted would be contrary

2024(See People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law’”].) Thus, we presume the court knows defendant’s current conviction was not violent as no person was present when the residential burglary was committed.

2024(See People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law’”].) Thus, we presume the court knows defendant’s current conviction was not violent as no person was present when the residential burglary was committed.

2025If the amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final then . . . . it, and not the old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 44 .) “Under well-established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power under section 1385 at any time before judgment is pronounced—but not after judgment is final.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 777 .) 6 III.

2020(See McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 46-47.) Chavez found that a grant of probation with a sentence imposed and execution suspended was not final for the purposes of dismissal under Penal Code section 1385 until the probation period expires. ( Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 776-777, 781-782.) McKenzie’s reliance on Chavez supports extending its ruling to any situation where the court retains some jurisdiction over defendant, such as a split term.

2025(Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019 .) Two dismissals of a criminal action, including voluntary dismissals under section 1385, generally preclude “any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony.” (§ 1387, subd. (a).) “However, section 1387.1 gives the prosecution one more opportunity to pursue charges under these circumstances if the alleged offense is a violent felony and the prior dismissals were due to excusable neglect.” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 557 .) A third filing of charges for a violent felony “is permitted where (1) either of the prior

2016In Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012 , 1016-1022, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 103 P.3d 276 ( Burris ), the California Supreme Court provided a detailed review of the rationale behind section 1387 and its differing treatment of misdemeanors and felonies.

2017It explained that section 782 is a general dismissal statute, similar in operation to Penal Code section 1385. ( *874 Haro , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 , 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 , citing Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 416 , 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272 , 283 P.3d 1160 ["In terms similar to section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss a criminal action 'in furtherance of justice' "].) 4 In analyzing whether dismissal under section 782 has the same effect as a dismissal under section 1385, the Haro court found persuasive the Second District Court of Appeal's opinio

2017It explained that section 782 is a general dismissal statute, similar in operation to Penal Code section 1385. ( *874 Haro , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 , 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 , citing Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 416 , 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272 , 283 P.3d 1160 ["In terms similar to section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss a criminal action 'in furtherance of justice' "].) 4 In analyzing whether dismissal under section 782 has the same effect as a dismissal under section 1385, the Haro court found persuasive the Second District Court of Appeal's opinio

2020(In re A.O. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 390, 394 ; People v. Haro (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 718, 720 ; but see In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 416 [“The analogy between section 782 and Penal Code section 1385 is . . . flawed . . . .”].) It is unclear, however, whether a juvenile court can exercise this power after disposition.

2017It explained that section 782 is a general dismissal statute, similar in operation to Penal Code section 1385. ( *874 Haro , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 , 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 , citing Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 416 , 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272 , 283 P.3d 1160 ["In terms similar to section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the power to dismiss a criminal action 'in furtherance of justice' "].) 4 In analyzing whether dismissal under section 782 has the same effect as a dismissal under section 1385, the Haro court found persuasive the Second District Court of Appeal's opinio

2017(People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 579 [ 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 299 P.3d 131 ]; People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 ] [no abuse of discretion in dismissing two prior strikes where current offense was petty theft].) Two years after Romero was decided, in People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 , 948 P.2d 429 ] (Williams), the high court took the opportunity to clarify the approach trial and appellate courts should take in considering dismissals under section 1385.

2017(People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 579 [ 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 299 P.3d 131 ]; People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 ] [no abuse of discretion in dismissing two prior strikes where current offense was petty theft].) Two years after Romero was decided, in People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 , 948 P.2d 429 ] (Williams), the high court took the opportunity to clarify the approach trial and appellate courts should take in considering dismissals under section 1385.

1993“It is not enough that on review the reporter’s transcript may show the trial court’s motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason ‘so that all may know why this great power was exercised.’ ” (People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ], italics in original; People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944 .) “Failure to state the reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 503, fn. 7 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 330

1993“It is not enough that on review the reporter’s transcript may show the trial court’s motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason ‘so that all may know why this great power was exercised.’ ” (People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ], italics in original; People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944 .) “Failure to state the reasons in the minutes renders a dismissal under section 1385 invalid.” (People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 136 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 576 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 503, fn. 7 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 330

2026(See e.g., People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438 , 445; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233 , 239–240.) Session does not discuss this case law or cite any authority holding that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) mandates dismissal of an enhancement. 9 both Senate Bills extensively.

2025(See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [despite “the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of justice” inquiry’”]; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287 , 291 [“We conclude that section 1385(c)(2)(C) does not mandate dismissal of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would endanger public safety”]; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233 , 239 [“the trial court has discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh g