section 3408 mandatory foreclosure settlement conferences in New York

2023CPLR 3408 mandates settlement conferences where, among other things, the loan secured by the mortgage was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes ( see RPAPL 1304[6][a][1]; Independence Bank v Valentine , 113 AD3d 62, 66-67 ).

2019Defendant was not entitled to a residential foreclosure settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408 because the loan secured by the mortgage was not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes (CPLR 3408; RPAPL 1304[6][a][1]; Independence Bank v Valentine , 113 AD3d 62, 66-67 [2d Dept 2013]).

2013Accordingly, since a mortgagor is only entitled to a mandatory settlement conference under CPLR 3408 for a home loan that falls under the definition outlined in RPAPL 1304 (5) (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d at 18 ; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 104-105 [2011]), and the loan here does not fall within the ambit of that statute, the Supreme Court properly rejected Valentine’s argument and granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Valentine and for an order of reference.

2013Accordingly, since a mortgagor is only entitled to a mandatory settlement conference under CPLR 3408 for a home loan that falls under the definition outlined in RPAPL 1304 (5) (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d at 18 ; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 104-105 [2011]), and the loan here does not fall within the ambit of that statute, the Supreme Court properly rejected Valentine’s argument and granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Valentine and for an order of reference.

2023As for defendant's argument that her loan was a "home loan" as defined by Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1304, and thus that she was entitled to a mandatory settlement conference under CPLR 3408, she did not appeal Supreme Court's earlier order granting summary judgment, which found that she had waived her right to raise the defense that the home was her residence, and that ruling was therefore law of the case ( see Rosso v Beer Garden , Inc. , 12 AD3d 152, 153-154 [1st Dept 2004]).

2023As for defendant's argument that her loan was a "home loan" as defined by Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1304, and thus that she was entitled to a mandatory settlement conference under CPLR 3408, she did not appeal Supreme Court's earlier order granting summary judgment, which found that she had waived her right to raise the defense that the home was her residence, and that ruling was therefore law of the case ( see Rosso v Beer Garden , Inc. , 12 AD3d 152, 153-154 [1st Dept 2004]).

2026Trust Co. v O'Connor , 223 AD3d at 875; PennyMac Corp. v Weinberg , 203 AD3d 1061, 1063 ).

2026Trust Co. v O'Connor , 223 AD3d 872 , 875 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Citimortgage, Inc. v Barton , 212 AD3d 706, 708 ).

2025Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, it does not appear that the action was subject to a mandatory settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408, as the record indicates that the defendants did not reside at the property at the time the action was commenced ( see id. § 3408[a][1]; 22 NYCRR 202.12-a[a]; US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento , 121 AD3d 187, 199-200 ).

2016In a residential foreclosure action, the parties are obligated to participate in good faith in the settlement conference mandated under CPLR 3408 and 22 NYCRR 202.12-a, and the court is authorized to impose an appropriate sanction for a party’s failure to comply (see US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento, 121 AD3d 187, 207 [2014]).

2025Plaintiff cites persuasive authority from the Second Department holding that a plaintiff's filing of an RJI constitutes taking proceedings under CPLR 3215(c), when filed within one year after the defendants' default, where a foreclosure settlement conference is "mandated by CPLR 3408 . . . . a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment" ( Citimortgage, Inc. v Zaibak , 188 AD3d 982, 983 [2d Dept 2020]; see also U.S. Bank N.A. v Newson , 240 AD3d 821 , 822 [2d Dept 2025]; U.S. Bank N.A. v 63 Holiday Dr .

2025Plaintiff also invokes a line of Second Department authority which holds that in residential mortgage foreclosure cases which are subject to mandatory settlement conferences under CPLR 3408, the mere filing of an RJI “for such a conference in connection with an ongoing demand for the ultimate relief sought in the complaint constitutes ‘proceedings for entry of judgment’ within the meaning of CPLR 3215 (c)” (see e.g., Citimortgage, Inc. v Zaibak, 188 AD3d 982 [2d Dept 2020]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Gross, 4 4 of 6 [* 4] FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 07/07/2025 04:08 PM INDEX NO. 507722/2018 NYSCE

2022However, under the statute, a mandatory settlement conference is available to "resident[s] of the property subject to foreclosure" (CPLR 3408[a]; see Richlew Real Estate Venture v Grant , 131 AD3d 1223, 1224 ), and the defendant admitted that he resides elsewhere.

2017Upon reviewing the differing averments of Ms. Kempton and the plaintiff, the court is further guided by the holding in Richlew Real Estate which stated, “In light of this factual dispute, a hearing is necessary to determine whether the subject loan constitutes a ‘home loan’ as that term is defined by RPAPL 1304, and thus whether the defendant is entitled to a mandatory settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408.” ( 131 AD3d at 1224-1225 .) Accordingly, the motion and cross motion will be granted to the extent that the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the defendants’ note and mort

2026Here, assuming that the action was subject to mandatory settlement conferences pursuant to CPLR 3408(a), thereby tolling the one-year period within which the plaintiff had to take proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the one-year period expired, at the latest, in January 2012 ( see Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v Buonauro , 233 AD3d at 974).

2026Trust Co. v O'Connor , 223 AD3d 872 , 875 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Citimortgage, Inc. v Barton , 212 AD3d 706, 708 ).

2026Although the time to "take proceedings" is tolled during settlement negotiations pursuant to CPLR 3408 ( see Citibank, N.A. v Kerszko , 203 AD3d 42, 49), here, the settlement negotiations did not begin until more than three years after the time to "take proceedings" had expired.

2026Although the time to "take proceedings" is tolled during settlement negotiations pursuant to CPLR 3408 ( see Citibank, N.A. v Kerszko , 203 AD3d 42 , 49), here, the settlement negotiations did not begin until more than three years after the time to "take proceedings" had expired.

2025NO. 78 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/07/2025 139 AD3d 772, 774 [2d Dept 2016]).

2025Plaintiff cites persuasive authority from the Second Department holding that a plaintiff's filing of an RJI constitutes taking proceedings under CPLR 3215(c), when filed within one year after the defendants' default, where a foreclosure settlement conference is "mandated by CPLR 3408 . . . . a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment" ( Citimortgage, Inc. v Zaibak , 188 AD3d 982, 983 [2d Dept 2020]; see also U.S. Bank N.A. v Newson , 240 AD3d 821 , 822 [2d Dept 2025]; U.S. Bank N.A. v 63 Holiday Dr .

2024The defendant's participation in settlement conferences pursuant to CPLR 3408 "did not demonstrate a clear intent to participate in the lawsuit on the merits" and thus did not constitute a formal or informal appearance in the action ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Stroman , 202 AD3d 804, 807 ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Martinez , 181 AD3d 470, 471 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Slone , 174 AD3d 866 ).

2023The plaintiff also failed to proffer any excuse for its delay in taking proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against William ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Benitez , 211 AD3d at 766-767; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Cross , 205 AD3d at 782; Federal Natl.