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33 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. Blakegreen2 sentences2017We have repeatedly recognized that "[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or alimony under § 46b-82, a trial court must weigh the 'station' or standard of living of the parties in light of other statutory factors such as the length of the marriage, employability, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income." Blake v. Blake , 207 Conn. 217 , 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988). 2017We have repeatedly recognized that "[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or alimony under § 46b-82, a trial court must weigh the 'station' or standard of living of the parties in light of other statutory factors such as the length of the marriage, employability, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income." Blake v. Blake , 207 Conn. 217 , 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988). | 2 | 8 |
Smith v. Smithgreen2 sentences2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court’s analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 743–44 (courts may consider ‘‘any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute’’ when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted]); Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 500 , 830 A.2d 394 (2003) (‘‘[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors 2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court’s analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 743–44 (courts may consider ‘‘any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute’’ when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted]); Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 500 , 830 A.2d 394 (2003) (‘‘[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors | 2 | 2 |
Pasquariello v. Pasquariellogreen2 sentences1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- 1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- | 2 | 2 |
Beede v. Beedegreen2 sentences1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- 1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- | 2 | 2 |
Maguire v. Maguiregreen2 sentences2016The trial court also specifically cited § 46b-82, the ali- mony statute, and two judicial opinions in which lump sum alimony was properly awarded when making the lump sum alimony award.13 See Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 47 , 608 A.2d 79 (1992) (‘‘[a]ny ambiguity as to the criteria upon which the court relied for alimony was put to rest [when] the trial court indicated that it had relied upon the criteria in § 46b-82 for its award of alimony’’). 2016The trial court also specifically cited § 46b-82, the ali- mony statute, and two judicial opinions in which lump sum alimony was properly awarded when making the lump sum alimony award.13 See Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 47 , 608 A.2d 79 (1992) (‘‘[a]ny ambiguity as to the criteria upon which the court relied for alimony was put to rest [when] the trial court indicated that it had relied upon the criteria in § 46b-82 for its award of alimony’’). | 1 | 2 |
Weinstein v. Weinsteingreen2 sentences2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali 2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali | 1 | 2 |
Koizim v. Koizimgreen2 sentences2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali 2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali | 1 | 2 |
Weiman v. Weimangreen2 sentences1998Similarly, the remainder of the plaintiffs personal injury award— $750,000 for past pain and suffering, $80,000 for past loss of earnings and $15,000 for past medical expenses — is also a marital asset pursuant to § 46b-81, and is thus subject to assignment. 6 We have made clear that “the purpose of property division [in an action for dissolution] is to unscramble the ownership of property, giving to each spouse what is equitably his [or hers].” Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234 , 449 A.2d 151 (1982). 1998Similarly, the remainder of the plaintiffs personal injury award— $750,000 for past pain and suffering, $80,000 for past loss of earnings and $15,000 for past medical expenses — is also a marital asset pursuant to § 46b-81, and is thus subject to assignment. 6 We have made clear that “the purpose of property division [in an action for dissolution] is to unscramble the ownership of property, giving to each spouse what is equitably his [or hers].” Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234 , 449 A.2d 151 (1982). | 1 | 2 |
Greco v. Grecogreen2 sentences2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 356 , 360 , 880 A.2d 872 (concluding that, "[u]nder the circumstances" presented, award providing "98.5 percent of the marital estate" to wife and "less than 2 percent" to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657 , 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly "considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets " [emphasis added] ); Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279 , 460 A.2d 1260 (h 2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 356 , 360 , 880 A.2d 872 (concluding that, "[u]nder the circumstances" presented, award providing "98.5 percent of the marital estate" to wife and "less than 2 percent" to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657 , 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly "considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets " [emphasis added] ); Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279 , 460 A.2d 1260 (h | 1 | 1 |
| Milbauer v. Milbauergreen | 1 | 1 |
| D'Ascanio v. D'Ascaniogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Distefano v. Distefanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cole v. Colegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scherr v. Scherr
green
2 sentences1998Since "[i]t would serve no useful function to require the trial court ritualistically to rehearse the statutory criteria that it has taken into account," Scherr v. Scherr , 183 Conn. 366 , 368 (1981), this court will not recount those statutory criteria and the evidence, other than as has been previously stated. 1998Since "[i]t would serve no useful function to require the trial court ritualistically to rehearse the statutory criteria that it has taken into account, " Scherr v. Scherr , 183 Conn. 366 , 368 (1981), this court will not recount those statutory criteria and the evidence, other than as has been previously stated. | 7 | 1994–1998 |
Blake v. Blake
green
