37 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ‘distinctive group.’” San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). [T]o strike the appropriate balance between a party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in juror selection, [our supreme court] in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be followed when a party objects to the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the ground that it was made on [an improper] discriminatory 2018Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 409 (Fla. 2014). 2 “CSI” refers to the television show Crime Scene Investigation. 2 “Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ‘distinctive group.’” San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). [T]o strike the appropriate balance between a party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in juror selection, [our supreme court] in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be followed when a pa | 3 | 3 |
Mark Anthony Poole v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2026Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 409 (Fla. 2014) (“This court has consistently held that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the propriety of the exercise of a peremptory challenge.”) During voir dire, when asked by defense counsel whether police officers are more or less likely to lie or tell the truth than the average person, another juror said that police would lie “like everybody else.” Juror Jones 2 agreed with that statement: “I feel the same as he just stated. 2018Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 409 (Fla. 2014). 2 “CSI” refers to the television show Crime Scene Investigation. 2 “Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ‘distinctive group.’” San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). [T]o strike the appropriate balance between a party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in juror selection, [our supreme court] in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be followed when a pa | 2 | 2 |
San Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ‘distinctive group.’” San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). [T]o strike the appropriate balance between a party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in juror selection, [our supreme court] in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be followed when a party objects to the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the ground that it was made on [an improper] discriminatory 2018Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 409 (Fla. 2014). 2 “CSI” refers to the television show Crime Scene Investigation. 2 “Under Florida law, a party’s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ‘distinctive group.’” San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). [T]o strike the appropriate balance between a party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges and the attempt to eliminate invidious discrimination in juror selection, [our supreme court] in Melbourne enunciated a three-step procedure to be followed when a pa | 2 | 2 |
Peacher v. Cohngreen2 sentences2011Peacher v. Cohn, 786 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). 2002Peacher v. Cohn, 786 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). | 2 | 2 |
Fotopoulos v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Melbourne v. Stategreen2 sentences2015In Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court established the following three-step proee-dure that must be followed when a party objects to the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis that it was made on a discriminatory basis: First, the objecting party must make a timely objection, show that the venire-person is a member of a distinct protected group, and request that the trial court ask the striking party to provide a reason for the strike. 2003We emphasized that in applying these guidelines, the trial court's focus "is not on the reasonableness of the explanation" for the exercise of a peremptory challenge "but rather its genuineness." Id. | 1 | 7 |
State v. Neilgreen2 sentences2003In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), this Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race violates the right of both the defendant and the State to trial by an impartial jury under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. [4] This Court delineated a test for trial courts to use in determining whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a pretext for racial discrimination. [5] Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), held that 1992He argues the trial court departed from the directives of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) and State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) when it allowed the state attorney to back-strike the only black member of the jury who had been (at that point) accepted by both sides for service on the jury panel, through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. | 1 | 6 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Smith v. State, 799 So.2d 421, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“The fact that a prospective juror has been previously arrested or has a relative who has been is generally considered to be a valid race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.”). 2003Smith v. State, 799 So.2d 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). | 1 | 2 |
Porter v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Anderson v. State, 750 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Porter v. State, 708 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dean v. State, 703 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 2000See Porter v. State, 708 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dean v. State, 703 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). | 1 | 2 |
Hamdeh v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Hamdeh, 762 So. 2d at 1032 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Olibrices v. Stategreen1 sentence2018In Olibrices v. State, 929 So. 2d 1176, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), our court found that the potential juror’s “membership within the objectively discernible group of Pakistani Muslims” was the basis of the exercise of a peremptory challenge. | 1 | 1 |
Franqui v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997); Curtis v. State, 685 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1996). 2014See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997); Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Symonette v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Symonette v. State, 778 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“The fact that a juror has been the victim of a crime has been held to be a valid race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.”). | 1 | 1 |
Schimmel v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Simmons, 940 So.2d at 583 (recognizing that a juror’s spouse being a law enforcement officer was race-neutral on its face); Russell v. State, 879 So.2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (stating that a potential juror having a relative in law enforcement “has been repeatedly found to be a valid, race neutral or gender neutral reason for a peremptory strike”); Chambers v. State, 682 So.2d 615, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[T]he law enforcement background of a juror’s spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge-”); Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“A | 1 | 1 |
| Russell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chambers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Czaja v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Simmons, 940 So.2d at 583 (recognizing that a juror’s spouse being a law enforcement officer was race-neutral on its face); Russell v. State, 879 So.2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (stating that a potential juror having a relative in law enforcement “has been repeatedly found to be a valid, race neutral or gender neutral reason for a peremptory strike”); Chambers v. State, 682 So.2d 615, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[T]he law enforcement background of a juror’s spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge-”); Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“A | 1 | 1 |
