section 1203.4 expungement in California

2022(See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, 700 .) The People further contend that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to allow the “trial court to adjust, modify, or strike probation terms, so that they can be complied with before termination of probation ….” The People note that some later determinations—like expungement of prior convictions pursuant to section 1203.4, subdivision (a)—require a finding of whether defendant successfully completed probation.

2022(See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, 700 .) The People further contend that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to allow the “trial court to adjust, modify, or strike probation terms, so that they can be complied with before termination of probation ….” The People note that some later determinations—like expungement of prior convictions pursuant to section 1203.4, subdivision (a)—require a finding of whether defendant successfully completed probation.

2017For example, a person sentenced to prison, unlike one confined in jail, is forever barred from seeking expungement under Penal Code section 1203.4 (see People v. Borja (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 378 , 381, 167 Cal.Rptr. 813 ), 13 and a jail inmate will have no further obligations upon completion of the sentence, while a person released from prison will still be supervised on parole ( Pen.

2017For example, a person sentenced to prison, unlike one confined in jail, is forever barred from seeking expungement under Penal Code section 1203.4 (see People v. Borja (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 378 , 381, 167 Cal.Rptr. 813 ), 13 and a jail inmate will have no further obligations upon completion of the sentence, while a person released from prison will still be supervised on parole ( Pen.

2026(People v. Guillen, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 991 .) Here, however, the court only 5 summarily revoked Alesana’s probation and never found him in violation of his probation.

2024Section 1203.4, subdivision (a)(1) states, “When a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, …, the defendant shall, at any time after the termination of the period of probation, if they are not then serving a sentence for an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of an offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw their plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; …, the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusatio

2024Like our high court in McCune, supra, __ Cal.5th ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 4240, at p. *27, fn. 4], we express no opinion whether section 1202.46 would support a further motion by the prosecutor. 14 at p. 1321 [dismissal under section 1203.4 does not release the defendant from responsibility for direct victim restitution under section 1202.4].)6 Lastly, respondent tells us that expungement of a criminal record under section 1203.4 is an “extraordinary remedy.” We are mindful that restitution serves the important purposes of making the victim whole and showing the criminal the harm done to the victi

2024(Allen, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 317-319; Covington, supra, 82 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) The defendants filed expungement motions under section 1203.4 even though they had not paid all the required restitution.

2023(See People v. Tidwell (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 212, 217 .) 24 ____________________________________ Wilson, J.

2022For immigration purposes, a person generally ‘continues to stand convicted of an offense notwithstanding a later expungement’ under California Penal Code § 1203.4.” (Robles Lopez v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2018) 901 F.3d 1071, 1075 ; accord U.S. v. Stoterau (9th.

2022Cir. 2008) 524 F.3d 988, 1001 [“[C]onvictions set aside pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4 are not ‘expunged’ for purposes of” federal construction of a defendant’s criminal 14 history.]; People v. Espinoza (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp 1, 6 [A section 1203.4 “dismissal does not make the conviction disappear and it is not considered an ‘expungement’ under either California law [citation] or federal immigration law.”]; People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 560 [Defendant’s section 1203.4 expungement had “no effect on the federal immigration consequences of his conviction.”].) As we noted in

2021Rather, imposing these assessments on an indigent defendant is tantamount to “inflict[ing] additional punishment.” (Id. at p. 1166.) Dueñas further observed that a restitution fine is “intended to be, and is recognized as, as additional punishment for a crime,” and that settled law holds “ ‘a punitive award must be considered in light of the defendant’s financial condition.’ ” ( Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169-1170.) According to Dueñas, imposing this additional punishment on an indigent 3 defendant is fundamentally unfair because an unsatisfied restitution obligation necessarily dep

2021(Waters, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 825 .) Two years after the defendant successfully completed probation, the defendant sought to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 1203.4.

2020(Id. at p. 136.) The Court of Appeal concluded that, even after dismissal of the conviction pursuant to section 1203.4, defendant’s conviction was still under the jurisdiction of the court and the court was not precluded from exercising its discretion to been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 .) Such is not the case here.