2 sentences2016In light of this language, the trial court's mere mention of two factors in the property distribution statute, namely, the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate, did not render the lump sum award an improper property distribution. 14 See id. at 46-47, 608 A.2d 79 (trial court did not improperly predicate alimony award on "impermissible statutory criterion [by] ... refer[ring] to § 46b-81 " in decision); Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 495 -99 , 560 A.2d 396 (trial court's characterization of lump sum payment as alimony in oral d 2016In light of this language, the trial court's mere mention of two factors in the property distribution statute, namely, the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate, did not render the lump sum award an improper property distribution. 14 See id. at 46-47, 608 A.2d 79 (trial court did not improperly predicate alimony award on "impermissible statutory criterion [by] ... refer[ring] to § 46b-81 " in decision); Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 495 -99 , 560 A.2d 396 (trial court's characterization of lump sum payment as alimony in oral d | 3 | 1991–2016 |
Sweet v. Sweet
green
2 sentences2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima 2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Robinson v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali 2016We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for con- sidering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are ‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Rob- inson, 187 Conn. 70, 72 , 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232 , 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81 or ali | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Pellow v. Pellow
green
2 sentences2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima 2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Demartino v. Demartino
green
2 sentences2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court’s analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 743–44 (courts may consider ‘‘any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute’’ when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted]); Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 500 , 830 A.2d 394 (2003) (‘‘[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors 2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court’s analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 743–44 (courts may consider ‘‘any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute’’ when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted]); Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 500 , 830 A.2d 394 (2003) (‘‘[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Valentine v. Valentine
green
2 sentences2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima 2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented, award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than 2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664 , 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approxima | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Gallo v. Gallo
green
2 sentences1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- 1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- | 2 | 1982–1989 |
Basile v. Basile
green
2 sentences1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- 1989In assigning marital property, however, ‘the trial court must also consider the liabilities of the parties, “the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income . . . [and] the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).’ McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171 ; see, e.g., Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583 , 362 A.2d 835 (1975).” We further stated that “[w]e have often distinguished between the assignment of property under § 46b-81 and alimony under § 46b- | 2 | 1982–1989 |
Ridgeway v. Ridgeway
green
2 sentences2026S. Statutes] §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, and relevant case law, including Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 , [ 663 A.2d 365 ] (1995), and Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 544 , [ 429 A.2d 801 ] (1980), to make its orders and findings.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the credible evidence before [it] and in consideration of the factors enumerated in § 46b-82 an award of alimony to the plaintiff [was] warranted.” The court ordered the defendant to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $4000 beginning in June 2024 and continuing until June 2028. 2026S. Statutes] §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, and relevant case law, including Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 , [ 663 A.2d 365 ] (1995), and Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 544 , [ 429 A.2d 801 ] (1980), to make its orders and findings.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the credible evidence before [it] and in consideration of the factors enumerated in § 46b-82 an award of alimony to the plaintiff [was] warranted.” The court ordered the defendant to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $4000 beginning in June 2024 and continuing until June 2028. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Krafick v. Krafick
green
2 sentences2026S. Statutes] §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, and relevant case law, including Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 , [ 663 A.2d 365 ] (1995), and Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 544 , [ 429 A.2d 801 ] (1980), to make its orders and findings.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the credible evidence before [it] and in consideration of the factors enumerated in § 46b-82 an award of alimony to the plaintiff [was] warranted.” The court ordered the defendant to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $4000 beginning in June 2024 and continuing until June 2028. 2026S. Statutes] §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, and relevant case law, including Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 , [ 663 A.2d 365 ] (1995), and Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 544 , [ 429 A.2d 801 ] (1980), to make its orders and findings.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the credible evidence before [it] and in consideration of the factors enumerated in § 46b-82 an award of alimony to the plaintiff [was] warranted.” The court ordered the defendant to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $4000 beginning in June 2024 and continuing until June 2028. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
