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74 California opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Horvathgreen2 sentences2015As our Supreme Court has noted, ‘the filing of a claim for damages “is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action.” And while it may be constitutionally permissible for the Legislature to place this substantive impediment in the path of a state cause of action, it is clear that the 25 supremacy clause will not permit a like abrogation of the perquisites of a federal civil rights litigant.’ ” (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 764 , quoting W 2014(See Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 841-842 [federal civil rights claims may not be frustrated by state substantive limitations “couched in procedural language”].) So, we must now turn to the city’s statute of limitations argument as it applies to section 1983 claims. | 2 | 4 |
Williams v. Reedgreen2 sentences2025Viking River goes much further; its casual invasion of state sovereignty is breathtaking, 10 Although there are some exceptions (see, e.g., Williams v. Reed (2025) 604 U.S. 168, 170 [ 145 S.Ct. 465 ] [state law exhaustion rule that entirely blocked assertion of federally authorized right of recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is preempted]), “ ‘[t]he general rule, “bottomed deeply in [a] belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them” ’ ” (Johnson v. Fankell (1997) 520 U.S. 911, 919 [ 117 S.Ct. 1800 ]). 12 and it d 2025Viking River goes much further; its casual invasion of state sovereignty is breathtaking, 10 Although there are some exceptions (see, e.g., Williams v. Reed (2025) 604 U.S. 168, 170 [ 145 S.Ct. 465 ] [state law exhaustion rule that entirely blocked assertion of federally authorized right of recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is preempted]), “ ‘[t]he general rule, “bottomed deeply in [a] belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them” ’ ” (Johnson v. Fankell (1997) 520 U.S. 911, 919 [ 117 S.Ct. 1800 ]). 12 and it d | 2 | 2 |
Felder v. Caseygreen2 sentences2025(Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138 [Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute did not apply to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in state court because the statute was preempted as inconsistent with federal law].) “Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?” (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 308 .) “Congress may expressly preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may imply preemption under the field, conflict, or obstacle preemption doctrines.” 1995VI, cl. 2) prohibits California from conditioning a right of action under section 1983 upon compliance with the Tort Claims Act. (16 Cal.3d at pp. 840-842.) This conclusion was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 123 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 ] (Felder), in which the federal high court ruled that under the supremacy clause and general principles of federalism, section 1983, which exists to vindicate important federally created rights, preempts state notice-of-claim statutes. ( 487 U.S. at p. 153 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 147 ].) The City contends | 2 | 2 |
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.green2 sentences2025As Justice Frankfurter once said, “These problems are not rendered non- 10 Although there are some exceptions (see, e.g., Williams v. Reed (2025) 604 U.S. 168, 170 [ 145 S.Ct. 465 ] [state law exhaustion rule that entirely blocked assertion of federally authorized right of recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is preempted]), “ ‘[t]he general rule, “bottomed deeply in [a] belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them” ’ ” (Johnson v. Fankell (1997) 520 U.S. 911, 919 [ 117 S.Ct. 1800 ]). 12 existent by disregard of t 2025As Justice Frankfurter once said, however, “[t]hese problems are not rendered nonexistent by disregard of them.” (Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at p. 462 (dis. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) Even assuming the high court had Article III power to create a heretofore unrecognized rule of federal procedural common law that is binding on the California courts, and even assuming the discretionary calculus that is required as a prerequisite to federal common lawmaking allowed the high court to create an “individual PAGA claim,” displacing state law to the contrary and replacing it with judge-made federa | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Fankellgreen2 sentences2025Viking River goes much further; its casual invasion of state sovereignty is breathtaking, 10 Although there are some exceptions (see, e.g., Williams v. Reed (2025) 604 U.S. 168, 170 [ 145 S.Ct. 465 ] [state law exhaustion rule that entirely blocked assertion of federally authorized right of recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is preempted]), “ ‘[t]he general rule, “bottomed deeply in [a] belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them” ’ ” (Johnson v. Fankell (1997) 520 U.S. 911, 919 [ 117 S.Ct. 1800 ]). 12 and it d 2025Viking River goes much further; its casual invasion of state sovereignty is breathtaking, 10 Although there are some exceptions (see, e.g., Williams v. Reed (2025) 604 U.S. 168, 170 [ 145 S.Ct. 465 ] [state law exhaustion rule that entirely blocked assertion of federally authorized right of recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is preempted]), “ ‘[t]he general rule, “bottomed deeply in [a] belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them” ’ ” (Johnson v. Fankell (1997) 520 U.S. 911, 919 [ 117 S.Ct. 1800 ]). 12 and it d | 2 | 2 |
