section 52-572h apportionment principles in Connecticut

2001In Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co ., 253 Conn. 787 , 801 , 756 A.2d 237 (2000), our Supreme Court held that: "the apportionment principles of § 52-572h do not apply where the purported apportionment complaint rests on any basis other than negligence. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Therefore, if the plaintiffs' claim against Nationwide arises out of a contractual relationship, Nationwide is prohibited from seeking apportionment under General Statutes § 52-572 .

2001In Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co ., 253 Conn. 787 , 801 , 756 A.2d 237 (2000), our Supreme Court held that: "the apportionment principles of § 52-572h do not apply where the purported apportionment complaint rests on any basis other than negligence. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Therefore, if the plaintiffs' claim against Nationwide arises out of a contractual relationship, Nationwide is prohibited from seeking apportionment under General Statutes § 52-572 .

1993These decisions do not take into account the concept recognized in Lukas v. New Haven, [ 184 Conn. 205 ] . . . 212, that comparative negligence under section 52-572h does not apply to a statutory cause of action.

1992These decisions do not take into account the concept recognized in Lukas v. New Haven, supra, 212 , that comparative negligence under section 52-572h does not apply to a statutory cause of action.

2022The legislative history of P.A. 99-69 makes clear that its principal purpose was to overrule legislatively a portion of this court’s decision in Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223 , 717 A.2d 202 (1998).’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., supra, 801.

2022The legislative history of P.A. 99-69 makes clear that its principal purpose was to overrule legislatively a portion of this court’s decision in Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223 , 717 A.2d 202 (1998).’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., supra, 801.

2001Durniak v. August Winter Sons, Inc ., 222 Conn. 775 , 782 (1992).

1994The supreme court has held, however, "[b]ecause an employer's right to obtain reimbursement from a third party tortfeasor is a statutory claim that is derived in its entirety from § 31-293 (a) . . . the employer's claim does not fall within the compass of § 52-572h [, which authorizes comparative negligence]. . . . [Therefore, i]t is generally held that the employee cannot be met with a defense that his own employer's negligence contributed to the injury." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Durniak v. August Winter Sons, Inc. , 222 Conn. 775 , 782 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992).

1995Ortiz held the doctrine of parental immunity, see Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518 , 525 (1988), precluded any attempt by the defendants to cite in the plaintiff's father in a lawsuit brought in the child's behalf.

1995Ortiz held the doctrine of parental immunity, see Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518 , 525 (1988), precluded any attempt by the defendants to cite in the plaintiff's father in a lawsuit brought in the child's behalf.

2007We further stated that "it would be illogical to allow the state to benefit from the apportionment provisions of § 52-572h (c) when there are multiple liable defendants, but not to subject the state to the reallocation provisions of § 52-572h (g) when a liable codefendant is insolvent." Id., at 267, 721 A.2d 511 . *880 In reaching our conclusion, we briefly summarized the history of Tort Reform, explaining that, "under Tort Reform I, [the trier of fact] in determining the percentage of damages attributable to a particular defendant . . . was able to take into account the percentage of damages

2007See Public Acts 1995, No. 95-111, § 1.... [Section] 52-102b (c) sets forth the notice that is required when a defendant asserts an apportionment claim against a nonparty to the action who has settled with the plaintiff or who has been released from the plaintiff's claims." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carlson v. Waterbury Hospital, 280 Conn. 125, 142 , 905 A.2d 654 (2006).

2007See Public Acts 1995, No. 95-111, § 1.... [Section] 52-102b (c) sets forth the notice that is required when a defendant asserts an apportionment claim against a nonparty to the action who has settled with the plaintiff or who has been released from the plaintiff's claims." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carlson v. Waterbury Hospital, 280 Conn. 125, 142 , 905 A.2d 654 (2006).

2002Co., 257 Conn. 718 , 778 A.2d 899 (2001). 8 In Collins, the court held that in a case involving multiple tortfeasors, where at least one of them is uninsured, the uninsured motorist carrier is entitled to apportionment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h . 9 Id., 742.

2002Co., 257 Conn. 718 , 778 A.2d 899 (2001). 8 In Collins, the court held that in a case involving multiple tortfeasors, where at least one of them is uninsured, the uninsured motorist carrier is entitled to apportionment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h . 9 Id., 742.

2001In reaching its conclusion, the Eurto court reasoned that because the Supreme Court in Steele v. Stonington , supra, 225 Conn. 217 , found that the difference between an action brought pursuant to § 13a-149 and an action on brought in common law negligence is paper thin, "it could easily be construed that the difference between negligence and . . . § 13a-144 is no difference at all because § 13a-144 holds the state liable through its ` neglect or default .'" Eurto v. Hyjeck , supra, 19 Conn.L.Rptr. 413 .

2001Instead of the doctrines of assumption of the risk, last clear chance and contributory negligence, the single standard of comparative negligence applies, and in determining the relevant negligence of each party the trier may consider the factors relevant to the assumption of the risk doctrine." Cahill v. Carella , 43 Conn. Sup. 168 , 173 , 648 A.2d 169 (1994).

