section 425.16(e) connection with litigation in California

2026Moussazadeh’s Cross-complaint Arose Out of Protected Activity “Section 425.16 protects litigation-related activity, i.e., ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding’ or ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.’” (Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980 , 991; see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2).) A “statement or writing is ‘made “in connection with”’ litigation under section 425.16(e)(2)—including anticipated litigation—‘if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directe

2025After granting rehearing, we consolidated the three appeals for argument and decision on our own motion. 11 “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 (Neville).) The provision “has been held to protect statements to persons who are not parties or potential parties to litigation, provided such statements are made ‘in connection with’ pending or anticipated litigation.

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2021Section 425.16 is “‘construed broadly’” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119 (Briggs)), and courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see § 425.16, subd. (a).) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 1

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2021Section 425.16 is “‘construed broadly’” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119 (Briggs)), and courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see § 425.16, subd. (a).) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 1

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2021Section 425.16 is “‘construed broadly’” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119 (Briggs)), and courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see § 425.16, subd. (a).) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 1

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2021Section 425.16 is “‘construed broadly’” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119 (Briggs)), and courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see § 425.16, subd. (a).) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 1

2022Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 ; Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 779 ; Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793 , 803-804.) In fact, courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see Finton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 210 [“ ‘all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proc

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2026Moussazadeh’s Cross-complaint Arose Out of Protected Activity “Section 425.16 protects litigation-related activity, i.e., ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding’ or ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.’” (Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980 , 991; see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2).) A “statement or writing is ‘made “in connection with”’ litigation under section 425.16(e)(2)—including anticipated litigation—‘if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directe

2026To hold otherwise would seem to doom any defamation claim.12 First, for “a statement or writing [to be] ‘made “in connection with” ’ litigation under section 425.16[, subdivision ](e)(2),” it must both “ ‘relate[] to the substantive issues in the litigation and [be] directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080 , 1096, italics added (Bassi).) We accept that defendants’ transmission of the YouTube videos to the court or another person having some interest in the litigation is protected, but the posting of the videos to the general pub

2024“Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that ‘a statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’” (Optional Capital, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113-114.) Here, the alleged false statements underlying the fraudulent misrepresentation claim were all made in the context of negotiations seeking to resolve Christopher’s contention the $360,000 loan from the Trust constituted a community debt that was omitted from the January 2019

2021A “ ‘statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95 , 113-114.) Pappas’s communications related to the substantive issue in the litigation—the insurance claim—and were directed to a person with an interest in the litigation—Opperwall.

2026Joseph Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009; see Callister v. James B.

2024Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1009.) The trial court determined that the GoDaddy letter fell within subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16, which protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v

2023(Rand Resources, LLC v. 5 City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620 ; Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 867 (Paul).) When interpreting the statute, “we keep in mind that the Legislature has instructed the courts to construe the anti-SLAPP statute ‘broadly.’ ” (Dorit v. Noe (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 458 , 468.) Applying this standard, we conclude Jaureguito’s statements constitute protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).

2015The statements or writings in question must occur in connection with ‘an issue under consideration or review’ in the proceeding.” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 866 .) Here, Abbott’s alleged defamatory statements to Pucci’s prospective employer that Pucci’s “lawsuit” had been “thrown out of court” were unrelated to any substantive issues under review by the NLRB.

2022Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 ; Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 779 ; Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793 , 803-804.) In fact, courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian); see Finton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 210 [“ ‘all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proc

2021It is far too late for the anti-SLAPP statute to fulfill its purpose of resolving the case promptly and inexpensively. ‘An anti-SLAPP motion is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.’” (Id. at p. 645.) Here, there was no such delay or discovery taken. 32 protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation

2010(Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 4-5 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 ].) Cases construing the subdivision hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ], fn. omitted; see also Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 ] [courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what co

2010(Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 4-5 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 ].) Cases construing the subdivision hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 ], fn. omitted; see also Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 ] [courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what co

2020Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 .) “ ‘ “Under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ [Citation.] Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that ‘a statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)

2015Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 824 .) The “mere potential or ‘bare possibility’ that judicial proceedings ‘might be instituted’ in the future is insufficient to invoke the litigation privilege. [Citation.] In every case, the privileged communication must have some relation to an imminent lawsuit or judicial proceeding which is actually contemplated seriously and in good faith to resolve a dispute, and not simply as a tactical ploy to negotiate a bargain.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 36 (Edwards).) Considering the above parameters, the Smoot Le

2026(See id. at pp. 907-908 [communication of settlement offer]; Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 86, 90 [negotiation and execution of release of claims]; Seltzer, at pp. 963, 969 [settlement negotiations].) Here, the photographs relate to the substantive issues in the Camacho litigation because Camacho’s writ petition sought to compel the City to provide him with the photographs he had requested of all LAPD officers.

2026We agree the production was protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). “ ‘[A] statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 (Seltzer).) “Statements and writings made in connection with litigation are therefore covered by the anti-SLAPP statute,” regardless of whether “the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest.” (GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professio

2026We agree the production was protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). “ ‘[A] statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 (Seltzer).) “Statements and writings made in connection with litigation are therefore covered by the anti-SLAPP statute,” regardless of whether “the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest.” (GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professio

2024(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 ; accord Neville, at p. 1268.) “Prelitigation letters demanding that a party cease from doing certain acts or be subject to a lawsuit based on that conduct are in preparation or anticipation of litigation and fall within the protection of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) . . . .” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 472 (Lunada).) 9 Petersen argues that Feldman admitted under penalty of perjury in the website action that the GoDaddy letter was not preparation for the website action, so subdivision

2024(Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [“The reasonable relevancy requirement of [Civil Code] section 47 is analogous to the ‘in connection with’ standard of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).”].) “To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be ‘in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 (Action Apartment).) Put differently, the statement must “ ‘be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment,

2024(Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [“The reasonable relevancy requirement of [Civil Code] section 47 is analogous to the ‘in connection with’ standard of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).”].) “To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be ‘in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 (Action Apartment).) Put differently, the statement must “ ‘be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment,

2024(Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [“The reasonable relevancy requirement of [Civil Code] section 47 is analogous to the ‘in connection with’ standard of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).”].) “To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be ‘in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 (Action Apartment).) Put differently, the statement must “ ‘be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment,

2022(Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) “ ‘Any act’ includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action[,]” including “qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation.” (Ibid.; see Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 [“[t]he anti-SLAPP statutes protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it rel

2020Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 .) “ ‘ “Under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ [Citation.] Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that ‘a statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)