Asgari v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2002(A sgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 755-756 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 937 P.2d 273 ] [“Governmental immunity for claims of violation of civil rights under section 1983 is not conferred expressly by statute, but is based upon a judicial gloss on section 1983,” whereas “governmental immunity under California law is governed by statute.”].) However, the individual defendants contend they are shielded from liability by various state statutory immunities. 2002(A sgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 755-756 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 937 P.2d 273 ] [“Governmental immunity for claims of violation of civil rights under section 1983 is not conferred expressly by statute, but is based upon a judicial gloss on section 1983,” whereas “governmental immunity under California law is governed by statute.”].) However, the individual defendants contend they are shielded from liability by various state statutory immunities. | 2 | 2 |
James L. Beck v. Caterpillar Inc. And United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Americagreen2 sentences1998Code, § 945.3 in 42 U.S.C. action]; Leigh v. McGuire (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F.Supp. 458 [no tolling of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (based on unlawful wiretap) during pendency of state criminal proceedings].) “[T]he federal courts have expressed a general willingness to borrow states’ tolling and savings provisions in the past, but only when the federal cause of action asserted is governed by a state statute of limitations, i.e., in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 . [Citations.] When the timeliness of a federal cause of action is measured by a state statute of limitations, it 1998Code, § 945.3 in 42 U.S.C. action]; Leigh v. McGuire (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F. Supp. 458 [no tolling of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (based on unlawful wiretap) during pendency of state criminal proceedings].) "[T]he federal courts have expressed a general willingness to borrow states' tolling and savings provisions in the past, but only when the federal cause of action asserted is governed by a state statute of limitations, i.e., in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 . [Citations.] When the timeliness of a federal cause of action is measured by a state statute of limitations, i | 2 | 2 |
Gatto v. County of Sonomagreen2 sentences2023(See Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 764 [“[t]he fact that federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 are exempt from the requirements of the Government Claims Act . . . provides no reason to exempt claims under [Civil Code] sections 51 and 52.1], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nevarez v. Forty Niners Football Co. LLC (N.D.Cal. 2018) 326 F.R.D. 562 , 575, fn. 8; Pierce v. County of Marin, supra, 291 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1000-1001.) In her closing brief, White asserts “[CalFire] . . . knows that [she] filed multiple claim forms wit 2006Code, §51 et seq.) where the money damages sought were not incidental or subsidiary to the plaintiff’s interest in injunctive relief, despite the similarity of Unruh Civil Rights Act claims to claims for violation of the FEHA and federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 , both of which are exempt from requirements of the Government Claims Act. 13 (Gatto, at pp. 760-765.) *1167 As we recognized in Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 744 : “Loehr[, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 ] and other state cases thus support the proposition that ‘an action for specific relief does n | 1 | 3 |
People v. Randy G.green2 sentences2016To allow minor students to challenge each of those decisions, through a motion to suppress or in a civil rights action under 42 United States Code 6 section 1983, as lacking articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion would make a mockery of school discipline and order.” (In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 566 (Randy G.).) For instance, in Randy G., a campus security officer encountered the minor in an area where students were not allowed to congregate. 2010To allow minor students to challenge each of those decisions, through a motion to suppress or in a civil rights action under 42 United States Code section 1983 , as lacking articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion would make a mockery of school discipline and order.” (In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) In New Jersey v. T. | 1 | 2 |
