exercise of a peremptory challenge (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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exercise of a peremptory challenge in Illinois

25 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Needy v. Sparksgreen
illappct · 1977 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See Needy v. Sparks, 51 Ill.

2008See Needy v. Sparks, 51 Ill.

22
People v. Enochgreen
ill · 1988 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 , 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988).

2008See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 , 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988).

22
People v. Graygreen
illappct · 2001 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006People v. Gray, 326 Ill.

2006People v. Gray, 326 Ill.

22
People v. Wileygreen
ill · 1995 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See People v. Wiley , 165 Ill. 2d 259, 282 (1995).

2000See People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 282 (1995).

22
People v. Johnsongreen
illappct · 1991 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1993–2006
2 sentences

2006People v. Gray, 326 Ill.App.3d 906, 912 , 260 Ill.Dec. 681 , 761 N.E.2d 1237 (2001), citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill.App.3d 967, 986 , 161 Ill.Dec. 628 , 578 N.E.2d 1274 (1991).

2006People v. Gray, 326 Ill.App.3d 906, 912 , 260 Ill.Dec. 681 , 761 N.E.2d 1237 (2001), citing People v. Johnson, 218 Ill.App.3d 967, 986 , 161 Ill.Dec. 628 , 578 N.E.2d 1274 (1991).

14
Batson v. Kentuckygreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2022
2 sentences

2022First, the party objecting to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is required to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986).

2006The Court held that the party objecting to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is first required to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 , 90 L.

13
People v. Younggreen
ill · 1989 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1993–1994
2 sentences

1994App.3d 829 , 164 Ill.Dec. 273 , 582 N.E.2d 1217 .) In addition, this court has held that the demeanor of a venireperson also constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 ; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 , 538 N.E.2d 453 .) Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's finding that the State advanced sufficiently race-neutral reasons to justify its challenge of Dickey was not clearly erroneous.

1994(People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 20 .) The circuit court has both the opportunity to observe a juror’s demeanor upon voir dire and the experience in supervising such examinations to assess the explanations of the State concerning the exercise of a peremptory challenge.

13
People v. MacKgreen
ill · 1989 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1992–1994
2 sentences

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

12
People v. Kindelangreen
illappct · 1991 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
1 sentence

1992(Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 240 (and cases cited therein); Kindelan, 213 Ill.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Laird v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad green
illappct · 1991
2 sentences

2007Co., 208 Ill.

2007Co., 208 Ill.

22007–2007
People v. Hudson green
ill · 2001
2 sentences

2001Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d at 136-38 , 745 N.E.2d at 1258 .

2001Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d at 136-38 , 745 N.E.2d at 1258 .

22001–2001
People v. Harris green
ill · 1989
2 sentences

1994App.3d 829 , 164 Ill.Dec. 273 , 582 N.E.2d 1217 .) In addition, this court has held that the demeanor of a venireperson also constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 ; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 , 538 N.E.2d 453 .) Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's finding that the State advanced sufficiently race-neutral reasons to justify its challenge of Dickey was not clearly erroneous.

1994App.3d 829 , 164 Ill.Dec. 273 , 582 N.E.2d 1217 .) In addition, this court has held that the demeanor of a venireperson also constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 ; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 , 538 N.E.2d 453 .) Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's finding that the State advanced sufficiently race-neutral reasons to justify its challenge of Dickey was not clearly erroneous.

21990–1994
People v. Hope green
ill · 1992
2 sentences

1996People v. Hope, 147 Ill. 2d 315 , 589 N.E.2d 503 (1992). 5 The State in its brief also suggests other race-neutral factors that would support the exercise of a peremptory challenge as to Edmonds.

1996People v. Hope, 147 Ill. 2d 315 , 589 N.E.2d 503 (1992). 5 The State in its brief also suggests other race-neutral factors that would support the exercise of a peremptory challenge as to Edmonds.

11996–1996
People v. Lovelady green
illappct · 1991
2 sentences

1994App.3d 829 , 164 Ill.Dec. 273 , 582 N.E.2d 1217 .) In addition, this court has held that the demeanor of a venireperson also constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 ; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 , 538 N.E.2d 453 .) Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's finding that the State advanced sufficiently race-neutral reasons to justify its challenge of Dickey was not clearly erroneous.