2019(People v. Hurtado (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 871, 878 .) "The court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary." (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).) "Thus, the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on [one factor] does not mean that it considered only that factor." (Ibid.) Allen has not met her burden of affirmatively showing the trial court erroneously based its ruling on section 1203.4's mandatory expungement provisions rather than the discretionary provisions in sections 1203.4 (the thir

2019(See Butler, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at pp. 587-589 [defendant who still owed about $2,000 of victim restitution was entitled to mandatory expungement because probation was discharged early when he became totally disabled in a car accident]; Seymour, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427, 1436 [defendant who still owed about $5,700 of victim restitution was entitled to mandatory expungement because his probation was discharged early to facilitate reinstatement of his nursing license].) When expungement is granted in this scenario, the victim restitution obligation survives the expungement.

2019(See Butler, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at pp. 587-589 [defendant who still owed about $2,000 of victim restitution was entitled to mandatory expungement because probation was discharged early when he became totally disabled in a car accident]; Seymour, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427, 1436 [defendant who still owed about $5,700 of victim restitution was entitled to mandatory expungement because his probation was discharged early to facilitate reinstatement of his nursing license].) When expungement is granted in this scenario, the victim restitution obligation survives the expungement.

2017(People v. Duncan [(2008)] 160 Cal.App.4th [1014,] 1018 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 ].) The People presented sufficient evidence to support Eric’s conviction based on testimony that he failed to comply with Officer Ho’s repeated orders to ‘stop,’ and by engaging in a physical altercation with Officer Ho while other officers attempted to conduct their investigation.” On April 9, 2014, the criminal trial court granted Eric’s petition to dismiss his criminal conviction under section 1203.4.

2016(Meyer v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 139-140 .) The appellate court reasoned that “expungement of the record under section 1203.4 is . . . a reward for good conduct and has never been treated as obliterating the fact that the defendant has been convicted of a felony.” (Id. at p. 140.) Because “a conviction which has been expunged still exists for limited purposes, including, among others, evidentiary use at a later trial [citation] and the denial of the right to carry a concealable weapon [citation] . . . petitioner should not be barred from pursuing a more suitable remedy . . . .” (Ibid.)

2015(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 .) However, the Welfare and Institutions Code provisions for sealing juvenile court records extend to eligible minors “a greater degree of protection from future prejudice resulting from his [or her] ‘record’” than do the expungement provisions of section 1203.4.

2015(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 .) However, the Welfare and Institutions Code provisions for sealing juvenile court records extend to eligible minors “a greater degree of protection from future prejudice resulting from his [or her] ‘record’” than do the expungement provisions of section 1203.4.

2015(In re S.A. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 241, 246 .) That is because “[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.” (Welf. & Inst.

2014(See, e.g., People v. Barrajas (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 926 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ] [holding that diversion statutes applicable to certain specified drug offenses applied equally to attempts to commit those specified drug offenses, despite the fact that attempts were not listed in the diversion statutes, because a literal reading of the statutes—which would punish attempted drug offenses more severely than successful ones—was absurd and did not advance the statutory purpose].) As noted above, the legislative history indicates that the purpose of section 1203.4, subdivision (b)’s exception of sex o

2014(See, e.g., People v. Barrajas (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 926 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ] [holding that diversion statutes applicable to certain specified drug offenses applied equally to attempts to commit those specified drug offenses, despite the fact that attempts were not listed in the diversion statutes, because a literal reading of the statutes—which would punish attempted drug offenses more severely than successful ones—was absurd and did not advance the statutory purpose].) As noted above, the legislative history indicates that the purpose of section 1203.4, subdivision (b)’s exception of sex o

2014(People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 888-889 .)” (People v. Zeigler (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 638, 675 [conc. opn. of Mihara, J.].) Defendant contends that the mandatory language of section 1203.4 entitled him to a release from the protective order because it was “clearly a penalty imposed on appellant as further punishment for his crime.