Baker v. McCollangreen2 sentences1997“Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” (Baker v. McCollan (1979) 443 U.S. 137, 146 [ 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433, 443 ].) The complaint alleges that respondents attempted “to deprive the Plaintiff of a fair trial by influencing witnesses and jurors with a false press release . . . .” Respondents argue that the criminal conviction estops appellant from relitigating facts necessarily established in the criminal proceeding. 1997“Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” (Baker v. McCollan (1979) 443 U.S. 137, 146 [ 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433, 443 ].) The complaint alleges that respondents attempted “to deprive the Plaintiff of a fair trial by influencing witnesses and jurors with a false press release . . . .” Respondents argue that the criminal conviction estops appellant from relitigating facts necessarily established in the criminal proceeding. | 1 | 2 |
| Jefferson County Public School System v. Jeffersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Stockton v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barbano v. Madison Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elwood v. Drescherred | 1 | 1 |
| Irwin v. City of Hemetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gotschall v. Daleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| E.U. v. J.E.green | 1 | 1 |
| Haywood v. Drowngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dwight R. v. Christy B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Pitchessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gregori v. Bank of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Salernogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chavez v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Breithaupt v. Abramgreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Sacramento v. Lewisred | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzaga University v. Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jean Belanger v. Madera Unified School District Board of Trustees of Madera Unified School District Thomas J. Riley, School Superintendentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eureka Teacher's Assn. v. Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMININISTRATIONgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States, Ex Rel. A. Amir Ali, Under 31 U.S.C. Section 3729, Qui Tam Relator v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeGrassi v. City of Glendoragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
green
2 sentences2024(CACI No. 3000.) The liability of a county for the violation of a constitutional right under section 1983 is governed by Monell, supra, 436 U.S. 658 . 2024(CACI No. 3000.) The liability of a county for the violation of a constitutional right under section 1983 is governed by Monell, supra, 436 U.S. 658 . | 3 | 2015–2024 |
Guillory v. Hill
green
2 sentences2019(Guillory I, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) Eventually, “several defendants including the various SWAT teams, unnamed ‘Doe’ police officers, and County of Orange defendants dropped out, either by plaintiffs’ failure to name the ‘Doe’ defendants or by settlement or summary adjudication,” leaving Hill as the sole remaining defendant. 2019(Guillory I, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) Eventually, “several defendants including the various SWAT teams, unnamed ‘Doe’ police officers, and County of Orange defendants dropped out, either by plaintiffs’ failure to name the ‘Doe’ defendants or by settlement or summary adjudication,” leaving Hill as the sole remaining defendant. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Hernandez v. City of Pomona
green
2 sentences2013(Ibid.) The decedent‟s parents and minor children, the plaintiffs, filed a complaint in federal court against the City of Pomona and the police officers, seeking damages in connection with the decedent‟s death. ( Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 507-508.) The plaintiffs asserted federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 and state law claims. ( Hernandez, supra, p. 508 .) The federal court bifurcated the federal and state law claims, and the federal claims went to trial before a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of all but one of the police officers. 2013(Ibid.) The decedent‟s parents and minor children, the plaintiffs, filed a complaint in federal court against the City of Pomona and the police officers, seeking damages in connection with the decedent‟s death. ( Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 507-508.) The plaintiffs asserted federal civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 and state law claims. ( Hernandez, supra, p. 508 .) The federal court bifurcated the federal and state law claims, and the federal claims went to trial before a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of all but one of the police officers. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn.