| Stopher v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Francis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shannon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Betancourt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Slappy
green
2 sentences1992He argues the trial court departed from the directives of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) and State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) when it allowed the state attorney to back-strike the only black member of the jury who had been (at that point) accepted by both sides for service on the jury panel, through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 6 | 1989–2018 |
Swain v. Alabama
red
2 sentences1986We therefore relinquished jurisdiction and requested that the trial court decide whether "there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory challenges [were] being exercised solely on the basis of race." In Neil the Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified question from the Third District: Absent the criteria established in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), may a party be required to state the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge? 1986We therefore relinquished jurisdiction and requested that the trial court decide whether "there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory challenges [were] being exercised solely on the basis of race." In Neil the Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified question from the Third District: Absent the criteria established in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), may a party be required to state the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge? | 5 | 1983–1986 |
Galloway Farms, Inc. v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1992He argues the trial court departed from the directives of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) and State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) when it allowed the state attorney to back-strike the only black member of the jury who had been (at that point) accepted by both sides for service on the jury panel, through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 4 | 1989–1992 |
Andrews v. Adams
green
2 sentences1992He argues the trial court departed from the directives of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) and State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) when it allowed the state attorney to back-strike the only black member of the jury who had been (at that point) accepted by both sides for service on the jury panel, through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 4 | 1989–1992 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2003In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), this Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race violates the right of both the defendant and the State to trial by an impartial jury under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. [4] This Court delineated a test for trial courts to use in determining whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a pretext for racial discrimination. [5] Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), held that 2003In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), this Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race violates the right of both the defendant and the State to trial by an impartial jury under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. [4] This Court delineated a test for trial courts to use in determining whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a pretext for racial discrimination. [5] Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), held that | 3 | 2003–2018 |
Men's International Professional Tennis Council v. Volvo North America Corp.
green
2 sentences1992He argues the trial court departed from the directives of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) and State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) when it allowed the state attorney to back-strike the only black member of the jury who had been (at that point) accepted by both sides for service on the jury panel, through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext. | 3 | 1990–1992 |
Purkett v. Elem
green
2 sentences2018Based on the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), and Neil-Slappy 4 case law, the procedure was stated as consisting of three steps: Step 1: Objection and Prima Facie Case A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis; b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct protected group; and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. 3 In Melbourne, the Court stated that State v. Neil, 45 2018Based on the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), and Neil-Slappy 4 case law, the procedure was stated as consisting of three steps: Step 1: Objection and Prima Facie Case A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis; b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct protected group; and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Aikens v. State
neutral
2 sentences2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Dean v. State
green
2 sentences2001See Anderson v. State, 750 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Porter v. State, 708 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dean v. State, 703 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 2000See Porter v. State, 708 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dean v. State, 703 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Allen v. State
green
2 sentences2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Knight v. State
green
2 sentences2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2001See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla.1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Aikens v. State, 609 So.2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Gonzalez v. State
green
2 sentences1996Cf. Gonzalez v. State, 569 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), quashed in part on other grounds, 585 So.2d 932 (Fla.1991) (involvement of a juror's close family member with the law); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995) (juror who had served as foreman of another jury supplied race-neutral reason). 1996In Gonzalez v. State, 569 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we held that, upon an objection to an exercise of a peremptory challenge, the party seeking to excuse the prospective juror is required to provide only a facially neutral explanation for the challenge having some support in the record. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Neil v. State
green
2 sentences1985This appeal presents the same issue as that framed in Neil v. State, 433 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), wherein this court certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question of great public importance: Absent the criteria established in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), may a party be required to state the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge? 1984In Neil v. State, 433 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance: Absent the criteria established in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), may a party be required to state the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge? | 2 | 1984–1985 |
Curtis v. State
green
2 sentences2014See Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997); Curtis v. State, 685 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1996). 2014See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997); Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gonzalez v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hernandez v. New York green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Floyd v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Rollins v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.