section 12022.3 enhancement in California

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

1992(See People v. Fritz, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at pp. 229-230; People v. Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ]; see also People v. Sutton (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 438,445-446 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 536 ] [recognizing authority under section 1385 to strike deadly weapon use enhancement under section 12022.3, despite failure of Legislature to include such enhancements in section 1170.1, subdivision (h)]; People v. Price (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 803, 818-820 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 99 ] [same].) *211 But it is not necessary that the Legisla

1992(See People v. Fritz, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at pp. 229-230; People v. Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ]; see also People v. Sutton (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 438,445-446 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 536 ] [recognizing authority under section 1385 to strike deadly weapon use enhancement under section 12022.3, despite failure of Legislature to include such enhancements in section 1170.1, subdivision (h)]; People v. Price (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 803, 818-820 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 99 ] [same].) *211 But it is not necessary that the Legisla

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’” the crimes under section 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [section 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [broadly construing phrase “‘in the commission of’” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in the commission of a crime].) Appellant has not articulated a persuasive reason why we shou

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

1991In People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal. App.3d at page 1411 , footnote 6, the Court of Appeal held: "The failure to pronounce sentence on a count is an unauthorized sentence and subject to correction on remand. [Citation.] Thus, as to the count IV section 12022.3 enhancement, there is no question that a harsher term (viz., imposition of the enhancement) could result on remand." Clearly, if the trial court's failure to impose or strike the sentence in the present case is an unauthorized sentence, this court has the authority to remand the case to the trial court with directions to impose a lawfully

1991In People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at page 1411 , footnote 6, the Court of Appeal held: “The failure to pronounce sentence on a count is an unauthorized sentence and subject to correction on remand. [Citation.] Thus, as to the count IV section 12022.3 enhancement, there is no question that a harsher term (viz., imposition of the enhancement) could result on remand.” Clearly, if the trial court’s failure to impose or strike the sentence in the present case is an unauthorized sentence, this court has the authority to remand the case to the trial court with directions to impose a lawfully

2001(See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Masbruch held that a weapons-use enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3, subdivision (a), covers the use of a firearm or deadly weapon “ ‘at least as an aid in completing an essential element of a subsequent crime.” (People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1013 , italics added, quoting People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-673 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 498 P.2d 1024 ].) We emphasized “ ‘The obvious legislative intent to deter the use of [deadly weapons] requires that “uses” be broadly construe

2001(See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Masbruch held that a weapons-use enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3, subdivision (a), covers the use of a firearm or deadly weapon “ ‘at least as an aid in completing an essential element of a subsequent crime.” (People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1013 , italics added, quoting People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-673 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 498 P.2d 1024 ].) We emphasized “ ‘The obvious legislative intent to deter the use of [deadly weapons] requires that “uses” be broadly construe

1994(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 , 16 A.L.R.4th 1255 ]; In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 813 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) In this case the argument turns not on the presence or absence of factual support, but whether a section 12022.3 enhancement can rest on vicarious, rather than personal, use or arming.

1994(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 , 16 A.L.R.4th 1255 ]; In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 813 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) In this case the argument turns not on the presence or absence of factual support, but whether a section 12022.3 enhancement can rest on vicarious, rather than personal, use or arming.

1992(See People v. Fritz, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at pp. 229-230; People v. Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ]; see also People v. Sutton (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 438,445-446 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 536 ] [recognizing authority under section 1385 to strike deadly weapon use enhancement under section 12022.3, despite failure of Legislature to include such enhancements in section 1170.1, subdivision (h)]; People v. Price (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 803, 818-820 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 99 ] [same].) *211 But it is not necessary that the Legisla

1992(See People v. Fritz, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at pp. 229-230; People v. Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ]; see also People v. Sutton (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 438,445-446 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 536 ] [recognizing authority under section 1385 to strike deadly weapon use enhancement under section 12022.3, despite failure of Legislature to include such enhancements in section 1170.1, subdivision (h)]; People v. Price (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 803, 818-820 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 99 ] [same].) *211 But it is not necessary that the Legisla

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987This result is contrary to the established principle that "[s]ince the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appeal." ( People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 459 ; People v. Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 767 [Mosk, J., conc. and dis. opn.].) Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has not retracted the Serrato distinction, we are bound to follow it. ( Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal. Rptr.

1986(See People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 102 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 12 ], and cases cited therein.) Thus, as to the count IV section 12022.3 enhancement, there is no question that a harsher term (viz., imposition of the enhancement) could result on remand. 7 The ability to impose a harsher sentence on remand after a defendant’s appeal and of the People or reviewing court to raise a question of sentencing error on defendant’s appeal are linked under the characterization that the sentence was “unauthorized.” (People v. Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 764; People v. Benton, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d a

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court (Du ran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698 ] [improper length base term sentence].) On the other hand, where a sentence is authorized by statute but the court errs in the manner of sentencin

1987Thus, where the sentence imposed is not authorized by the statutes governing sentencing, the sentence is illegal and no bar to subsequent imposition of a greater sentence. ( People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal. App.3d 1405, 1409 [failure to impose enhancement under § 12022.3]; People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 616, 630-631 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 837 ] *962 [imposition of consecutive sentence in violation of § 669]; People v. Grimble (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 678, 684-685 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 362 ] [imposition of consecutive sentences in violation of § 669]; People v. Superior Court ( Duran ) (1978) 84 Cal

1987(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1409 ; People v. Foley, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045, 1048 .) In some situations, however, the distinction between illegal and otherwise erroneous sentences is less certain: for example, the Courts of Appeal seem to disagree on the characterization of a sentence which violates section 654.

