section 203 time penalties in California

2018Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay the wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, "the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid." This provision has been interpreted to mean the penalty is an amount "equal to the employee's daily wages for each day ... that the wages are unpaid." ( Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365 , 377, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ; accord Mamika v. Barca (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 487 , 493, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 175 ["A proper reading of section 203 mandates a

2018Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay the wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, "the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid." This provision has been interpreted to mean the penalty is an amount "equal to the employee's daily wages for each day ... that the wages are unpaid." ( Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365 , 377, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ; accord Mamika v. Barca (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 487 , 493, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 175 ["A proper reading of section 203 mandates a

2017In its decision awarding Spiess $640 in wages, $128 in liquidated damages, $105.20 in interest, and $8,538 as a penalty pursuant to section 203, the labor commissioner expressly concluded Gateway did not qualify as an “ ‘other municipal corporation’ ” under section 220(b).2 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. 2 Though the position of the labor commissioner may be persuasive authority as to an issue within its purview where the labor commissioner takes a consistent stance as to that issue, where, as here, the labor commissioner has not taken a consistent position, as demo

2014Appeals Bd. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 148, 154-155 [the “last antecedent rule does not trump” considerations of “the spirit of the statute . . . as a whole”].) Statutes governing conditions of employment, such as the payment of wages, are to be liberally construed “in favor of protecting employees.” (Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1103 .) This policy and purpose is not furthered by excluding retirees from the full protections of section 202, enforced by the penalty provisions of section 203.

2024(Davis v. Morris, [supra,] 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 99 P.2d 345 ].)” (Trombley, at p. 808.) In sum, we explained, Labor Code section 216 “makes it a crime for an employer having the ability to pay, knowingly and intentionally to refuse to pay wages which he knows are due.” (Trombley, at pp. 807-808.) Some decades later, the court in Barnhill, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 1 , also followed the suggestion in Davis in recognizing a good faith defense to section 203 penalties.

2024(Davis v. Morris, [supra,] 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 99 P.2d 345 ].)” (Trombley, at p. 808.) In sum, we explained, Labor Code section 216 “makes it a crime for an employer having the ability to pay, knowingly and intentionally to refuse to pay wages which he knows are due.” (Trombley, at pp. 807-808.) Some decades later, the court in Barnhill, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 1 , also followed the suggestion in Davis in recognizing a good faith defense to section 203 penalties.

2024(See, e.g., Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 782 [affirming trial court’s award of section 203 penalties when the employer’s classification of employees as pipe tradesmen rather than sprinkler fitters was clearly erroneous and therefore not reasonable]; Diaz, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 869 [affirming trial court’s award of penalties when the employer negligently failed to inquire into living wage increases under an amended ordinance].) Because courts already evaluate an employer’s misunderstanding of legal requirements aga

2013On the contrary, they raised complicated issues of first impression” (Id. at p. 1202.) In addition, there was no evidence the employer knew it was required to compensate its production workers at the rates prescribed in the LWO, or showing the company acted in bad faith when it failed to pay such rates.” (Ibid.) In contrast to Barnhill and Amaral, the courts in Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314 (Armenta) and Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 765 (Road Sprinkler), rejected claims that there was a good faith dispute

2013(Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) DTLA challenges the $237,840 in waiting time penalties awarded under Labor Code section 203 as improper because the award conflicted with the trial court’s finding, made in connection with its denial of plaintiffs’ claim for liquidated damages, “that DTLA’s actions were taken in good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing the actions were not in violation of the law.” DTLA did not object to the portion of the trial court’s statement of decision regarding penalties under Labor Code section 203.

2013(Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) DTLA challenges the $237,840 in waiting time penalties awarded under Labor Code section 203 as improper because the award conflicted with the trial court’s finding, made in connection with its denial of plaintiffs’ claim for liquidated damages, “that DTLA’s actions were taken in good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing the actions were not in violation of the law.” DTLA did not object to the portion of the trial court’s statement of decision regarding penalties under Labor Code section 203.