1994App.3d 829 , 164 Ill.Dec. 273 , 582 N.E.2d 1217 .) In addition, this court has held that the demeanor of a venireperson also constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 ; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 , 538 N.E.2d 453 .) Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's finding that the State advanced sufficiently race-neutral reasons to justify its challenge of Dickey was not clearly erroneous.

11994–1994
People v. Kitchen green
ill · 1994
2 sentences

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

11994–1994
People v. Powell green
illappct · 1991
2 sentences

1994(See People v. Powell (1991), 224 Ill.App.3d 127, 133-35 , 166 Ill.Dec. 631 , 586 N.E.2d 589 .) Without answering that question here, we believe that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse is a valid concern and may be considered by the prosecutor, at least in combination with other circumstances, in determining whether to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror.

1994(See People v. Powell (1991), 224 Ill.App.3d 127, 133-35 , 166 Ill.Dec. 631 , 586 N.E.2d 589 .) Without answering that question here, we believe that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse is a valid concern and may be considered by the prosecutor, at least in combination with other circumstances, in determining whether to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror.

11994–1994
People v. Andrews green
ill · 1993
2 sentences

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

11994–1994
People v. Hudson green
ill · 1993
2 sentences

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

1994In that line of work.'" Our cases have held that the unemployment of a prospective juror may be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22 , 201 Ill.Dec. 1 , 636 N.E.2d 433 ; People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 432 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 ; People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 301-02 , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 , 614 N.E.2d 1184 ; People v. Mack (1989), 128 *903 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551 , 538 N.E.2d 1107 .) The defendant argues, however, that the unemployment of a prospective juror's spouse sh

11994–1994
People v. Baisten green
illappct · 1990
1 sentence

1993App. 3d 64, 79 , 560 N.E.2d 1060 (age of children).) Similarly, as stated earlier, a prospective juror’s demeanor, including inattentiveness or hesitancy in answering questions can be a legitimate, race-neutral basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.

11993–1993
People v. Talley green
illappct · 1987
1 sentence

1988In People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill.

11988–1988
People v. Robinson green
illappct · 1984
1 sentence

1984(People v. Robinson (1984), 121 Ill.

11984–1984
People v. Wheeler green
cal · 1978
2 sentences

1981Indeed, the Wheeler court paradoxically stated that while a California statute defines a peremptory challenge “as one for which ‘no reason need be given’ * * * it does not follow therefrom that it is an objection for which no reason need exist.” ( 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274 , 583 P.2d 748, 760 , 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 .) The court further assumed that this unexpressed reason will be some kind of bias on the part of the prospective juror, and finally decided that some types of bias (specific bias) are acceptable grounds for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, while other types (group bias) are no

1981Indeed, the Wheeler court paradoxically stated that while a California statute defines a peremptory challenge “as one for which ‘no reason need be given’ * * * it does not follow therefrom that it is an objection for which no reason need exist.” ( 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274 , 583 P.2d 748, 760 , 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 .) The court further assumed that this unexpressed reason will be some kind of bias on the part of the prospective juror, and finally decided that some types of bias (specific bias) are acceptable grounds for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, while other types (group bias) are no

11981–1981

Where else courts name it

CA 56 (1928–2026) FL 37 (1967–2026) LA 26 (1941–2017) IL 25 (1981–2022) TX 23 (1974–2013) NY 21 (1980–2021) NJ 19 (1976–2025) GA 16 (1996–2017) OH 16 (1992–2022) MN 15 (1990–2019) MA 12 (1998–2025) MS 11 (1995–2024) NV 10 (2011–2019) UT 8 (1988–2014) PA 7 (1967–2018) MO 7 (1975–2018) WA 7 (2001–2018) SC 7 (1982–2025) IN 7 (1984–2015) DC 6 (1982–1997) AL 6 (1990–2003) AZ 5 (1915–1989) MI 4 (2015–2021) CT 4 (1999–2006) KY 3 (2003–2007) IA 3 (2017–2019) AR 3 (1997–2015) TN 3 (2007–2019) NC 3 (1975–1997) OR 2 (2024–2024) WI 2 (2004–2012) CO 2 (1985–2014) MD 2 (1989–1989) OK 2 (1994–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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