D. S. v. D. S.
green
1 sentence2025Accordingly, the trial court treated these potential payments as a future stream of income to be awarded as alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82, rather than as property subject to distribution pursuant to 351 Conn. 1 JANUARY, 2025 7 D. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Melrod v. Melrod
green
2 sentences2021Neither statute authorizes the court to consider the ability of a spouse to support his or her children, and the defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that, unlike an alimony award, it is proper to assign property for that purpose. 20 The court in Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180 , 574 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 321 Md. 67 , 580 A.2d 1077 (1990), observed that the failure to award an indefinite award of alimony to the plaintiff wife might be unconscionable because ‘‘it could not help but have some effect upon the child to go back and forth between a father who can afford to live in 2021Neither statute authorizes the court to consider the ability of a spouse to support his or her children, and the defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that, unlike an alimony award, it is proper to assign property for that purpose. 20 The court in Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180 , 574 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 321 Md. 67 , 580 A.2d 1077 (1990), observed that the failure to award an indefinite award of alimony to the plaintiff wife might be unconscionable because ‘‘it could not help but have some effect upon the child to go back and forth between a father who can afford to live in | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Taylor v. Taylor
neutral
1 sentence2020I disagree, rather, with the majority’s interpretation of the sentence, ‘‘[a]limony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year.’’ I would instruct the court on remand to determine whether the plaintiff proved that her income at the time of the filing of her motion to modify alimony was less than $100,000 per year and, if so, to proceed to the determination of alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82. 1 I specifically disagree with the majority’s assertions, analysis and conclusions in these two paragraphs set forth in part II B of its opinion: ‘‘In cont | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Taylor v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences2020I disagree, rather, with the majority’s interpretation of the sentence, ‘‘[a]limony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year.’’ I would instruct the court on remand to determine whether the plaintiff proved that her income at the time of the filing of her motion to modify alimony was less than $100,000 per year and, if so, to proceed to the determination of alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82. 1 I specifically disagree with the majority’s assertions, analysis and conclusions in these two paragraphs set forth in part II B of its opinion: ‘‘In cont 2020I disagree, rather, with the majority’s interpretation of the sentence, ‘‘[a]limony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year.’’ I would instruct the court on remand to determine whether the plaintiff proved that her income at the time of the filing of her motion to modify alimony was less than $100,000 per year and, if so, to proceed to the determination of alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82. 1 I specifically disagree with the majority’s assertions, analysis and conclusions in these two paragraphs set forth in part II B of its opinion: ‘‘In cont | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Steller v. Steller
green
2 sentences2020I disagree, rather, with the majority’s interpretation of the sentence, ‘‘[a]limony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year.’’ I would instruct the court on remand to determine whether the plaintiff proved that her income at the time of the filing of her motion to modify alimony was less than $100,000 per year and, if so, to proceed to the determination of alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82. 1 I specifically disagree with the majority’s assertions, analysis and conclusions in these two paragraphs set forth in part II B of its opinion: ‘‘In cont 2020I disagree, rather, with the majority’s interpretation of the sentence, ‘‘[a]limony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year.’’ I would instruct the court on remand to determine whether the plaintiff proved that her income at the time of the filing of her motion to modify alimony was less than $100,000 per year and, if so, to proceed to the determination of alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82. 1 I specifically disagree with the majority’s assertions, analysis and conclusions in these two paragraphs set forth in part II B of its opinion: ‘‘In cont | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ramin v. Ramin
green