yellow
2 sentences2005In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., supra, 496 U.S. 498 , the Supreme Court held that the *1369 provisions of Medicaid are enforceable by individuals. 1995The court reemphasized its prior holdings that the coverage of section 1983 must be "broadly construed." ( Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 105 [ 107 L.Ed.2d at p. 427 ].) It then directed a two-step inquiry, asking first if a federal right had been violated, and second whether Congress had specifically foreclosed a section 1983 remedy. ( 493 U.S. at p. 106 [107 L.Ed.2d at pp. 427-428].) The court also noted that the burden is on the defendant to establish that Congress had withdrawn the remedy, and the court will not lightly conclude that it has done so. ( Id. | 2 | 1995–2005 |
City of Fresno v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ 2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ | 2 | 2000–2003 |
Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton
green
2 sentences2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ 2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ | 2 | 2000–2003 |
Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates
green
2 sentences2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ 2003(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, citing Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] [failure to challenge condition of building permit by administrative mandate precludes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action]; Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 ] [employee’s failure to challenge city civil service commission finding employee was properly demoted bars factually inconsistent claims]; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1484 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] [ | 2 | 2000–2003 |
Reynolds ex rel. Estate of Reynolds v. County of San Diego
red
2 sentences1998(Reynolds v. County of San Diego (S.D.Cal. 1994) 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 , affd. in part and remanded in part (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 1162 .) To make a prima facie case under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 1998Unless a plaintiff can show that unnecessary force was used, courts *617 will protect the officer.'" ( Neal v. Helbling, supra, 726 S.W.2d at p. 487 .) This is the rule in federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 , [4] the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions. ( Reynolds v. County of San Diego (S.D.Cal.1994) 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 , affd. in part and remanded in part, (9th Cir.1996) 84 F.3d 1162 .) To make a prima facie case under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Joan Marie DONOGHUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the COUNTY OF ORANGE; Dennis W. La-Ducer, Defendants-Appellees
green
2 sentences1998(Donoghue v. Orange County (9th Cir. 1987) 848 F.2d 926 [federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; Johnson v. City of Chico (E.D.Cal. 1989) 725 F.Supp. 1097 [statute of limitations for civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is drawn from state statute of limitations].) However, the cited cases involved the inapposite situation of federal claims for which there was no federal statute of limitations. 8 In such cases, the general rule is that state law applies (though in recent years more courts have departed from the general rule and borrowed limitations periods from other federal 1998Plaintiff cites federal civil rights cases where state statutes of limitations, including tolling provisions, were applied to federal claims, upon findings that the state provisions were not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal *1371 legislation. ( Donoghue v. Orange County (9th Cir.1987) 848 F.2d 926 [federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; Johnson v. City of Chico (E.D.Cal. 1989) 725 F. Supp. 1097 [statute of limitations for civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is drawn from state statute of limitations].) However, the cited cases involved the inapposite situation | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Edward Joseph Harding v. David Galceran Terry Gingerich Lawrence Moser James D. Chisim
green
2 sentences1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal 1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Neal v. Helbling
green
2 sentences1998Unless a plaintiff can show that unnecessary force was used, courts will protect the officer.’ ” {Neal v. Helbling, supra, 726 S.W.2d at p. 487 .) This is the rule in federal civil rights actions under 42 United States Code section 1983 , 4 the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions. 1998Unless a plaintiff can show that unnecessary force was used, courts *617 will protect the officer.'" ( Neal v. Helbling, supra, 726 S.W.2d at p. 487 .) This is the rule in federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 , [4] the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions. ( Reynolds v. County of San Diego (S.D.Cal.1994) 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 , affd. in part and remanded in part, (9th Cir.1996) 84 F.3d 1162 .) To make a prima facie case under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Leigh v. McGuire
green
2 sentences1998Code, § 945.3 in 42 U.S.C. action]; Leigh v. McGuire (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F.Supp. 458 [no tolling of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (based on unlawful wiretap) during pendency of state criminal proceedings].) “[T]he federal courts have expressed a general willingness to borrow states’ tolling and savings provisions in the past, but only when the federal cause of action asserted is governed by a state statute of limitations, i.e., in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 . [Citations.] When the timeliness of a federal cause of action is measured by a state statute of limitations, it 1998Code, § 945.3 in 42 U.S.C. action]; Leigh v. McGuire (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 507 F. Supp. 458 [no tolling of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (based on unlawful wiretap) during pendency of state criminal proceedings].) "[T]he federal courts have expressed a general willingness to borrow states' tolling and savings provisions in the past, but only when the federal cause of action asserted is governed by a state statute of limitations, i.e., in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 . [Citations.] When the timeliness of a federal cause of action is measured by a state statute of limitations, i | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Reynolds v. County of San Diego