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

2014(See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 107-108 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 , 18 P.3d 674 ] [use of a weapon after a series of sex crimes can be “found to have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the crimes under § 12022.3, subd. (a)]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the defendant displayed the handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in the commission of’ ” in statutes providing enhancement for use of a weapon in

1988The reason the court could attach the great bodily injury and weapons use enhancement to each sex offense is that neither the Culbreth rule (In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]) nor section 654 prohibits the imposition of multiple enhancements for weapons use under section 12022.3 (People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 68 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ]; see generally People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627-630 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]) or great bodily injury under section 12022.8 (People v. McElrath, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 178, 188 ).

1988The reason the court could attach the great bodily injury and weapons use enhancement to each sex offense is that neither the Culbreth rule (In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]) nor section 654 prohibits the imposition of multiple enhancements for weapons use under section 12022.3 (People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 68 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ]; see generally People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627-630 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]) or great bodily injury under section 12022.8 (People v. McElrath, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 178, 188 ).

2001(See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Masbruch held that a weapons-use enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3, subdivision (a), covers the use of a firearm or deadly weapon “ ‘at least as an aid in completing an essential element of a subsequent crime.” (People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1013 , italics added, quoting People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-673 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 498 P.2d 1024 ].) We emphasized “ ‘The obvious legislative intent to deter the use of [deadly weapons] requires that “uses” be broadly construe

2001(See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Masbruch held that a weapons-use enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3, subdivision (a), covers the use of a firearm or deadly weapon “ ‘at least as an aid in completing an essential element of a subsequent crime.” (People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1013 , italics added, quoting People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672-673 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 498 P.2d 1024 ].) We emphasized “ ‘The obvious legislative intent to deter the use of [deadly weapons] requires that “uses” be broadly construe

1988The reason the court could attach the great bodily injury and weapons use enhancement to each sex offense is that neither the Culbreth rule (In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]) nor section 654 prohibits the imposition of multiple enhancements for weapons use under section 12022.3 (People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 68 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ]; see generally People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627-630 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]) or great bodily injury under section 12022.8 (People v. McElrath, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 178, 188 ).

1988The reason the court could attach the great bodily injury and weapons use enhancement to each sex offense is that neither the Culbreth rule (In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]) nor section 654 prohibits the imposition of multiple enhancements for weapons use under section 12022.3 (People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 68 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ]; see generally People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627-630 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 645 ]) or great bodily injury under section 12022.8 (People v. McElrath, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 178, 188 ).

1984Likewise, to say that Culbreth no longer applies because of its apparent exclusion under Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (h), would ignore the maxim of statutory construction that when a statute expresses certain exceptions to a general rule, other exceptions are necessarily excluded. [Citation.] Therefore, we find that Culbreth does apply to the sentencing issues in the instant case.” (People v. Edwards, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 448 .) Thus, although neither Edwards nor Cardenas involved section 12022.3 enhancements, both cases relied on a statutory analysis based on an interpretati

1984People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ] held Culbreth’& single-occasion rule limits the imposition of firearm use enhancements under section 12022.5 when sentence is imposed under the determinate sentence law (DSL).

2012Instead, the court has consistently held that a homicide is committed in the perpetration of a felony if the killing and felony are parts of ‘one continuous transaction,’ and this transaction may include flight after the felony to a place of temporary safety. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 187-189; see People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006-1014 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the accused only displayed a handgun one hour before the rape]; People v. Frausto (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 890, 903 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 ] [§ 12022.53, subd. (d) en

2012Instead, the court has consistently held that a homicide is committed in the perpetration of a felony if the killing and felony are parts of ‘one continuous transaction,’ and this transaction may include flight after the felony to a place of temporary safety. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 187-189; see People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006-1014 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 , 920 P.2d 705 ] [§ 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement upheld where the accused only displayed a handgun one hour before the rape]; People v. Frausto (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 890, 903 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 ] [§ 12022.53, subd. (d) en

2003The court noted it had “long ago rejected the assumption ‘that to bring a homicide within the terms of section 189 .. . . , the killing must have occurred “while committing,” “while engaged in,” or “in pursuance” of the named felonies, and that the killing must have been “a part of’ the felony or attempted felony “in an actual and material sense.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, a murder may be determined to have been committed in the perpetration of a felony if it occurred after the felony, e.g., during the attempt to escape or for the purpose of preventing discovery of the previously committed felony.”

2003The court noted it had “long ago rejected the assumption ‘that to bring a homicide within the terms of section 189 .. . . , the killing must have occurred “while committing,” “while engaged in,” or “in pursuance” of the named felonies, and that the killing must have been “a part of’ the felony or attempted felony “in an actual and material sense.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, a murder may be determined to have been committed in the perpetration of a felony if it occurred after the felony, e.g., during the attempt to escape or for the purpose of preventing discovery of the previously committed felony.”