section 52-418 statutory proscriptions in Connecticut

2008Ed. 2d 557 (1985); violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. 11 Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 22-23 , 453 A.2d 1158 (1983).

2008Ed. 2d 557 (1985); violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. 11 Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 22-23 , 453 A.2d 1158 (1983).

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2008Ed. 2d 557 (1985); violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. 11 Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 22-23 , 453 A.2d 1158 (1983).

2008Ed. 2d 557 (1985); violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. 11 Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 22-23 , 453 A.2d 1158 (1983).

2006Partnership No. 3, 203 Conn. 133, 145-46 , 523 A.2d 1271 (1987). “[W]e have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an [arbitrator’s] award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy ... or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.” (Citations omitted.) Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6 , 612 A.2d 742 (1992). “[Arbitrators are accorded substantial discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, particularly in the case of an unrestricted submission, which relievefs] the arbit

2006Partnership No. 3, 203 Conn. 133, 145-46 , 523 A.2d 1271 (1987). “[W]e have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an [arbitrator’s] award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy ... or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.” (Citations omitted.) Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6 , 612 A.2d 742 (1992). “[Arbitrators are accorded substantial discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, particularly in the case of an unrestricted submission, which relievefs] the arbit

2018We turn to the plaintiff's claim that the arbitrator's award of punitive damages constituted a manifest disregard of the law pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4). 4 *751 The arbitration *648 in this case was an unrestricted submission. 5 Of the three grounds that our Supreme Court has recognized for vacating an award based on an unrestricted submission, the plaintiff argues only that "the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418." Garrity v. McCaskey , 223 Conn. 1 , 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992). "[A] claim that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers may be established und

2018We turn to the plaintiff's claim that the arbitrator's award of punitive damages constituted a manifest disregard of the law pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4). 4 *751 The arbitration *648 in this case was an unrestricted submission. 5 Of the three grounds that our Supreme Court has recognized for vacating an award based on an unrestricted submission, the plaintiff argues only that "the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418." Garrity v. McCaskey , 223 Conn. 1 , 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992). "[A] claim that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers may be established und

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2003Statutes § 52-418 provides in pertinent part that "[u]pon the application of a party to the arbitration, . . . the superior court shall make an order vacating the award if it finds . . . (4) that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted CT Page 3933 cannot be made." "Our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418

2003When a submission is unrestricted, the Supreme Court has held that an award can be vacated if, inter alia , "the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 ." 1 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 , 248 Conn. 108 , 116 , 728 A.2d 1063 (1999).

2003When a submission is unrestricted, the Supreme Court has held that an award can be vacated if, inter alia , "the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 ." 1 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 , 248 Conn. 108 , 116 , 728 A.2d 1063 (1999).

1999"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, [Connecticut courts have] recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); (2) the award violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 .

1999"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, [Connecticut courts have] recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); (2) the award violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 .

1999"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, [Connecticut courts have] recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); (2) the award violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 .

1999"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, [Connecticut courts have] recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 344 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); (2) the award violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 339 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 .

2021Co., 273 Conn. 86, 94 , 868 A.2d 47 (2005): ‘‘(1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further noted that § 52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if ‘‘the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’’ General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4).

2021Co., 273 Conn. 86, 94 , 868 A.2d 47 (2005): ‘‘(1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further noted that § 52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if ‘‘the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’’ General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4).

2007These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, 77 Conn. App. 832, 838 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003). “[W]hen a challenge to a voluntary arbitration award rendered pursuant to an unrestricted submission raises a legitimate and colorable claim of violation of public policy, the question of whether the award violates public policy requires de novo

2007These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, 77 Conn. App. 832, 838 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003). “[W]hen a challenge to a voluntary arbitration award rendered pursuant to an unrestricted submission raises a legitimate and colorable claim of violation of public policy, the question of whether the award violates public policy requires de novo

2003These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 796 , 758 A.2d 387 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 905 , 762 A.2d 910 (2000).

2003These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 796 , 758 A.2d 387 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 905 , 762 A.2d 910 (2000).

2003These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 796 , 758 A.2d 387 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 905 , 762 A.2d 910 (2000).

2003These grounds arise when the award (1) rules on the constitutionality of a statute, (2) violates clear public policy or (3) contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 796 , 758 A.2d 387 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 905 , 762 A.2d 910 (2000).