2022Spectrum disagrees on this point, arguing that the nature of a section 226.7 missed-break action is critical to the operation of Labor Code section 203’s waiting-time penalty provision, just sought as a remedy should be treated no differently: “whether or not [premium pay] has been paid is irrelevant to whether section 226.7 was violated . . . and an employer’s provision of an additional hour of pay does not excuse a section 226.7 violation.” (Kirby, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1256 .) 18 NARANJO v. SPECTRUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

2016Section 203, subdivision (b) provides for suit to be filed “for these penalties at any time before the expiration of the statute of limitations on an action for the wages from which the penalties arise.” Kirby concluded that “a section 226.7 action is brought for the nonprovision of meal and rest periods, not for the ‘nonpayment of wages.’ ” (Kirby, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1255 , original italics.) Following Kirby , section 226.7 cannot support a section 203 penalty because section 203, subdivision (b) tethers the waiting time penalty to a separate action for wages.

2024(Davis v. Morris, [supra,] 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 99 P.2d 345 ].)” (Trombley, at p. 808.) In sum, we explained, Labor Code section 216 “makes it a crime for an employer having the ability to pay, knowingly and intentionally to refuse to pay wages which he knows are due.” (Trombley, at pp. 807-808.) Some decades later, the court in Barnhill, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 1 , also followed the suggestion in Davis in recognizing a good faith defense to section 203 penalties.

2024(Davis v. Morris, [supra,] 37 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 99 P.2d 345 ].)” (Trombley, at p. 808.) In sum, we explained, Labor Code section 216 “makes it a crime for an employer having the ability to pay, knowingly and intentionally to refuse to pay wages which he knows are due.” (Trombley, at pp. 807-808.) Some decades later, the court in Barnhill, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 1 , also followed the suggestion in Davis in recognizing a good faith defense to section 203 penalties.

2023(Cf. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117 [“Where different words or phrases are used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature intended a different meaning”].) And providing a good-faith defense to employers accused of failing to pay wages is consonant with the scope of the employer’s obligation: “In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall pay, without condition . . . all wages, or parts thereof, conceded by him to be due, leaving to the employee all remedies he might otherwise be entitled to as to any

2023(Cf. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117 [“Where different words or phrases are used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature intended a different meaning”].) And providing a good-faith defense to employers accused of failing to pay wages is consonant with the scope of the employer’s obligation: “In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall pay, without condition . . . all wages, or parts thereof, conceded by him to be due, leaving to the employee all remedies he might otherwise be entitled to as to any

2019(Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 674-675, 684 .) 4 of the two homes, Tag, Cohen’s income, and the restaurant/lounge stock against Cohen and Tag; and (7) a violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act3 (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.) against Cohen and Tag, for shuttering Tag after the breakup to frustrate the collection of any judgment.4 Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for each of these claims in the SAC sought damages “in a sum to be proven at trial.” However, plaintiff elsewhere in the SAC demanded (1) her “share of profits” in the Hollywood home, which she alleged was “in excess of $300

2019(Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 674-675, 684 .) 4 of the two homes, Tag, Cohen’s income, and the restaurant/lounge stock against Cohen and Tag; and (7) a violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act3 (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.) against Cohen and Tag, for shuttering Tag after the breakup to frustrate the collection of any judgment.4 Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for each of these claims in the SAC sought damages “in a sum to be proven at trial.” However, plaintiff elsewhere in the SAC demanded (1) her “share of profits” in the Hollywood home, which she alleged was “in excess of $300

2019Moreover, to the extent an overtime or minimum wage issue also exists, there is no need to consider “whether violations of meal period regulations give rise to claims for waiting time penalties under section 203 [because the employer will owe] minimum wages for time worked [and that] is a proper basis for . . . waiting time penalties under section 203.” (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 810 ; see also Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1308, 1336-1337 [in an overtime case, there is no itemized wage statement violation where the hours worked are accurate, but the wag

