exercise of a peremptory challenge in Massachusetts

2025In an affidavit prepared after the trial (but not, so far as the record reflects, presented to the trial judge), the plaintiff averred that two of these challenges applied to "a Haitian woman" and a Caribbean or Central American Immigrant." Waiver concerns 6 aside, where the plaintiff did not develop the record to support his affidavit, and did not raise this issue to the trial judge, we discern no reason to disturb the usual "presumption that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is proper." Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008).

2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44

2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44

2008“The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-488 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) [Soares], and the equal protection clause [of the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986).” Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 464 (1991). 6 There is a presumption that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is proper.

2024In some circumstances, "a single peremptory challenge may be sufficient to rebut the presumption, especially where 'the challenged juror is the only member of his or her protected class in the entire venire.'" Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 9 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295 , 306 n.15 (2012).

2018See Commonwealth v. Issa , 466 Mass. 1 , 8, 992 N.E.2d 336 (2013).

2012See Harris, supra at 465 .

2008“The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-488 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) [Soares], and the equal protection clause [of the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986).” Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 464 (1991). 6 There is a presumption that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is proper.

2001This assumption is rebuttable, however, on a showing that (1) there is a pattern of excluding members of a discrete group and (2) it is likely that individuals are being excluded solely on the basis of their membership within this group.” Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78, 80 (1997), and cases cited.

1998In order to “minimize the necessity for lengthy appellate examinations and retrials springing from confusion over jury selection,” Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78, 81 (1997), the court in Commonwealth v. Soares, supra, established a procedure, later refined in Commonwealth v. Burnett, 418 Mass. 769, 770 (1994), that must be followed in those cases where the exercise of a peremptory challenge is the subject of an objection.

2012While we have held that a juror’s occupation may be a sufficient basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garrey, supra at 429 , “where a question has been validly raised about the propriety of a party’s use of a peremptory challenge, the claim of occupation as legitimate disqualifier should be carefully scrutinized.” Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 224 (2008).

2008See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 429 (2002).

2025See Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 321 (1999) ("A trial judge is in the best position to decide if a peremptory challenge appears improper and requires an explanation by the party exercising it"). 3.

2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44

2010See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463-466 (2003).

1998In order to “minimize the necessity for lengthy appellate examinations and retrials springing from confusion over jury selection,” Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78, 81 (1997), the court in Commonwealth v. Soares, supra, established a procedure, later refined in Commonwealth v. Burnett, 418 Mass. 769, 770 (1994), that must be followed in those cases where the exercise of a peremptory challenge is the subject of an objection.