section 1717 costs in California

2021(Zintel Holdings, LLC 11 prevailing party and awards fees as costs under section 1717 “only upon final resolution of the contract claims . . . .” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (Hsu), italics added; accord, Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 928 (Butler-Rupp) [§ 1717 prevailing party can only be determined “by the final result of the litigation”]; Jackson v. Homeowners Assn.

2016(Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 866, 867.) Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment finding no contract was ever formed, but it denied the defendants' ensuing motion for attorney fees and costs under Civil Code section 1717.

1991Code § 1717 [“the court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract” and shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as “an element of the costs of suit”]; see also California Rules of Court, rule 870.2 [a motion to claim fees as an element of costs under section 1717 “shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed”].) The Walshes’ reliance on Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 420 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] and Presley of Southern California v. Whelan (

1991Code § 1717 [“the court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract” and shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as “an element of the costs of suit”]; see also California Rules of Court, rule 870.2 [a motion to claim fees as an element of costs under section 1717 “shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed”].) The Walshes’ reliance on Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 420 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] and Presley of Southern California v. Whelan (

2023(Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095 .) When a party is entitled to fees as costs pursuant to Civil Code sections 1717 and 1032, the trial court, in determining the reasonableness of such fees, may “‘take all of the circumstances [of the case] into account.’” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 683 .) The moving 28 party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred.

2022And both incur attorney fees and costs within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717 in enforcing the contract on behalf of their client.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094 .) The trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding fees for time spent by in-house lawyers and reducing them by 40 percent.

2008(Id. at p. 221.) The Olen court concluded that the sublessee was entitled to recover filing fees under section 1032 as a matter of right, because he was a defendant in whose favor a dismissal had been entered. {Olen, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 221 .) The court acknowledged that attorney fees may be recoverable under Civil Code section 1717 as costs pursuant to statute and awarded to the prevailing party as part of a memorandum of costs.

1998(Dickens, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 ; see Olen, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 223.) On that point, Olen appears to have been commenting on the fact that fairly recent case law had established that parties to contracts containing unilateral or bilateral attorney fee provisions could recover such fees either as special damages or as items of costs pursuant to section 1717.

1998(See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1725 , 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 274 ; Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 1633, 1637-1638 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 .) However, those cases were decided under former rule 870.2 of the California Rules of Court, which stated that "[a]ny notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under Civil Code section 1717 shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served or filed." ( Russell v. Trans Pacific Group, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1721, fn. 7 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ; Nazemi v. Tseng, sup

1998(See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 *706 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1725 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ]; Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1637-1638 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ].) However, those cases were decided under former rule 870.2 of the California Rules of Court, which stated that “[a]ny notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under Civil Code section 1717 shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served or filed.” (See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1720, fn. 7 ; Nazemi v. Tseng, supra, 5 Cal.App

1998(See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 *706 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1725 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ]; Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1637-1638 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ].) However, those cases were decided under former rule 870.2 of the California Rules of Court, which stated that “[a]ny notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under Civil Code section 1717 shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served or filed.” (See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1720, fn. 7 ; Nazemi v. Tseng, supra, 5 Cal.App

1998(See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 *706 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1723-1725 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ]; Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1637-1638 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ].) However, those cases were decided under former rule 870.2 of the California Rules of Court, which stated that “[a]ny notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under Civil Code section 1717 shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served or filed.” (See Russell v. Trans Pacific Group, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1720, fn. 7 ; Nazemi v. Tseng, supra, 5 Cal.App

1998(See In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) In any event, assuming that rule 870.2 provides guidance on the subject, the earliest possible deadline for filing the motion would have been 60 days after the. dismissal was entered on October 22, 1996.

1998(See In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) In any event, assuming that rule 870.2 provides guidance on the subject, the earliest possible deadline for filing the motion would have been 60 days after the. dismissal was entered on October 22, 1996.

2026The $7,364.08 difference between this amount and the $63,153.79 amount awarded pursuant to section 1717 represents recoverable costs determined in parallel proceedings in which the trial court addressed a motion by Finley and Adams to tax costs. 6 to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751 .)9 A. Entitlement to Fees and Costs Turning to the first of Finley and Adams’s two contentions, we commence our analysis with the text of section 1717: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fee

2026The $7,364.08 difference between this amount and the $63,153.79 amount awarded pursuant to section 1717 represents recoverable costs determined in parallel proceedings in which the trial court addressed a motion by Finley and Adams to tax costs. 6 to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751 .)9 A. Entitlement to Fees and Costs Turning to the first of Finley and Adams’s two contentions, we commence our analysis with the text of section 1717: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fee

2026The $7,364.08 difference between this amount and the $63,153.79 amount awarded pursuant to section 1717 represents recoverable costs determined in parallel proceedings in which the trial court addressed a motion by Finley and Adams to tax costs. 6 to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751 .)9 A. Entitlement to Fees and Costs Turning to the first of Finley and Adams’s two contentions, we commence our analysis with the text of section 1717: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fee