2002Conclusion "`The party challenging the award bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it, and only upon a showing that it falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes, or procedurally violates the parties' agreement will the determination of an arbitrator be subject to judicial inquiry.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent Builders v. American Application Systems, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 486 , 488 , 547 A.2d 1381 (1988), cert. denied, 210 Conn. 809 , 556 A.2d 608 (1989)." Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. Bridgeport, 4

2002Conclusion "`The party challenging the award bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it, and only upon a showing that it falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes, or procedurally violates the parties' agreement will the determination of an arbitrator be subject to judicial inquiry.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent Builders v. American Application Systems, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 486 , 488 , 547 A.2d 1381 (1988), cert. denied, 210 Conn. 809 , 556 A.2d 608 (1989)." Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. Bridgeport, 4

2002Justice Norcott, writing for the majority, upheld the trial court's finding that there was just cause for dismissal after instructing us as follows: We begin our analysis with a restatement of familiar principles reflecting this court's traditional deference to arbitral awards. "`We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes.' Board of Education v. AFSCME , 195 Conn. 266 , 270 , 487 A.2d 553 (1985); Board of Education

2002Justice Norcott, writing for the majority, upheld the trial court's finding that there was just cause for dismissal after instructing us as follows: We begin our analysis with a restatement of familiar principles reflecting this court's traditional deference to arbitral awards. "`We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes.' Board of Education v. AFSCME , 195 Conn. 266 , 270 , 487 A.2d 553 (1985); Board of Education

1995Moreover, there is no indication in the record that such interest had any value or that evidence as to the value of such interest was offered to the arbitrator. "(T)he burden rests on the party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it;" Costello Construction Corp. v. Teamsters Local 559, 167 Conn. 315 , 320 (1994); "and only upon a showing that it falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes, or procedurally violates the parties' agreement will the determination of an arbitrator be subject to judicial inquiry." (Internal quotation marks

1977The courts are “bound by the arbitrator’s determination unless that determination clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes, or procedurally violates the parties’ agreement.” Costello Construction Corporation v. Teamsters Local 559, 167 Conn. 315, 318 , 355 A.2d 279 .

1985“We have always respected the autonomy of the arbitration process and have often said that an arbitration award will be disturbed only where it clearly falls within the proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” 3 (Citations omitted.) Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 682 , 427 A.2d 859 (1980).

1985“We have always respected the autonomy of the arbitration process and have often said that an arbitration award will be disturbed only where it clearly falls within the proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.” 3 (Citations omitted.) Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 682 , 427 A.2d 859 (1980).

2017In light of these constraints, a court may vacate an unrestricted arbitration award only under certain limited conditions: "(1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... (2) the award violates clear public policy ... [or] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer , supra, 293 Conn. at 754 , 980 A.2d 297 .

2017In light of these constraints, a court may vacate an unrestricted arbitration award only under certain limited conditions: "(1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... (2) the award violates clear public policy ... [or] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer , supra, 293 Conn. at 754 , 980 A.2d 297 .

2013“Our courts have held that claims of manifest disregard of the law fall within the statutory proscription of § 52-418 (a) (4). [A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside . . . because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. . . . [T]he manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary lack of f

2013“Our courts have held that claims of manifest disregard of the law fall within the statutory proscription of § 52-418 (a) (4). [A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside . . . because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. . . . [T]he manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary lack of f

2012Hence, who—court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration." See also AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 298 Conn. 824, 835 , 6 A.3d 1142 (2010) (citing "three recognized grounds for vacating an award: [1] the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... [2] the award violates clear public policy ... or [3] the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418[a]" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2012Hence, who—court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration." See also AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 298 Conn. 824, 835 , 6 A.3d 1142 (2010) (citing "three recognized grounds for vacating an award: [1] the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... [2] the award violates clear public policy ... or [3] the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418[a]" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2010The judicial recognition of these grounds for vacatur evinces a willingness, in limited circumstances, to employ a heightened standard of judicial review of arbitral conclusions, despite the traditional high level of deference afforded to arbitrators’ decisions when made in accordance with their authority pursuant to an unrestricted submission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 287 Conn. 189, 197 , 947 A.2d 916 (2008).

2010The judicial recognition of these grounds for vacatur evinces a willingness, in limited circumstances, to employ a heightened standard of judicial review of arbitral conclusions, despite the traditional high level of deference afforded to arbitrators’ decisions when made in accordance with their authority pursuant to an unrestricted submission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 287 Conn. 189, 197 , 947 A.2d 916 (2008).

2002Co. v. DelGreco , 205 Conn. 178 , 186 , 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME , supra, 271; Caldor, CT Page 8498 Inc. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 340 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983); aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection , 190 Conn. 14 , 18 , 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159 , 183 Conn. 102 , 106 , 438 A.2d 1171 (1981); Board of Education v. Local 818 , supra, [639]." Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 338 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989).

2002Co. v. DelGreco , 205 Conn. 178 , 186 , 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME , supra, 271; Caldor, CT Page 8498 Inc. Thornton , 191 Conn. 336 , 340 , 464 A.2d 785 (1983); aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985); Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection , 190 Conn. 14 , 18 , 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159 , 183 Conn. 102 , 106 , 438 A.2d 1171 (1981); Board of Education v. Local 818 , supra, [639]." Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 , 338 , 555 A.2d 406 (1989).