2019Moreover, to the extent an overtime or minimum wage issue also exists, there is no need to consider “whether violations of meal period regulations give rise to claims for waiting time penalties under section 203 [because the employer will owe] minimum wages for time worked [and that] is a proper basis for . . . waiting time penalties under section 203.” (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 810 ; see also Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1308, 1336-1337 [in an overtime case, there is no itemized wage statement violation where the hours worked are accurate, but the wag

2026Pitney Bowes argues that sections 201 through 203 do not authorize an action to collect unpaid wages, but only waiting time penalties, which are not wages. 21 Canela and Pitney Bowes cite Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93 and Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244 in support of their respective positions.

2024But as discussed, TNS acknowledges the Supreme Court’s decision in Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.5th 93 and concedes section 218.5 applies to claims for waiting time penalties under section 203.

2018Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay the wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, "the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid." This provision has been interpreted to mean the penalty is an amount "equal to the employee's daily wages for each day ... that the wages are unpaid." ( Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365 , 377, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ; accord Mamika v. Barca (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 487 , 493, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 175 ["A proper reading of section 203 mandates a

2018Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay the wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, "the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid." This provision has been interpreted to mean the penalty is an amount "equal to the employee's daily wages for each day ... that the wages are unpaid." ( Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365 , 377, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ; accord Mamika v. Barca (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 487 , 493, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 175 ["A proper reading of section 203 mandates a

2024(See, e.g., Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 782 [affirming trial court’s award of section 203 penalties when the employer’s classification of employees as pipe tradesmen rather than sprinkler fitters was clearly erroneous and therefore not reasonable]; Diaz, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 869 [affirming trial court’s award of penalties when the employer negligently failed to inquire into living wage increases under an amended ordinance].) Because courts already evaluate an employer’s misunderstanding of legal requirements aga

2024(See, e.g., Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 782 [affirming trial court’s award of section 203 penalties when the employer’s classification of employees as pipe tradesmen rather than sprinkler fitters was clearly erroneous and therefore not reasonable]; Diaz, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 869 [affirming trial court’s award of penalties when the employer negligently failed to inquire into living wage increases under an amended ordinance].) Because courts already evaluate an employer’s misunderstanding of legal requirements aga

2018(See Heritage Residential Care, Inc. v. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 75 , 84, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 ["Like inadvertence, clerical error denotes behavior that is accidental, not deliberate"]; Cleveland v. Groceryworks.com, LLC (N.D.

2018(See Heritage Residential Care, Inc. v. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 75 , 84, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 ["Like inadvertence, clerical error denotes behavior that is accidental, not deliberate"]; Cleveland v. Groceryworks.com, LLC (N.D.

2015(See Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1401-1402 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377 , 241 P.3d 870 ] [§ 203 penalties not recoverable under the UCL].) Under the PAGA, 75 percent of any penalty the plaintiffs recover would go to the State.

2015(See Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1401-1402 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377 , 241 P.3d 870 ] [§ 203 penalties not recoverable under the UCL].) Under the PAGA, 75 percent of any penalty the plaintiffs recover would go to the State.

2013On the contrary, they raised complicated issues of first impression” (Id. at p. 1202.) In addition, there was no evidence the employer knew it was required to compensate its production workers at the rates prescribed in the LWO, or showing the company acted in bad faith when it failed to pay such rates.” (Ibid.) In contrast to Barnhill and Amaral, the courts in Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314 (Armenta) and Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 765 (Road Sprinkler), rejected claims that there was a good faith dispute

2008An employee who has not received the minimum wage is entitled to recover the amounts unlawfully withheld (§ 1194), plus additional amounts as penalties and liquidated damages where culpable conduct is shown (Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 325-326 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 ] [“waiting time” penalties under § 203 available where employer failed to pay minimum wage]; § 1194.2 [liquidated damages award]), and the additional civil penalties under section 1197.1 “are in addition to any other penalty provided by law” for failure to pay minimum wages.