2025(See DeSaulles, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1154 ; Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 170 [a prevailing party is entitled to costs and, if authorized by statute or contract, attorney fees where she accepted a § 998 offer that was silent on costs and fees]; On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 [“when a section 998 offer is silent about attorney’s fees and costs, it cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude their recovery and the prevailing party may seek them”]; Ritzenthaler v. Fireside Thrift Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“A compro

2025(See DeSaulles, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1154 ; Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 170 [a prevailing party is entitled to costs and, if authorized by statute or contract, attorney fees where she accepted a § 998 offer that was silent on costs and fees]; On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 [“when a section 998 offer is silent about attorney’s fees and costs, it cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude their recovery and the prevailing party may seek them”]; Ritzenthaler v. Fireside Thrift Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“A compro

2025(See DeSaulles, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1154 ; Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 170 [a prevailing party is entitled to costs and, if authorized by statute or contract, attorney fees where she accepted a § 998 offer that was silent on costs and fees]; On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 [“when a section 998 offer is silent about attorney’s fees and costs, it cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude their recovery and the prevailing party may seek them”]; Ritzenthaler v. Fireside Thrift Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“A compro

2021(Zintel Holdings, LLC 11 prevailing party and awards fees as costs under section 1717 “only upon final resolution of the contract claims . . . .” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (Hsu), italics added; accord, Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 928 (Butler-Rupp) [§ 1717 prevailing party can only be determined “by the final result of the litigation”]; Jackson v. Homeowners Assn.

2021Monte Vista Estates-East (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 773, 780 [no prevailing party under § 1717 until final disposition of the lawsuit].) Stated differently, for purposes of Civil Code section 1717, “[o]nly when a final judgment has been entered in [an action] . . . will there be a prevailing party.” (580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 30 .) Where, as here, there is an “appellate decision [that] does not decide who wins the lawsuit but instead contemplates further proceedings in the trial court” (e.g., Appeal 1), our court ruled more than 25 years ago that t

2021Monte Vista Estates-East (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 773, 780 [no prevailing party under § 1717 until final disposition of the lawsuit].) Stated differently, for purposes of Civil Code section 1717, “[o]nly when a final judgment has been entered in [an action] . . . will there be a prevailing party.” (580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 30 .) Where, as here, there is an “appellate decision [that] does not decide who wins the lawsuit but instead contemplates further proceedings in the trial court” (e.g., Appeal 1), our court ruled more than 25 years ago that t

2021Monte Vista Estates-East (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 773, 780 [no prevailing party under § 1717 until final disposition of the lawsuit].) Stated differently, for purposes of Civil Code section 1717, “[o]nly when a final judgment has been entered in [an action] . . . will there be a prevailing party.” (580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 30 .) Where, as here, there is an “appellate decision [that] does not decide who wins the lawsuit but instead contemplates further proceedings in the trial court” (e.g., Appeal 1), our court ruled more than 25 years ago that t

2019The arbitrator then issued an amended award that included amounts for interest, costs, and fees. ( Century City , at pp. 872-873, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 605 .) The trial court refused to confirm the amended award, but the Court of Appeal reversed, explaining that while arbitrators generally are without power to correct errors of fact or law in rulings they made, they retain power to rule on issues submitted to them but left undecided. ( Id. at pp. 877-881, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 605 .) Century City and other amendment cases rest on the understanding that an arbitrator's authority does not expire at the mome

2019The landlord reasoned that because fees were to be awarded to the prevailing party following entry of judgment, it "was required to await the award before making a motion for attorney fees." ( Id. at p. 872, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 605 .) The arbitrator by letter agreed to make an award and directed the landlord to submit a motion for fees and costs under Civil Code section 1717.

2016(See Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126 [appellate court required to address sua sponte the question of appealability “whenever a doubt exists” concerning the issue].) After entry of judgment, JMR filed a motion for attorney fees awardable as costs pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 (attorney fee motion).

2016(See Texas Commerce Bank v. Garamendi (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1249 [party prevailing on contract entitled to costs under Civil Code section 1717 even if not entitled to costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032].) IV.

2015Code, § 1717 attorney fees as costs]; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 [jurisdiction to rule on motion for statutory attorney fees as costs]; Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461 [same].) As for the contention that the court sua sponte awarded attorney fees in violation of Hixon’s due process rights after the Zipperts’ counsel filed a purportedly unsolicited supplemental declaration, we have already addressed this extraordinary claim.

2015Code, § 1717 attorney fees as costs]; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 [jurisdiction to rule on motion for statutory attorney fees as costs]; Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461 [same].) As for the contention that the court sua sponte awarded attorney fees in violation of Hixon’s due process rights after the Zipperts’ counsel filed a purportedly unsolicited supplemental declaration, we have already addressed this extraordinary claim.