2 sentences2016Because their conclusion in part II necessitates a finding that the equitable factors do not support an award of attorney’s fees, I would conclude that it is essential to provide a separate analysis of the equitable factors as they relate to the award of attorney’s fees. 4 But see Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 353 , 915 A.2d 790 (2007) (party’s litigation misconduct can form part of basis of such award of attorney’s fees). 5 The majority reasons as follows: ‘‘Furthermore, we see no reason why such calculations should be barred in the attorney’s fees context when both this court and the Appell 2016Because their conclusion in part II necessitates a finding that the equitable factors do not support an award of attorney’s fees, I would conclude that it is essential to provide a separate analysis of the equitable factors as they relate to the award of attorney’s fees. 4 But see Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 353 , 915 A.2d 790 (2007) (party’s litigation misconduct can form part of basis of such award of attorney’s fees). 5 The majority reasons as follows: ‘‘Furthermore, we see no reason why such calculations should be barred in the attorney’s fees context when both this court and the Appell | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Turgeon v. Turgeon
green
2 sentences2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 356 , 360 , 880 A.2d 872 (concluding that, "[u]nder the circumstances" presented, award providing "98.5 percent of the marital estate" to wife and "less than 2 percent" to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657 , 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly "considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets " [emphasis added] ); Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279 , 460 A.2d 1260 (h 2016See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco , supra, 275 Conn. at 356 , 360 , 880 A.2d 872 (concluding that, "[u]nder the circumstances" presented, award providing "98.5 percent of the marital estate" to wife and "less than 2 percent" to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet , 190 Conn. 657 , 664, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983) (upholding awards when trial court properly "considered all the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented almost 90 percent of all family assets " [emphasis added] ); Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 279 , 460 A.2d 1260 (h | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Borkowski v. Borkowski
green
2 sentences2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court's analysis. 17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski , supra, 228 Conn. at 743 -44 , 638 A.2d 1060 (courts may consider "any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute" when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Demartino v. Demartino , 79 Conn.App. 488 , 500, 830 A.2d 394 (2003) ("[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaus 2016In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court's analysis. 17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski , supra, 228 Conn. at 743 -44 , 638 A.2d 1060 (courts may consider "any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute" when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Demartino v. Demartino , 79 Conn.App. 488 , 500, 830 A.2d 394 (2003) ("[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaus | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re Shavoughn K.
green
1 sentence2015In O’Neill, this court stated that ‘‘the purpose of the rehabilitative alimony [award] was to allow the plaintiff to finish her nursing training or other training so that she may obtain permanent employment.’’ Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
O'Neill v. O'Neill
green
2 sentences2015The plaintiff asserts that although courts have broad discretion in determining whether to award alimony under § 46b-82, he merited spousal support pursuant to O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 313 , 536 A.2d 978 (‘‘[t]he unambiguous pur- pose of rehabilitative alimony is to allow the recipient spouse to attain self-sufficiency’’), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806 , 540 A.2d 374 (1988). 2015The plaintiff asserts that although courts have broad discretion in determining whether to award alimony under § 46b-82, he merited spousal support pursuant to O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 313 , 536 A.2d 978 (‘‘[t]he unambiguous pur- pose of rehabilitative alimony is to allow the recipient spouse to attain self-sufficiency’’), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806 , 540 A.2d 374 (1988). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| O'Neill v. O'Neill green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Williams v. Williams green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Trella v. Trella neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Trella v. Trella neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Duhl v. Duhl neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lupien v. Lupien green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Duhl v. Duhl green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Graham v. Graham green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Graham v. Graham green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Sunbury v. Sunbury green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Watson v. Watson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Passamano v. Passamano neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Passamano v. Passamano neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Dubicki v. Dubicki green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Burke v. Burke green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McPhee v. McPhee green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.