general forfeiture rule in California

2013But after defendant filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court disapproved Pacheco on this point and held that the general forfeiture rule of Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 and People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 applies to such claims.

2013But after defendant filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court disapproved Pacheco on this point and held that the general forfeiture rule of Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 and People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 applies to such claims.

2025(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235, 237 ; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 294 .) And only facial constitutional challenges to a probation condition that are “capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record” are exempt from the general forfeiture rule.

2013But after defendant filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court disapproved Pacheco on this point and held that the general forfeiture rule of Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 and People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 applies to such claims.

2019(Cf. People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137 , 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 [holding that, because of the substantial risk of gamesmanship, 'a defendant forfeits the right to complain on appeal of conviction of a time-barred lesser included offense where the charged offense was not time-barred and the defendant either requested or acquiesced in the giving of instructions on the lesser offense'].)" ( Simon, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 15 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 .) Defendant has not raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

2019(Cf. People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137 , 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 [holding that, because of the substantial risk of gamesmanship, 'a defendant forfeits the right to complain on appeal of conviction of a time-barred lesser included offense where the charged offense was not time-barred and the defendant either requested or acquiesced in the giving of instructions on the lesser offense'].)" ( Simon, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 15 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 .) Defendant has not raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

2021The People contend that Smith has forfeited any right he may have to seek a hearing on his ability to pay because he failed to raise it in the trial court during sentencing. “ ‘ “ ‘[A] constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” ’ ” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 .) “The concept of forfeiture for failure to raise ability to pay fines, fees or assessments is well established in our caselaw prior to Dueñas.”

2013(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 591, 594, 599 (McCullough).) The high court further found that People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186 and People v. Lopez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508 , also cited by defendant, did not hold that challenges to a defendant‟s ability to pay fees may be raised first on appeal. ( McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th 589, 599-600, fn. 2 .) Here, defendant does not claim, as in Pacheco that he cannot pay the awarded amount.

2013"As a general rule, only 'claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.' " (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 .) A narrow exception to the general forfeiture rule applies to " 'obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings.' " (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1113 .) The "appropriateness of a restitution fine is fact specific," however, and "as a matter of fairness to the People, a defendant should not be permitted to contest for the first time on a

2003Finally, in light of the majority's acknowledgement that Scott is merely an application of "the general forfeiture doctrine" (maj. opn., ante, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 726 , 79 P.3d at p. 1032 ), the distinction it purports to draw between the two is mystifying.

2021(See, e.g., People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 ; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 137-138 ; but see, e.g., People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1154 [concluding forfeiture applied].) In this case, however, there is no basis for Smith to avoid the forfeiture rule that applies when a defendant fails to raise a challenge at sentencing to the ability to pay fines and fees.

2020(Compare People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126 , 1153–1155 [defendant forfeited issue by failing to raise below even though Dueñas had not then been decided] with People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138 [the Dueñas holding was not reasonably foreseeable and asserting the argument prior to that decision would have been futile].) Even if we agreed with those decisions that hold that a Dueñas argument would have been futile before that decision was announced, Quintero’s argument fails because Dueñas was decided in January 2019—seven months before Quintero’s sentencing hearing.

2019(Cf. People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137 , 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 [holding that, because of the substantial risk of gamesmanship, 'a defendant forfeits the right to complain on appeal of conviction of a time-barred lesser included offense where the charged offense was not time-barred and the defendant either requested or acquiesced in the giving of instructions on the lesser offense'].)" ( Simon, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 15 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 .) Defendant has not raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

2019(Cf. People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137 , 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 [holding that, because of the substantial risk of gamesmanship, 'a defendant forfeits the right to complain on appeal of conviction of a time-barred lesser included offense where the charged offense was not time-barred and the defendant either requested or acquiesced in the giving of instructions on the lesser offense'].)" ( Simon, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 15 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 .) Defendant has not raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

2003(See, e.g., In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Defendant cites no authority that this consideration is relevant under the general forfeiture principle.

2003(See, e.g., In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Defendant cites no authority that this consideration is relevant under the general forfeiture principle.

2025A “sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case,” such as a violation of “mandatory provisions governing the length of confinement.” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; accord People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 .) Angel does not contend that his 59-years-to-life sentence failed to comply with provisions concerning the length of his confinement; rather, his claim is that the trial court imposed a lawful sentence in a procedurally flawed manner.

2025Code, § 3275; see Coughlin v. Blair (1953) 41 Cal.2d 587, 603 [“Damages are awarded in an action for breach of contract to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain and insofar as possible to place him in the same position he would have been in had the promisor performed the contract.”].) Consistent with this compensation requirement, the CAA “order[s] the drafting party to pay the reasonable 17 HOHENSHELT v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (§ 1281.99,

2025Code, § 3275; see Coughlin v. Blair (1953) 41 Cal.2d 587, 603 [“Damages are awarded in an action for breach of contract to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain and insofar as possible to place him in the same position he would have been in had the promisor performed the contract.”].) Consistent with this compensation requirement, the CAA “order[s] the drafting party to pay the reasonable 17 HOHENSHELT v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (§ 1281.99,

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2023Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907 [“failure to declare a forfeiture upon a nonappearance without sufficient excuse, either where no excuse is offered or where the finding of an excuse constitutes an abuse of discretion, deprives the court of jurisdiction to later declare a forfeiture”].) Section 1305.1 sets forth a limited exception to the general forfeiture rule codified in section 1305, subdivision (a).

2023(See, e.g., People v. Elliot (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 572 [defendant forfeited claim that trial court exhibited racial bias during jury selection process by failing to raise the issue at trial].) Lashon asserts the general forfeiture rule should not apply because her claim involves a “substantial right” or “an important issue of constitutional law.” Her reliance on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 for this assertion is misplaced.