2001Instead of the doctrines of assumption of the risk, last clear chance and contributory negligence, the single standard of comparative negligence applies, and in determining the relevant negligence of each party the trier may consider the factors relevant to the assumption of the risk doctrine." Cahill v. Carella , 43 Conn. Sup. 168 , 173 , 648 A.2d 169 (1994).

1998By the same reasoning, however, in my view, it is also clear that the specific legislative allowance of allocation with respect to negligent persons precludes allocation, as a matter of common law, with respect to reckless or intentional tortfeasors. “[I]n interpreting statutes we have on occasion read specific statutory references to indicate a legislative intent to exclude, by implication, other related potential referents. . . . [Where] the explicit language or the legislative history of [the statute indicates] such a legislative intent, we [are] required to respect that implication, and we

1998By the same reasoning, however, in my view, it is also clear that the specific legislative allowance of allocation with respect to negligent persons precludes allocation, as a matter of common law, with respect to reckless or intentional tortfeasors. “[I]n interpreting statutes we have on occasion read specific statutory references to indicate a legislative intent to exclude, by implication, other related potential referents. . . . [Where] the explicit language or the legislative history of [the statute indicates] such a legislative intent, we [are] required to respect that implication, and we

1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged.

1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged.

1998Rptr. 367 ). "[I]f the state, by statute or otherwise, does not consent to be sued, it remains immune from suit irrespective of whether or not apportionment constitutes a cause of action upon which [the defendant] could recover monetary damages." Camejo v. Southern Connecticut Gas Co. , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 310068 (December 6, 1995, Ballen, J. ) ( 15 Conn. L.

1998Further, the state cannot be held liable for apportionment of damages under General Statutes § 52-572h because the state is not a party "against whom recovery is allowed." "There is nothing in the language of § 52-572h . . . which either expressly waives the states sovereign immunity or indicates a legislative intent to waive the states sovereign immunity for purposes of apportionment." Teasley v. Delta Elevator Services, Inc. , Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 129123 (December 31, 1996, Pellegrino, J. ) ( 18 Conn. L.

1997Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 669 , 563 A.2d 1013 (1989).

1997Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 669 , 563 A.2d 1013 (1989).

1997"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading." WestPort Bank Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin Aresco, 221 Conn. 490 , 495 , 605 A.2d 862 (1992). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco.

1997"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading." WestPort Bank Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin Aresco, 221 Conn. 490 , 495 , 605 A.2d 862 (1992). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco.

1996Moreover, "[t]he trial courts in Connecticut are sharply split over the proper procedure for adding parties to an action for the purpose of apportioning liability [for damages.]" Doe v. Bay Management Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 521274 (November 9, 1993, Teller, J., 8 CSCR 1250 , 1250 ).

1995The defendant also argues that the doctrine of parental immunity does not bar a claim against the parents of an injured minor for apportionment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h . 1 Based on the public policy expressed in §§ 52-102 and 52-572h (c) and the common law as reaffirmed in Squeglia v. Squeglia, supra, the doctrine of parental immunity does bar citing in the parents for apportionment purposes in this case.

1995This is the proper procedure for bringing a person into a negligence action for the purpose of apportionment of liability under General Statutes § 52-572h ." On May 5, 1995, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue "that particular aspect of the defendants' motion to cite in additional defendants in order to require the defendants to do it themselves." The plaintiff argues that Bradford v. Herzig, 33 Conn. App. 714 , 723 , 638 A.2d 608 (1994), holds that a court may not order a plaintiff to sue someone.

1995This is the proper procedure for bringing a person into a negligence action for the purpose of apportionment of liability under General Statutes § 52-572h ." On May 5, 1995, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue "that particular aspect of the defendants' motion to cite in additional defendants in order to require the defendants to do it themselves." The plaintiff argues that Bradford v. Herzig, 33 Conn. App. 714 , 723 , 638 A.2d 608 (1994), holds that a court may not order a plaintiff to sue someone.

1994National Fire Proofing Co. v. Town of Huntington, 81 Conn. 632 , 634 (1909).

1994"Apportionment of liability among defendants under Section 52-572h is adequately accomplished by joining the additional person as a party to the action by using Section 52-102 , and does not require any claims against that person by existing defendants. . . ." Baker v. Franco, 7 Conn. L.

1993The effect of the parental immunity doctrine upon joinder of parents as parties in a negligence action was considered in Bueno v. Duva, 7 CSCR 919 (1992), an action for negligence where a child on a bicycle was struck by an automobile.

1993In Bueno v. Duva, supra, the court concluded that even though a direct claim by the child against the parent would be barred by the parental immunity doctrine, the negligence of a parent who is a party to the case can be considered when the trier determines the percentages of negligence under section 52-572h (f) of the General Statutes, and the proportional share of damages for which the defendant is liable under subsection (d) of the same statute.

1992The court in Wandland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 190 Conn. 791 (1983), however, discussed the relationship of assumption of the risk special defenses and comparative negligence under Section 52-572h .