green
2 sentences1998(Reynolds v. County of San Diego (S.D.Cal. 1994) 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 , affd. in part and remanded in part (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 1162 .) To make a prima facie case under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 1998Unless a plaintiff can show that unnecessary force was used, courts *617 will protect the officer.'" ( Neal v. Helbling, supra, 726 S.W.2d at p. 487 .) This is the rule in federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 , [4] the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions. ( Reynolds v. County of San Diego (S.D.Cal.1994) 858 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 , affd. in part and remanded in part, (9th Cir.1996) 84 F.3d 1162 .) To make a prima facie case under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal 1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Johnson v. City of Chico
green
2 sentences1998(Donoghue v. Orange County (9th Cir. 1987) 848 F.2d 926 [federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; Johnson v. City of Chico (E.D.Cal. 1989) 725 F.Supp. 1097 [statute of limitations for civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is drawn from state statute of limitations].) However, the cited cases involved the inapposite situation of federal claims for which there was no federal statute of limitations. 8 In such cases, the general rule is that state law applies (though in recent years more courts have departed from the general rule and borrowed limitations periods from other federal 1998Plaintiff cites federal civil rights cases where state statutes of limitations, including tolling provisions, were applied to federal claims, upon findings that the state provisions were not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal *1371 legislation. ( Donoghue v. Orange County (9th Cir.1987) 848 F.2d 926 [federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; Johnson v. City of Chico (E.D.Cal. 1989) 725 F. Supp. 1097 [statute of limitations for civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is drawn from state statute of limitations].) However, the cited cases involved the inapposite situation | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Hardin v. Straub
green
2 sentences1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal 1998Code, § 911.2 is inoperative in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action].) *1372 Where federal claims are governed by state statutes of limitations, state tolling provisions also apply, as long as they are not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal legislation. ( Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536 [ 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582 ] [federal court applying state statute of limitations to state prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was required to apply state statute tolling limitation period for prisoners]; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App.4th 1293 [ 41 Cal | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025(Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138 [Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute did not apply to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in state court because the statute was preempted as inconsistent with federal law].) “Preemption is foremost a question of congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?” (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 308 .) “Congress may expressly preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may imply preemption under the field, conflict, or obstacle preemption doctrines.” | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jones v. Williams
green
1 sentence2025Legal Principles Title 42 USC § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 26 the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . for redress . . . .” Title 42 USC § 1983 was enacted “ ‘to deter state actors from using the badge of authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to pr | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Modacure v. B&B Vehicle Processing, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2025Legal Principles Title 42 USC § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 26 the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . for redress . . . .” Title 42 USC § 1983 was enacted “ ‘to deter state actors from using the badge of authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to pr | 1 | 2025–2025 |
William Brogan v. San Mateo County
green
1 sentence2024(Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193 , 254.) In the context of a procedural due process claim, federal law provides that “[w]hen state remedies are adequate to protect an individual’s procedural due process, a section 1983 action alleging a violation of those 19 rights will not stand.” (Brogan v. San Mateo County (1990) 901 F.2d 762, 764 ; see also Jefferson v. Jefferson County Public School System (6th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d 583 , 588 [“Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes or remed | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Martinez v. City of Clovis green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Bach v. County of Butte green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| County of Los Angeles v. the Superior Court green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Robert R. Cervantes v. City of San Diego San Diego Police Department Dennis Sesma Officer Carlos Garcia Les Wardwell Officer Eugene Bojorquez green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Groves v. Peterson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Branson v. Nott red | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ray v. Township of Warren green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Daniels v. Williams green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Boeken v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Picklesimer green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Miller v. Gammie red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Woodford v. Ngo red | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Stoot v. City of Everett green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Weatherford v. Bursey green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sanchez Ex Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.